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Abstract
This doctoral thesis is structured in three essays. In the first essay (Chapter 2) I
explore the behavioural effects of anxiety on agents’ performance. I hypothesize
that a certain level of tension and pressure can induce agents to exert more effort,
according to theories of anxiety in psychology. The negative valence associated to
this emotion might propose an impairment in performance. On the contrary, the
laboratory economic experiment I have run shows that when an anxious mood is
induced individuals are more likely to exert more effort. Anxiety leads to performance
improvements.
In the second essay (Chapter 3) I raise a methodological issue on the use of effort
tasks in economic experiments. Effort tasks are usually assumed to lead to similar
results. However, the choice of the effort task can significantly drive experimental
results. I have conducted an economic experiment where I compare four different
effort tasks which give a measure of participants’ performance or investment when
they compete for a prize. Results show that there is no equivalence between the
types of task applied.
The last essay (Chapter 4) is a substantial part of a joint project with Professor
Daniel J. Zizzo. We ran an experiment where participants are asked to enter a
2-player prize competition. Each pair consists of a High Type participant, who
performs a previous real effort task better, and a Low Type participant, who performs
a previous real effort task worse. Participants receive feedback on their performance
rank and their opponents’ performance rank. They are also informed about the
allocation of an extra monetary reward. Participants are then asked to choose their
level of investment. They can also sabotage their opponent. Results show that
perceived unfairness of the reward allocation rule, expectations of investment and
sabotage, and competitive feelings affect participants’ behaviour in the contest.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis has two objectives: it explores how anxiety affects agents’ performance
and it discusses a methodological issue on the use of effort tasks in economic labora-
tory experiments.
It first tries to investigate whether emotions, fairness and expectations affect
agents’ performance. It examines the effects of anxiety on workers’ performance. It
also studies how affective states and expectations drive the level of investment, and
therefore performance, when workers compete in a contest. Moreover, it analyses how
perceived unfairness and hostile emotions induce workers to engage in destructive
effort that reduces opponents’ performance.
Differently from the current research in economics which considers emotions
in different contexts with respect to risk attitude and in relation to social norms
and preferences in interpersonal interactions (Hopfensitz and van Winden, 2008;
Bosman and van Winden, 2010; Reuben and van Winden, 2005; Ben-Shakhar et al.,
2007), this study sheds light on the effect of anxiety on workers’ performance at
an individual task under a piece rate incentive scheme and on the effects of hostile
emotions on workers’ performance in tournaments.
The validity of this research topic is supported by a large psychological literature
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on affective states which nowadays builds on established findings (Isen et al., 1978;
Nasby and Yando, 1982; Isen, 1987). Psychologists have shown that emotions have
strong and predictive power on decision-making processes and that they can affect
consistently individuals’ behaviour (Isen and Means, 1983; Isen et al., 1991; Murray
et al., 1990; Mackie and Worth, 1991; Schwarz et al., 1991; Ellis et al., 1984, 1985;
Parrott and Sabini, 1990). For example, Isen and Patrick (1983); Isen and Geva
(1987); Arkes et al. (1988) show that people in whom positive affect had been induced
were more risk averse than people in control conditions, when the risk situation was
a real one in which they could have a meaningful loss. Otherwise, they appeared
more risk-prone (Isen and Patrick, 1983).
Secondly, this thesis raises a methodological issue on the use of effort tasks in
economic experiments. Effort tasks are laboratory tools that allow experimentalists
to collect measurements on individuals’ level of investment or performance (Bull
et al., 1987; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2005; Vesterlund and Nierderle, 2007; Abeler
et al., 2011; Gill and Prowse, 2011). Effort tasks are implicitly assumed to lead
to similar results as far as they can minimize personal skills involved in the task.
Effort tasks can be categorized in two groups: 1) induced value effort tasks, where
individuals select a value that would represent their chosen performance, and 2) real
effort tasks, tasks that imply a physical or mental effort to be performed. Real and
induced value effort tasks have been implicitly assumed to be equivalent.
However, the choice of the effort task may considerably affect experimental data.
This is due to the substantial difference between effort tasks. This thesis provides
evidence of the non-equivalence of the effort tasks. It aims to point out that the
choice of an effort task may affect the laboratory results and that any interpretation
of them should acknowledge the nature of the task used.
The following chapters of this dissertation apply the experimental methodology.
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This methodology has been chosen because of the nature of the data I aim to analyse.
In fact, it seems difficult to gather data on emotions in the field. Even if some
field data are available, they suffer from noise, identification problems, and lack of
control. The laboratory allows the researcher the use of a controlled environment
in which variations in individual factors can be tested while keeping all others
constant. In laboratory experiments it is possible to create analogous environments
that mimic real-life scenarios. Although stylised, they have the important advantage
of providing a great deal of control over relevant margins.
Some experiments I carried out are enriched by the use of experimental psychol-
ogy techniques that facilitate the test of behavioural hypotheses. The combined use
of both economic experimental methodology and psychological techniques underlines
the interdisciplinary feature of my research.
This doctoral thesis is structured in three substantial chapters. In Chapter 2
I explore the behavioural effects of anxiety on workers’ performance. Specifically,
I investigate the motivational role of an anxious mood on individual performance.
According to a large psychological literature, anxiety consistently affects individuals’
performance and, therefore, it is considered a determinant drive. The negative
valence associated to this emotion might propose an impairment in performance. On
the contrary, I hypothesize that a certain level of tension and pressure can actually
induce workers to exert more effort.
I ran two economic experiments (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) where partic-
ipants were asked to carry out a real effort task, the slider task by Gill and Prowse
(2010). In this task participants were asked to position as many sliders as they
could in two minutes at a certain value indicated in the instructions. Participants
performance was given by the number of sliders correctly positioned in the time
limit. Before carrying out the real effort task participants’ mood was manipulated.
An established mood inducement technique called Personal Recollection, widely
used in experimental psychology, was applied: students were asked to recall two
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personal events in which they felt very anxious. The mood manipulation lasted for
20 minutes. Before and after the mood induction stage participants elicited their
mood with the use of a Likert Scale.
Results shows that an increase in anxiety leads to performance improvements
and induces subjects to exert more effort. Data support the Processing Efficiency
Theory by Eysenck and Calvo (1992). According to their formulation the individual’s
initial effect to worries is negative because worries interfere with attention to the
task-relevant information, thus reducing the resources potentially available for the
task. Consequently, performance is impaired. However, “[...] an increase in anxiety
can therefore improve performance if the worker is motivated to increase effort to
such an extent that it counterbalances and exceeds the initial negative impact of
worry (p. 415)”. Therefore, this essay shows that anxiety has a motivational function
that induces the subject to increase effort and therefore to boost performance.
This essay adds an additional contribution to the economic literature: the causal
link between personality and behaviour. I measured the proneness to anxiety either
in a separated experimental session (Experiment 1) or in the same experimental
session (Experiment 2) using the State Trait Anxiety Inventory by Spielberger
(1972). I found that personality counts: participants with proneness to anxiety
(High Trait-Anxiety individuals) are more affected by threatening stimuli and, there-
fore, they achieve high level of performance. These findings support the claim that
a sufficiently high level of anxiety may act as incentive and that anxiety arousal
and anxiety trait increase workers’ performance. Hence, they should be taken into
account for contract and job design.
Chapter 3 discusses the methodological issue on the use of effort tasks in eco-
nomic experiments. To show that the choice of the task substantially affects the
quality of the experimental results I ran an economic experiment which consisted of
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four treatments identical except for the effort task applied. Three real effort tasks,
the Slider Task, the Maths Task, the Grid Task, and an induced value effort task
were implemented in the lab.
The “Slider Task” by Gill and Prowse (2011) required participants to use their
computer mouse to position up to forty-eight sliders, having a range of integer
values from 0 to 100 and appearing at position zero, in the central position (value
50). Students had two minutes to correctly position as many sliders as they could.
Subjects’ performance was given by the number of sliders correctly positioned in two
minutes. For the “Maths Task” (Vesterlund and Nierderle, 2007) participants were
asked to sum a series of four 2-digit numbers that appeared on their screen. They
were provided of a list of operations and they were asked to solve as many as they
could in the time constraint (two minutes). The number of correct answers gives
the participant’s performance. Participants dealing with the “Grid Task” (Abeler
et al., 2011) saw a 5 by 5 grid on the screen and were asked to count the number of
ones randomly assigned in the cells. They had two minutes to solve as many grid as
they could. Performance was given by the number of grid correctly solved. Finally,
in the treatment in which the “Induced-Value Effort Task” was used participants
were endowed with ten experimental points and they had to decide how much to
invest and how much to keep for themselves. The part of endowment not invested
(if any) was converted in pounds and paid to subjects at the end of the experiment.
Participants with the highest investment won a prize.
The effort tasks, thus, provided a measure of participants’ level of performance
(or investment). Participants were asked to compete in a two-player all-pay auction
in order to win a prize. Those with the highest performance could get the prize. In
this competitive setting I expect that an anxious emotional state will have a positive
effect on subjects’ level of performance (or investment). I expect that the more
risk averse contestant will exert less effort, and that there will gender difference in
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performance. These effects should not depend on the effort task used.
Results show that there is no equivalence between the types of task applied.
There is evidence that participants’ performance is differently affected by the same
group of explanatory variables across treatments: the more the anxiety level the
worse the level of effort when participants deal with the mathematical task and
the grid task. On the contrary, the effects of anxiety on individuals’ performance
take completely different directions when either the slider task or the induced value
effort task are used. There is also evidence that a high degree of risk aversion
positively affects subjects’ performance when the grid task is applied but it does not
have any significant impact on performance when the other effort tasks are used.
This suggests that the nature of the real effort task strongly affects experimental
results. Hence, researchers using the economic experimental methodology should be
aware of the limitation of the effort tasks tool and should acknowledge it in their work.
Chapter 4 is a substantial part of a joint work with my supervisor Daniel J.
Zizzo. We aim to analyse the effects of three types of allocation rules of mone-
tary rewards on individuals’ decisions of investment and sabotage in tournaments.
We conducted an experiment where participants were initially asked to perform
a real effort task for five minutes, the counting task (Abeler et al., 2011). At
the end of the real effort task their performance was ranked. Two groups were
created: the High Type participants group, who performed better in the task, and
the Low Type participant group, who performed worse in the task. Participants
received information on their own type, their opponent’s type, and the possibility
to be given a bonus of an extra £5. Moreover, they were informed about the
bonus allocation rule to be applied: randomly between contestants, according to a
meritocracy rule (High Type participants received the bonus), or according to an
anti-meritocracy rule (Low Type participants received the bonus). The allocation
rule differed across treatments: in one treatment High Type participants were
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rewarded (meritocracy rule), in a second treatment the Low Type subjects received
the reward (anti-meritocracy rule), and finally in a control treatment, the bonus was
randomly assigned to either a High Type or a Low Type subject (random allocation).
Successively, participants were asked to enter a 2-player prize competition. Each
pair consisted of a High Type participant and a Low Type participant. They were
asked to choose their level of investment. They could also sabotage their opponents’
level of investment and, therefore, reduce their opponents’ performance and proba-
bility to win the prize.
Results show that Low Type participants were more willing to invest when they
were not rewarded and to sabotage their opponents’ investment when they were
rewarded for their comparatively poor performance in a previous task. Their decision
of investment and sabotage depended on their expectations of their opponents’ level
of investment and sabotage. Low Type participants provided explanations about
their behaviour in the contest. They had a clear understanding of the fairness of the
allocation procedures and specifically, when unfairly rewarded, they felt competitive
feelings that affected their behaviour in the tournament. These results suggest
that the allocation procedures for monetary rewards prior the competition affect
contestants’ behaviour and therefore they should be taken into account in contest
design with respect to the contest’s objectives.
Overall, this thesis shows how some emotions affect agents’ performance. More-
over, it considers the role of perceived unfairness and expectations on agents’ decisions
of investment and sabotage in contests. Emotions, fairness and expectations have
a substantial impact on workers’ behaviour to be acknowledged in the discussion
of contract design and contests design. Finally, this thesis provides an important
insight on the limitation of the effort tasks tool and open a debate on the appropriate
use of them in the experimental methodology.
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Chapter 2
Motivation and Emotions: Effects
of Anxiety on Workers’
Performance
2.1 Introduction
Incentives are the essence of economics. The most basic concept of demand considers
how to induce a consumer to purchase. Similarly, supply relationships are descrip-
tions of how agents respond with more output or labour for additional compensation.
Incentive problems arise when a principal wants to delegate a task to an agent1.
The principal wants to induce the agent to behave in a way that is beneficial to
him but does not have perfect knowledge of the agent’s actions. The agent dislikes
labour and her/his interests may not be aligned with the principal’s interests. A
large literature has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used
1Delegation can be motivated either by the possibility of benefiting from some increasing returns
associated with the division of tasks or by the principal’s lack of time or lack of any ability to
perform the task himself or by any other form of the principal’s bounded rationality to face complex
problems. However, by the mere fact of this delegation the agent may get access to information
that is not available to the principal (Laffont and Martimort, 2002).
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to induce agents to act in the interest of their principals2.
However, emotions have not been considered in standard agency theory as
incentives (Baker et al., 1987) and very few attempts have been made in order
to implement emotional factors in contract design and in personnel management
(Lazear and Oyer, 2000; Lazear, 1989).
This essay looks at the motivational role of one particular emotion, anxiety,
and specifically investigates the effects of anxiety on individuals’ performance.
According to a large psychological literature anxiety consistently affects individuals’
performance and therefore it is considered a determinant driver. The negative valence
associated with this emotion might cause impairment in performance. However, in
this work I hypothesize that a certain level of tension and pressure can actually
induce agents to exert more effort. I conducted two economic laboratory experiments
where I asked subjects to carry out a real effort task after having manipulated their
current mood by using an established mood inducement technique. I measured their
level of anxiety arousal and their propensity to anxiety, controlling for any confound
effects due to these measurements. Results show that an increase in anxiety leads
to performance improvements and subjects with a high propensity to anxiety (High
Trait Anxiety) exert more effort as soon as their emotional arousal increases.
2.2 Related Literature
The received view in the standard incentive theory is that workers respond to
incentives. Specifically, an increase in financial incentives provided for an activity is
expected to induce workers to supply more output, or similarly, to increase their
performance (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Prendergast, 1999). The theory of
2For example options, discretionary bonuses, promotions, profit sharing, efficiency wages,
deferred compensation, and so on (Lazear, 1986; Fama, 1991; Baker, 1992; Lazear and Rosen, 1981;
Prendergast, 1999; Baker et al., 1987).
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compensation represents the core of personnel economics: performance is positively
related to effort, workers dislike labour, money is the main incentive and the re-
lationship between monetary compensation for an activity and the level of effort
exerted to carry out that activity is monotonic (Lazear, 2000a; Lazear and Oyer,
2007; Lazear, 2000b, 1999; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999; Paul R. and Roberts, 1992).
Many economic models have been offered to explain this relationship, for example,
in the specific form of piece rate (which is defined to be payment on the basis of
output)3 or, in general, in the form of different compensation schemes (Seiler, 1984;
Brown, 1992; Brown and Philips, 1986; Goldin, 1986; Drago and Hyewood, 1995)4.
The economic literature on the provision of incentives in firms5 has so far ne-
glected important factors like emotional status and traits in the design of contracts
and personnel managerial practices. Few attempts have been made in this direction
in economics: Lazear (1989) discusses the conditions under which personality-
contingent wages are not equivalent to segregation practices and addresses the
problems connected to the observability of personalities and the pay inequality.
Generally, psychological factor concerns arise in the “mix and matching” processes
where “matching the right workers to the right firms as well as matching workers to
the most appropriate jobs within the firms creates economic value of a magnitude
that few other economic processes can” (Lazear and Oyer, 2000). To my knowledge,
3Lazear (1986) provides a detailed discussion of when to pay a piece rate. Fama (1991) discusses
other reasons for paying on the basis of some measured time interval. Baker (1992) points out the
difficulty created by pay-for-performance payment scheme when performance measurement is a
problem.
4A recent approach assumes that employees’ get intrinsic motivation from the creation of their
own output (Deci, 1972; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Hackman and Lawler, 1971; Hackman,
1980; Murdock, 2002) and hence, takes into account extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in the
formulation of organizational and personnel policies. A review of the literature of intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation is out of the purpose of this work because I will specifically focus on anxiety
as an emotion that can act as incentives distinguishing its effects from the effects of any intrinsic
motivation.
5See Prendergast (1999) for a survey.
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no work in economics specifically considers emotions for their potential role as
incentives. Can good mood, happiness, envy, frustration or disappointment, for
example, affect individuals’ performance and therefore boost individuals’ effort? In
which direction?
This essay aims to explore how emotions relate to agents’ performance and,
specifically, to address the motivational force of one emotion in particular: anxiety.
My findings will be a contribution to contract and job design, and worker interaction
policies in firms as well. The choice of anxiety (and anxiety trait) is guided by the
knowledge that it is a strong and consistent determinant of individuals’ performance
and hence it has a predictive power on agents’ behaviour. Indeed, the behavioural
effects on task performance and individual differences in trait anxiety have been the
core of quite substantial literature in psychology (Montague, 1953; Spence et al.,
1956, 1957; Spence and Spence, 1966).
I will explain here briefly the concept of anxiety and the main theories in psychol-
ogy on the relationship between anxiety and performance before addressing some
related findings in the economic literature.
Anxiety: Definition and Theories in Psychology
According to the glossary of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorder (First et al., 1987) the term anxiety denotes “apprehension, tension, or
uneasiness that stems from the anticipation of danger” (page 392). It is agreed, in
fact, that there are two common principles of anxiety theory: the anticipatory and
aversive feature of this emotion6. Some theorists see anxiety as a “basic emotion”
that coordinates a quasi-autonomous process in the nervous system by communicat-
ing that a self-preservation goal is violated (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987; Gray,
6See Lazarus (1966) for a survey on the experimental evidence of the anticipatory effects of
anxiety.
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1985b; Corr, 2008). In his work with humans and rats, LeDoux (1996) established
the role of the amygdala7 in the preconscious evaluation of a stimulus as representing
a potential threat. In this sense, the aversive nature of anxiety is connected to the
appropriate “flight” or escape response8. Anxiety can be also evaluated as a com-
bination of different emotional states: for example, fear and expectancy (Plutchik,
1980) or fear and apprehension (Izard, 1977).
In this context, I will consider anxiety as a multidimensional construct (or
structure where the structure of an emotion is a vector of component values; this
vector is called profile) consisting of the following dimensions: negative valence, high
unexpectedness, low control, high relation with social context, and high relation with
self-esteem (Frijda, 1986). However, I shall also evaluate anxiety as “(1) an emotional
state, evoked in a particular context and having a limited duration, and (2) as person-
ality traits, characterizing individuals across time and situations” (Spielberger, 1972).
Anxiety and Performance in Psychology
Considerable research interest has focused on the relationship between anxiety
and performance in psychology. It is apparent from these studies that the relation-
ship is not a unique one, especially because anxiety interacts with other variables
in the response-acquisition situation. A very important variable is, for example,
task difficulty. Montague (1953) found that high-anxious subjects performed better
than low-anxious subjects in the serial learning of a relatively easy list of nonsense
syllables, but performed more poorly than low-anxious subjects on lists of increasing
difficulty. Spence et al. (1956, 1957) have reported a series of experiments in which
7The amygdala is located within the medial temporal lobes of the brain and it has a primary
role in the processing of memory and emotional reactions.
8Anxiety is an ambiguous construct usually identified with fear. However, fear is said to differ
from anxiety primarily in having an identifiable eliciting stimulus. In this sense anxiety is often
“prestimulus” that is anticipatory to more or less real threatening stimuli. In anxiety the nature
and the location of the threat might remain unknown and thus difficult to cope whereas in fear
the threat is clearly located in space and time.
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the relative superiority of high-anxious or low-anxious people in paired-associate
learning9 was shown to be related to the task difficulty. Thus, the evidence in the
lab seemed to Spence and colleagues to point out to some sort of non-monotonic
relation between anxiety and performance10, especially for subjects in the middle
range of anxiety11: subjects in the middle range were found to be superior to those
in the extremes in carrying out the task.
The relationship between emotional intensity and performance has been formal-
ized in the so-called Yerkes-Dodson Law. According to this law the relation between
emotional intensity and performance can be represented by an inverted U-curve. An
increase in emotional intensity from some zero point upwards is supposed to increase
the quality of performance, up to an optimal point. Further increases in intensity
then lead to performance deterioration (Hebb, 1970). The optimal point is reached
sooner (at lower intensity) the less well learned or more complex is the performance.
An increase in emotional intensity affects finer skills, complex reasoning task, and
recently acquired skills more readily than routine activity. However, the predictions
of the Yerkes-Dodson Law do not always find support in the laboratory evidence:
Spence and Spence (1966) found that the experimental manipulations of anxiety do
not always induce poorer performance; highly anxious subjects indeed sometimes
perform better than do less anxious ones.
Overall, it is assumed that anxiety refers to higher vigilance and motivates
careful preparation, for example for examination and social interactions. Attention
and motivation are anxiety components fully addressed in the Processing Efficiency
Theory by Eysenck and Calvo (1992). According to their formulation the initial
9In the paired associates task subjects must learn a list consisting of words, like high-low and
light-dark; then subjects are given the first word and they must respond with the second.
10This sort of relation has also been found by Montague (1953).
11Here anxiety is given by the measurement of trait (Manifest) using the Taylor Scale of Manifest
Anxiety (Taylor, 1953).
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effect of worries is negative because worries interfere with attention to the task-
relevant information, thus reducing the resources potentially available for the task.
Consequently, performance is impaired. However, anxiety has a motivational function
that induces the subject to increase effort and therefore to boost performance:
Worry about task performance has a second effect [...]. It serves a mo-
tivational function...In order to escape from the state of apprehension
associated with worrisome thoughts and to avoid the likely aversive con-
sequences of poor performance, anxious subjects try to cope with threat
and worry allocating additional resources (i.e. effort) and/or initiating
processing activities (i.e. strategies) (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992, p. 415).
An increase in anxiety can therefore improve performance if the agent is motivated
to increase effort to such an extent that it counterbalances and exceeds the initial
negative impact of anxiety12.
The understanding of the effects of anxiety on individuals’ behaviour and perfor-
mance cannot disregard the study of anxiety trait. Research on anxiety has seen
the development of theories of emotions that classified anxiety either as a primary
(Gray, 1985a; Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987; Corr et al., 1997) or secondary
emotion (Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1977; Ekman, 1992; Ortony and Turner, 1990) and
theories of personality that included anxiety trait (or neuroticism) as one of the
major dimensions of personality (See Digman, 1990, for a review). An attempt of
unifying the research areas of anxiety within a common theoretical framework was
made by Eysenck (1997) with his Unified Theory of Anxiety13. Eysenck pointed
12Worry or self-preoccupation is characterized by concerns over evaluation and failure, and
expectations of aversive consequences. It is activated in stressful situations and is more likely to
occur in individuals with high proneness to anxiety. Since in the Processing Efficiency Theory
worry is the component of state anxiety precisely responsible for effects of anxiety on performance
effectiveness and efficiency I will consider it in this work as an equivalent word to anxiety.
13Specifically, three research areas were unified in his theory: emotion, personality, and clinical
or abnormal psychology.
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out that there are fairly consistent individual differences in the cognitive biases
operating within the emotional system.
However, in 1966 Spielberger had already proposed a conceptual framework for
considering trait and state anxiety. In that framework, he argued that external
stimuli are initially subject to a process of cognitive appraisal, which determines
whether or not any particular stimulus is regarded as threatening. Only those stimuli
that are appraised as threatening increase the level of state anxiety. Trait anxiety
affects the process of cognitive appraisal.
[A]nxiety as a personality trait would seem to imply a behavioural disposi-
tion that predisposes an individual to perceive a wide range of objectively
non-dangerous circumstances as threatening (Spielberger, 1966, p. 17).
Since the mid-sixties, the trait-state distinction has received wide recognition in
the psychological literature in explaining the tendency for individuals high in trait
anxiety to experience more state anxiety than those low in trait anxiety (Spielberger
et al., 1980; Dreger, 1985; Spielberger, 1985; Endler, 1997).
The measurement of anxiety trait is nowadays a well-established research proce-
dure in psychological studies that aim to explore the connection between anxiety
and behaviour. Results show that individuals’ arousal, behaviour, and performance
strictly depend on individual differences in anxiety trait (Eysenck, 1985; Sarason
and Palola, 1960; Cassady and Johnson, 2002; Sarason et al., 1990; Hembree, 1990;
Sarason, 1984, 1973).
The Neuropsychology of Anxiety
The relationship between emotions and performance has attracted growing at-
tention among researchers due to the recent findings in neuroscience on the deviant
behaviour of neurological patients with specific brain lesions, such as the frontal
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lobe (ventromedial prefontal lobe) damage (Damasio, 2008; Camille et al., 2004)14.
With respect to the specific psychological state of anxiety, researchers have found
that two particular brain structures are involved: the hippocampus and the amyg-
dala (Gray, 1982; Gray and McNaughton, 2000). Felix-Ortiz et al. (2013) show
that the basolateral amygdala (BLA) and the ventral hippocampus (vHPC) have
both been implicated in mediating anxiety-related behaviour. In particular, their
findings demonstrate that activation of BLA-vHPC synapses acutely and robustly
increases anxiety-related behaviour while inhibition of BLA-vHPC synapses de-
creases anxiety-related behaviour. Tye et al. (2011) confirm that specific parts of
the basolateral amygdala (BLA) are critical circuit elements for acute anxiety control.
However, Bannerman et al. (2004) suggest that the hippocampus plays a key
role for the emotion of anxiety. In particular, the ventral hippocampus makes
its own distinctive contribution to the control of behaviour in certain situations
where anxiety occurs as distinct from fear, which more plausibly depends on the
amygdalar functions15. The hippocampus and the amygdala are of course likely to
be highly interactive. The idea of anxiety and fear as different emotional entities
with separate underlying neural substrates is at the core of Gray’s behavioural
inhibition theory (Gray, 1982; Gray and McNaughton, 2000). This theory is based
on extensive similarities between the behavioural effects of anxiolytic drugs and
hippocampal lesions. According to the behavioural inhibition theory there is a sharp
(functional, behavioural and pharmacological) distinction between fear and anxiety.
Fear has the function of moving the subject away from danger and it is insensitive to
anxiolytic drugs. Anxiety has the function of moving the subject toward danger. It
involves inhibition of aggressive behaviour, increased risk assessment and defensive
quiescence. All this manifestations of anxiety are sensitive to anxiolytic drugs.
14Damasio (2008) finds that patients who have damages in their frontal lobes become emotionally
flat and lose their ability to make decisions, while retaining their cognitive power.
15Both hippocampus and amygdala are involved in anxiety-related processes and behaviour, as
Felix-Ortiz et al. (2013) show.
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The functions of the hippocampal system are distributed across the nominal
psychological functions of anxiety and memory. It rests on the evidence that anx-
iolytic drugs affect “hippocampal” tests of memory (Paré, 2003; Huff and Rudy,
2004). The hippocampal memory system may provide the means for encoding both
the spatial and the temporal contexts (the “where” and the “when”) associated
with a particular event (Eichenbaum and Fortin, 2003; Morris et al., 2003). There
are several recent demonstrations of hippocampal involvement in the temporal
sequencing of events (Agster et al., 2002; Fortin et al., 2002; Kesner et al., 2002).
The challenge is to identify a common psychological operation that might underlie
both the episodic-like memory function and a role in anxiety. Gray and McNaughton
(2000) suggest that the operation performed by the hippocampus is to compare
different potential response alternatives and then to select the optimal response. In
the case of episodic-like memory tasks, this process will involve using conditional
information provided by either spatial or temporal cues, or both, to select the
appropriate learned response. In the case of tests of anxiety, the process may involve
selecting between conflicting approaches and avoid responses.
Roozendaal et al.’s (2009) review shows that intensely emotional events or chronic
exposure to stressful experience can create traumatic memories and even result in
the development of mood and anxiety disorders. Acute and chronic stress induces
long-term functional and morphological alterations in the amygdala, together with
associated changes in the hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex, which might
underlie the cognitive changes, increases in anxiety-like behaviour and mood al-
terations. These changes and alterations could have long-term consequences for
cognitive performance and working memory.
Neurobehavioural and psychological evidence of the effects of emotions on
decision-making processes has recently attracted the interest of economists (Zizzo,
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2008, 2004b; Camerer et al., 2005). Ambler and Burne (1999) have studied the
impact of affect on memory of TV advertising, using behavioural measures to assess
performance in tasks of image recognition and recall. The results obtained suggest
that under normal conditions, recognition and recall of affective TV material (using
e.g. suspense, drama, humour) is superior to cognitive material (based on plain
facts). Administration of propanolol (a blocker drug used to treat anxiety) reduces
slightly recognition and recall of affective material, but increases substantially the
recall of cognitive material.
Anxiety in Economics
Anxiety research in economics was pioneered by Loewenstein (1987) and Caplin
and Leahy (2001). Loewenstein investigated some implications of anticipatory emo-
tions for consumption decisions and in particular looked at anxiety effects on saving
behaviour: anxiety (for the future) occurs when retirement is close or because of a
possible loss of wage income; “this anxiety raises the returns, in terms of anxiety
reduction, of saving, and counteracts the saving-discouraging effect of the loss of
income upon retirement” (Loewenstein, 1987, p. 677). The emotional effect on
behaviour can explain some anomalous saving phenomena like saving for short-term
concrete goals instead of for a future retirement. Caplin and Leahy (2001) consider
a general two-period decision problem under uncertainty. The novel element in their
Psychological Expected Utility Theory is an exogenous map which assigns a psycho-
logical state due to anticipatory emotions like hopefulness, anxiety, and suspense, to
the first period outcome and a lottery over the second period outcome. The agent’s
overall utility function is therefore given by the sum of the utility of the first period
defined over psychological states and the utility of the second period which depends
on the expectation with respect to the lottery. Although Caplin and Leahy present
a powerful framework for modeling situations and emotions involving uncertainty,
anxiety effects remain not very well addressed in their model. Rauh and Seccia (2006)
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reconsider the psychological expected utility theory and develop a formalization of
anxiety consistent with expected utility maximization. In their two-period model
anxiety is defined as the difference between expected utility with zero uncertainty
and expected utility evaluated at optimal effort16. In this model anxiety is reduced
when the information increases, and it is a function of an agent’s effort, her/his skill
and her/his emotional arousal. In particular, they show that anxiety can induce
greater effort and expected performance as the Processing Efficiency Theory claims.
A different interpretation and formalization of anxiety is given by Wu (1999) who
refers to anxiety as the psychological utility induced by an unresolved gamble. He
includes anxiety in his model of decision making with delayed resolution of uncer-
tainty. Anxiety is thus defined as unproductive worrying, a source of psychological
dissatisfaction. Instead of considering what alternatives can be undertaken to avoid
an uncertain future, anxiety affects the evaluation of specific outcomes of gambles
with delayed resolution (it measures how large the discount is for delayed resolution).
In the experimental literature few researchers investigate the choice problem
under uncertainty in the presence of an anxious mood and provide explanations
that take into account the anticipatory effects of anxiety. Bosman and van Winden
(2010) conducted an experiment on a choice problem between a safe option and a
risky option when there is a global risk, that is, when there is a probability of a
certain risk that is not possible to avoid. Their results show that anxiety influenced
decisions and created a tendency to take less risk. Hopfensitz and van Winden
(2008) and van Winden et al. (2010) considered a setting of dynamic choice and
the impact of the timing of the resolution of risk on people’s willingness to take
risks. They focused on anticipated and experienced emotions and found that anxiety
definitely reduced risk taking.
16In fact the agent is uncertain about her/his skill in doing the activity or task at the first
period, but she/he can make inference about it observing her/his own first period performance.
Consequently, the first period effort not only increases expected first period performance but also
the amount of information at the beginning of the second period about the skill.
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In all this research anxiety has been studied in relation to risk attitude. As far
as I know, there is only one study in the economic literature that explores anxiety
in relation to task performance: Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010). The au-
thors collected their evidence from a randomized natural experiment, that is, a real
life situation in which treatments and control groups are determined via explicit
randomization, on professional performance in a soccer competition. Using data
from penalty kicks, they claim that teams that take the first kick in the sequence
win the penalty shoot-out 60% of the time. Therefore, given the characteristics
of the setting they attribute this difference in performance to psychological effects
(pressure, anxiety) resulting from the consequences of the kicking order17.
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta’s setting involves the interaction between players
and therefore it examines the behavioural anxiety effects when agents play against
each other. In my context I aim to define the behavioural effect of anxiety on
individual task performance. This eventually will allow me to consistently draw
inferences in other strategic situations.
Literature Overview
In this chapter I am going to explore the relationship between anxiety and
individual’s performance. I will refer to the Processing Efficiency Theory by Eysenck
and Calvo (1992), assuming therefore that anxiety has a motivational function that
induces the subject to increase effort to such an extent that it counterbalances and
exceeds the initial negative impact of anxiety on performance. From a psychological
perspective, I will consider anxiety as a multidimensional construct consisting of
various dimensions: negative valence, high unexpectedness, low control, high relation
with social context, and high relation with self-esteem (Frijda, 1986).
17See the survey by Woodman and Hardy (2001) and Zaichkowsky and Baltzell (2001) for similar
findings in the sports psychology literature.
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I will also take “Trait Anxiety” and the trait-state distinction into consideration,
building my behavioural hypotheses on the assumption that individuals high in trait
anxiety show the tendency to experience more state anxiety than those low in trait
anxiety (Spielberger et al., 1980).
Therefore, I am going to evaluate anxiety as “(1) an emotional state, evoked in
a particular context and having a limited duration, and (2) as personality traits,
characterizing individuals across time and situations” (Spielberger, 1972).
In order to study the causal relationship between anxiety and performance I will
induce an anxious state into participants of two laboratory experiments by using
a mood inducement technique. This technique consists of personal recollection of
past events in which subjects were exposed to stressful experience. According to
the neuropsychological literature (Roozendaal et al., 2009) this exposure can create
traumatic memories through morphological alterations in the amygdala and can
result in the development of an anxious mood.
From an economic perspective, I will not consider anxiety in relation to risk
attitude as most economists have done so far. I will rather try to explore the effects
of anxiety in relation to task performance. Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010)
studied the competitive setting of football players and examined the behavioural
anxiety effects when agents play against each other. In my study, I will instead
focus on the behavioural effect of anxiety on individual task performance.
2.3 The Experiments: Behavioural Hypotheses,
Design and Procedure
To find the relation and causal effect of anxiety on individual task performance I




I expect that an anxious state can improve the performance of anxious agents by
acting as incentives as predicted by the Processing Efficiency Theory (Eysenck and
Calvo, 1992). The linear principal-agent model in economic theory predicts that a
higher level of effort allows participants to achieve a higher levels of performance18.
My first hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1. Anxiety positively affects performance.
In order to study the effects of anxiety on performance I will induce an anxious
state by using a mood inducement technique19. I expect that participants more
prone to become anxious are more likely to become anxious if threatened by a
negative stimulus. I will refer to these group of participants as the High Trait
anxious subjects20. High Trait anxious individuals will experience a higher level of
anxiety and will perform better. Hence, my second behavioural hypothesis follows:
HYPOTHESIS 2. High Trait anxious subjects perform better when their
anxiety arousal increases.
The Experiments
18Agents’ performance or output is given by q = µ +  where µ is the level of investment, a
measure of skill or average output, chosen by the agent prior to a realization of the random or luck
component  (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
19Mood inducement techniques are widely used techniques in psychological laboratory experi-
ments that aim to manipulate subjects’ mood (Martin, 1990).
20“The stronger the anxiety trait, the more probable that the individual will experience more
intense elevations in State Anxiety in a threatening situation.” (Spielberger et al., 1970, p. 1).
State Anxiety indicates the individual’s current level of anxiety.
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The experiments, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, were conducted in February
and March 2011 at the University of East Anglia. Instructions, control questionnaire
and experimental tasks were computerized21. The experiments were programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 151 subjects (74 men
and 77 women) aged between 18 and 41 took part in the 26 sessions. All of them
were university students, enrolled in different schools (only 10% were Economics
students); 45% were British while the rest were represented by a wide variety of
international students. Participants received a show-up fee of £3 and a payment
based on their performance22. Subjects were randomly assigned to the seats in the
lab where partitions between them assured the anonymity and the avoidance of any
communication. Instructions were read aloud and the experimenter checked the
participants’ answers to the control questionnaire individually.
Procedure
At the beginning of each session subjects were asked to fill in the State Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI) questionnaire by C. Spielberger (1976). This questionnaire
aims to assess the current anxious state (State Anxiety) and the proneness to anxiety
(Trait Anxiety) of subjects. It consists of 20 questions on State Anxiety and 20
questions on Trait Anxiety and it is framed in order to avoid any kind of demand
effect. The instructions have a neutral frame as well. Participants used a four-point
Likert scale for their answers. The STAI questionnaire, hence, assigns two scores,
one for State Anxiety and another for Trait Anxiety; for each subject there are
therefore two measurements from 0 to 8023.
21Participants received paper instructions as well.
22The average payment per subject was 12 pounds.
23To the four-point Likert scale answers scheme another possible answer was added: “I did
not understand the question”. Subjects that were not sure about the meaning of the question
could select it. This type of answer was considered as not answering the question in the score
counting. Scores were adjusted according to the number of not answered questions. If there were 3
or more questions not answered for each set of questions (Trait or State) the score for that set was
considered missing (Spielberger, 1972). There were only 3 participants whose score, either State or
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After completing the STAI questionnaire, participants received instructions for
the second part of the experiment, which consisted of two sections. In the first section
a mood manipulation technique was applied and in second section participants were
asked to perform a real effort task. Instructions for the mood manipulation task were
very general and framed neutrally: participants were asked to recall two personal
situations over the last year in which they felt very anxious. Then they were given
the possibility to write about them briefly. Finally, they were induced to think about
some adjectives that could better describe their feelings in those situations. Overall,
the task lasted for eighteen minutes24. This mood inducement technique is called
Personal Recollection and its validity and effectiveness in inducing an anxious mood
is established and proved by several psychological experiments (Martin, 1990)25.
In the last section of the experiment participants carried out a real effort task26,
the slider task by Gill and Prowse (2009)27. Forty-eight sliders, with a range of
integer values from 0 to 100, appeared on the screen and subjects were asked to
drag each slider up to the value of 50 with the help of their mouse28. They had two
minutes to correctly position as many sliders as they could. For each value correctly
positioned they gained one point. Subjects repeated the task for ten rounds; the
Trait, was considered missing. The STAI questionnaire is in Appendix A.1.
24Experimental instructions are in Appendix A.2.
25In addition to the personal recollection technique other mood types of mood manipulation
and procedures were examined in pilot experiments like music, cognitive tasks and real effort tasks
(Martin, 1990).
26Real effort tasks are widely used in many economic laboratory experiments. They are practical
tools that give a measure of the level of effort exerted by participants. Quite a few tasks have been
used in economic experiments. For example, mathematical questions (Vesterlund and Nierderle,
2007; Eriksson et al., 2008; Dohmen and Falk, 2011), folding letters (Konow, 2000; Falk and Ichino,
2006; Konow et al., 2009), counting numbers in a series of grids (Pokorny, 2008; Abeler et al., 2011;
Falk et al., 2006), solving some anagrams and various segretarial tasks (Gneezy, 2002; Gneezy
et al., 2003). A more extensive literature review on the literature of real effort tasks is presented
in Chapter 3 - “Does it matter which effort task you use?”.
27Guidance and practical advice of the use of this task have been followed.
28See Figure A.1 in Appendix A.3 for a screen shot of the task.
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score was reset at the end of each round29. At the end of the experiment one round
was randomly selected for the payment30.
Experimental Treatments
I ran two experiments, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. They were identical in
the tasks and material used but slightly different in their procedures: Experiment 1
consisted of two sessions separated over time while Experiment 2 consisted of only
one session. Participants in Experiment 1 were invited twice by email; the second
session took place one week later31. Running two separate sessions in Experiment 1
allow me to have an additional control on any experimenter demand effect (Zizzo,
2010) or confound effect due to the implementation of the STAI questionnaire32.
Each experiment consisted of two treatments: in the main treatments a mood
manipulation technique for anxiety was applied while in the control treatments a
non-anxious mood was induced33. Table 2.1 contains details of the treatments and
the number of subjects in each experiment.
Emotion Elicitation
Before and after completing the real effort task, participants rated the extent
29In this work I chose to use the slider task because it allows to minimize the physical skills
required to carry out the task and to get an unambiguous measure of the subjects’ effort exerted in
the time constraint. This task provides in fact only the measure of the number of sliders correctly
positioned in the time constraint. I do not have any measure of how long subjects take (or how
hard was) to position each slider. Participants were incentivised to try to correctly position as
quickly as possible each slider.
30Each point was paid £0.30.
31The first session of Experiment 1 lasted around 15 minutes and the second session of Experiment
2 lasted around one hour. Sessions of Experiment 2 lasted around one hour and 15 minutes.
32In the first session of Experiment 1 subjects filled in the STAI questionnaire.
33In the control treatments I used the same mood inducement technique, personal recollection, as
in the main treatments. However, in these sessions participants were asked to remember pleasant
events.
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Table 2.1: Experimental Treatments and Number of Subjects
Number of Sessions Treatment Subject Mood
Experiment 1 2 sessions A 40 Anxious
2 sessions B 37 Non-Anxious
Experiment 2 1 session C 37 Anxious
1 session D 37 Non-Anxious
Total 151
to which they felt each of the eight emotions presented to them between 0 (not at
all) and 4 (very much) on a Likert scale . The type of emotions were drawn from
Slyker and McNally (1991) and were anxiety, tiredness, despondency, frustration,
apprehensiveness, tiredness, happiness, and anger34.
In my analysis I will consider the Trait Anxiety score and the arousal anxiety
values before the real effort task as my main variables of anxiety while the State
Anxiety score and the arousal anxiety values after the real effort task will be used
as control for subjects’ current emotional state.
2.4 Results
Performance and Anxiety
Figure 2.1 shows that performance increases over the ten periods indicating
learning effects35.
On average performance is greater in the main treatments of Experiment 1 and
34Slyker and McNally (1991) tested the relative effectiveness of some mood inducement procedures
for anxious and depressed moods.
35I reproduced the performance trend of the real effort task by Gill and Prowse (2011).
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Figure 2.1: Performance Trend
Experiment 2 where an anxious mood is induced (Treatment A and C) compared
to the control treatments where a non-anxious mood is induced (Treatment B and
D). The difference in treatments is confirmed by the t-test (p-value ≤ 0.001) and
the non-parametric test Wilcoxon rank-sum (p-value = 0.005)36 performance is
significantly higher when participants’ mood is negatively manipulated (Figure
2.2)37.
While there is no significant difference in the level of performance between
treatment A (Experiment 1) and treatment C (Experiment 2) when an anxious
mood is induced, performance is significantly higher in treatment D compared to
treatment B, treatments in which a non-anxious mood is induced (t-test, p-value
= 0.020, Wilcoxon rank sum test, p-value = 0.025). The procedure of the two
separated sessions over time seems to not affect the level of exerted effort when
participants have an anxious mood. However, filling in the STAI questionnaire just
before the real effort task seems to induce subjects to work harder when their mood
36The t-tests and non-parametric tests used now and onwards are two-sided unless specified
otherwise.
37For the t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test I merged treatment A with C and treatment B
with D. This is because I aim to compare performance by mood.
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Figure 2.2: Performance by Mood
is positively manipulated.
Looking at Table 2.2, anxiety is higher in the main treatments (treatments A
and C): average elicited anxiety is statistically significant (t-test, p-value = 0.006,
Wilcoxon rank sum test, p-value = 0.005) compared to the average elicited anxiety
in the treatments (Treatment B and D) where subjects were asked to recall pleasant
events (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.033). In particular, in Treatment C
anxiety has the highest mean with the lowest standard deviation (Table 2.2).
Negative emotions like despondency, sadness, apprehension, tiredness, and frus-
tration are on average higher in Treatment C compared to the other treatments
(Table 2.2) while, at the aggregate level, tiredness, sadness, apprehension, anger and
frustration are on average higher in treatments where an anxious mood is induced
and despondency and happiness are on average higher in the treatments in which
subjects are meant to be relaxed. Tiredness differs significantly between the main
treatments and control treatments at a 10% level (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value
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Table 2.2: Average values of Performance and Emotions
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
A B C D
Performance 19.04 (4.24) 17.80 (5.18) 19.46 (4.56) 18.75 (5.95)
Anxiety 1.67 (1.45) 1.05 (1.31) 1.78 (1.25) 1.21 (1.25)
Happiness 2.02 (1.36) 2.46 (1.46) 2.13 (1.15) 2.62 (1.06)
Tiredness 1.75 (1.59) 1.35 (1.60) 2.48 (1.32) 2.01 (1.41)
Despondency 0.47 (0.78) 0.84 (1.21) 1.05 (0.84) 0.86 (0.97)
Sadness 0.40 (0.84) 0.62 (1.20) 0.83 (0.98) 0.27 (0.50)
Apprehension 1.05 (1.33) 1.22 (1.52) 1.73 (1.19) 1.13 (1.10)
Anger 0.45 (1.10) 1.62 (0.44) 0.35 (0.67) 0.32 (0.70)
Frustration 0.65 (1.09) 0.63 (1.09) 1.05 (1.15) 0.59 (0.89)
Note: Standard Deviation in parentheses
= 0.081) while happiness happens to be significantly higher in the control treatments
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.027) (Table 2.3).
The results above support the effectiveness of the mood inducement technique
used both for the main treatments and for the control ones: subjects are on average
more anxious when an anxious mood is induced and happier when a non-anxious
mood is induced. Moreover, it has been shown that performance is higher in the
main treatments where an anxious mood is induced (Treatment A and C) compared
to the control treatments where a non-anxious mood is induced.
Regressions on Performance
There is strong evidence that anxiety positively affects agents’ performance as
shown by the regression analysis on the performance level. I employed an Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) estimation model with error clustering on all my aggregate
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Table 2.3: Aggregate average values of Performance and Emotions
Main Treatments Control Treatments
Performance 17.48 (4.41) 16.59 (5.09)
Anxiety 1.72 (1.35) 1.13 (1.27)
Happiness 2.07 (1.26) 2.54 (1.27)
Tiredness 2.10 (1.50) 1.67 (1.53)
Despondency 0.75 (0.86) 0.85 (1.09)
Sadness 0.61 (0.93) 0.44 (0.93)
Apprehension 1.37 (1.30) 1.17 (1.32)
Anger 0.40 (0.92) 0.24 (0.59)
Frustration 0.85 (1.13) 0.60 (0.99)
Note: Standard Deviation in parentheses
data38. Table 2.4 presents the estimates of an OLS regression model with error
clustering.
Anxiety has a strong significant positive effect on performance (β = 0.873): an
increase in anxiety level induces subjects to work harder.
RESULT 1. As predicted by hypothesis 1, there is strong evidence that anxiety
positively affects performance.
Subjects that experience higher levels of anxiety arousal exert more effort; this
allows them to perform better the individual task. Result 1 is consistent with
38I also used random effects regression models and I found that random effects regression
estimates converge to OLS regression estimates. For my data the error clustering model is the most
appropriate considering the nature of my independent variables (time-invariant variables). The use
of clusters provides a robust standard error per group (that is, per subject). Sashegyi et al. (2000)
argues that where observations over time are taken for different group of subjects an econometric
model must control both for intra-cluster correlation and intra-individual correlation within the
same cluster. In either way, I control for the subject level non independence of observations.
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Table 2.4: OLS Estimates with Error Clustering on Performance
Period 0.322*** (7.94)
Main 0.849 (1.39)













British Nationality 1.794*** (2.81)
School of Economics 0.327 (0.27)
State Score -0.016 (-0.37)





t statistics in parentheses;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;
Model 1: Error clustering with demographic variables.
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the Processing Efficiency Theory: anxious subjects wish to avoid the negative con-
sequences of a negative performance and hence they put more effort in the task.
Because of its motivational role and its effects on effort and performance, anxiety
might represent a type of incentive.
Results also show that overall performance increases over time (variable “Pe-
riod”39) indicating the trend of learning effects (β = 0.322). In addition to Anxiety
and Period, the regression model considers the following set of independent variables
as well: treatment dummies (Main = 1 if an anxious mood was induced; Number
of Sessions = 1 if a treatment consisted of two separated sessions over time), eight
emotion elicitation variables that indicate the emotional state on a 5-point Likert
scale before the real effort task, Trait Anxiety and State Anxiety scores, and two
variables that detect the shape of the relationship between anxiety and performance
(abs(Anx) is the absolute value of the difference between the anxiety values and the
anxiety average value, and abs(Anx)Square is the square of the difference between the
anxiety values and the anxiety average value). Model 1 includes some demographic
variables as well (Age, School of Economics = 1 if Economics, British Nationality =
1 if British, Gender = 1 if male).
Participants in treatments where an anxious mood was induced perform better
than participants in treatments where the mood manipulation aims at relaxing
(Main, β = 0.849). The coefficient is not significant and this indicates that in the
main treatments subjects have different sensitivities to the anxious stimulus. I find
hence in the main treatments on average a higher level of anxiety and yet some
groups of participants that perform better than other when an anxious mood is
induced.
The coefficient of Number of Sessions is not significant as well: running a unique
session for my experimental tasks does not provide any significant bias in my results.
39There were ten periods.
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It appears that as long as anxiety arousal increases towards the mean performance
increases (abs(Anx), β = 0.014) but only in a small size since the magnitude of the
coefficient is decreased but the coefficient of abs(Anx)Square variable. However,
none of the variables have any significant effects on performance and hence I can
claim that performance in these experiments does not have a bell-shaped relationship
with anxiety arousal. On the contrary, it seems that the more anxiety increases the
higher the performance.
Either an apprehensive or a frustrated status negatively affects subjects’ perfor-
mance (Apprehension, β = -0.871; Frustration, β = -0.724) while being despondent
might produce some positive effects (Despondency, β = 0.957). There is no other
robust result linked to the elicitation of emotion or anxiety characteristics40.
Moreover, there is mostly no correlation between the emotions elicited before
completing the real effort task. Frustration seems to be correlated with despondency
(Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.554, p-value ≤ 0.001, Spearman correlation
coefficient = 0.525, p-value ≤ 0.001). Therefore, for the robustness check I dropped
either the despondency or frustration variable in additional regression analysis and
I found that anxiety is still significant. See Table A.3 in Appendix A.241.
Regressions by Trait Anxiety Groups
In order to more accurately identify the relation between Trait Anxiety and
subjects’ performance, and specifically to test hypothesis 2, the subject pool has
been divided in three groups (Low Trait Anxiety, Medium Trait Anxiety, and High
40In additional regression analysis I introduced some interaction terms between anxiety and
other variables like period, despondency, apprehension and gender. I found some significant effect
between anxiety and despondency. See Table A.2 in Appendix A.3.
41I also found evidence of some demographic effects. See Table 2.4.
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Trait Anxiety) according to subjects’ Trait Anxiety score. The thresholds used to
create the three trait anxiety groups are the trait score upper quartile and the trait
score bottom quartile values of the Trait Anxiety score distribution, specifically 35
and 47.368 (Figure 2.3)42.
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Trait−Anxiety Score Distribution
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The Trait Anxiety score distribution is slightly skewed to the right (mean = 41.50,
median = 39, St. Dev = 10.09, skewness = 0.73) and there is a consistent group of
participants whose score is within 30 and 40. However, I have overall a nearly normal
distribution of the Trait Anxiety score which allowed me to create the three different
groups of Trait-Anxiety subjects and finally to identify different behavioural effects43.
Hence I ran three sub-sample OLS regressions with error clustering. Table 2.5
shows the estimation results.
Low Trait anxious (Low TA column) subjects were not affected by the mood
inducement technique and indeed their level of anxiety does not have a significant
impact on performance. Moreover, I noticed that Low Trait anxious participants
42Different groups have been considered in order to check the effect of a specific threshold
values. For example I simply divided my observations in three groups with the same number of
observations; the results obtained do no significantly differ from those reported here.
43See Figure A.2 for the Trait Anxiety scores distribution in Appendix A.2.
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Table 2.5: OLS Estimates with Error Clustering on Performance with Trait Anxiety
Groups
High TA Medium TA Low TA
Period 0.341*** (3.38) 0.282*** (6.18) 0.395*** (4.01)
Main 1.419 (0.86) 1.603** (2.23) -5.797*** (-3.68)
Number of Sessions -1.549 (-1.52) -1.933** (-2.37) -0.780 (-0.67)
abs(Anx) -1.044 (-0.20) -2.853 (-1.19) 2.187 (0.65)
abs(Anx)Square -0.269 (-0.16) 1.164 (1.31) -0.314 (-0.20)
Anxiety 1.637** (2.38) -0.203 (-0.44) 0.494 (1.46)
Despondency 0.738 (0.87) 0.768 (1.41) -4.428*** (-3.38)
Sadness -0.868 (-1.12) 0.833 (1.59) -1.080 (-1.32)
Apprehension -0.264 (-0.40) -0.908** (-2.40) -0.385 (-0.56)
Tiredness -0.819* (-1.83) -0.381 (-1.57) -0.211 (-0.59)
Happiness 0.121 (0.16) -0.519* (-1.88) -0.422 (-0.69)
Anger -0.367 (-0.45) 0.737** (2.00) -3.065*** (-2.95)
Frustration -0.178 (-0.36) -1.196** (-2.59) 1.382 (1.68)
Age -3.808** (-2.20) -1.676*** (-3.40) -3.806*** (-4.96)
Gender 1.612 (1.18) 1.462* (1.84) 6.263*** (8.48)
British Nationality 2.490* (1.92) 1.455 (1.63) 1.262 (1.42)
School of Economics 4.308 (1.41) -3.179** (-2.34) 4.617*** (3.64)
State Score -0.072 (-0.76) -0.012 (-0.21) 0.247*** (3.09)
Trait Score 0.280*** (3.31) -0.051 (-0.45) 0.568*** (3.90)
Constant 4.056 (0.67) 23.581*** (4.94) -5.007 (-1.08)
Observations 380 770 320
R-Square 0.414 0.362 0.657
F-test 5.040 6.916 26.973
t statistics in parentheses;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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give up when they are despondent (Despondency, β = -4.428). By contrast, for
High Trait anxious individuals (High TA column) anxiety is a determining factor for
performance (Anxiety, β = 1.637): an increase in anxiety allows subjects to achieve
better results. The effect of anxiety on individuals’ performance is related to the
proneness to anxiety.
For the Medium Trait Anxiety (Medium TA column) group a significant impact
on performance is given basically by apprehension, anger and frustration: the
negative coefficients of apprehension and frustration indicate that Medium Trait
anxious subjects work less hard as soon as they feel more apprehensive and frustrated
(Apprehension, β = -0.908; Frustration, β = -1.196) but a feeling of anger seems to
push Medium Trait anxious participants to perform better44.
RESULT 2. As predicted by hypothesis 2, High Trait anxious subjects perform
better when their anxiety arousal increases.
To summarize, anxiety significantly increases High Trait anxious subjects’ per-
formance while it does not affect Low Trait and Medium Trait anxious subjects’
behaviour. High Trait anxious individuals are more likely to respond to threatening
stimuli and therefore to become anxious (See Table A.5 in Appendix A). This is
confirmed by the coefficient of the variable “Trait Score” for the High Trait anxious
subjects (β = 0.280) which is strongly significant (p-value = 0.001).
Frustration and Apprehension decrease Medium Trait anxious subjects’ per-
formance while despondency has negative effects on Low Trait anxious subjects’
performance45.
44For robustness check I dropped either despondency or frustration variable in additional
regression analysis and I found that anxiety is significant and robust for High Trait Anxiety Group
and positively affects individuals’ performance.
45Performance always increases over time and Medium Trait and Low Trait anxious subjects
exert more effort when an anxious mood is induced. The number of sessions have a negative effect
on performance for Medium Trait anxious subjects, thus filling in the STAI questionnaire in the
same lab session of the real effort task does change my results for the Medium Trait Anxiety group.
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2.5 Discussion
My results show that anxiety is positively related to performance: an increase in
anxiety induces an increase in performance. Hence I can assert that anxiety has a
motivational role and a positive effect on agents’ performance. Moreover, I found
that the effects of anxiety on performance are related to propensity to anxiety. High
Trait anxious subjects are more sensitive to the mood manipulation and therefore
their emotional state allows them to achieve better results.
My findings support the Processing Efficiency Theory that states the motivational
force of anxiety and the Yerkes-Dodson law that links performance to emotional
arousal and motivation: High Trait anxious individuals are threatened by some
stimuli and their emotional arousal increases. Therefore, in order to avoid negative
emotions associated with bad performance they exert more effort and hence they
are able to perform better.
In this experiment I measure subjects’ performance as the number of sliders
correctly positioned in the time constraint. This output is one of the proxies of the
effort variable (or input) which can be used. The latter, in fact, is not observable
and measurable. Individuals’ performance or output is given by q = µ +  where
µ is the level of investment or effort, a measure of skill or average output, chosen
by the agent prior to a realization of the random or luck component  (Lazear and
Rosen, 1981). In this experiment, anxiety boosts (at least some type of) individuals
abs(Anx) and abs(Anx)Square variables do not identify any pattern in the relationship between the
level of anxiety and performance for any Trait Anxiety group. Finally, estimates on demographic
variables indicate that students enrolled in the School of Economics perform better if they are Low
Trait anxious subjects, worse if they are Medium Trait anxious subjects. Male students show a
better performance than female students if they are Low Trait anxious subjects. Young students
perform always better, especially if they are High Trait anxious subjects. Table A.4 in Appendix
A shows the estimates of OLS regressions with error clustering by Trait Anxiety groups without
demographic variables.
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to exert more effort acting as an incentive.
It is worth, at this stage, to reassert how I defined anxiety: a general state of
tension and apprehension triggered, in this case, by a mood inducement technique.
Roughly speaking, anxiety is a complex state characterized by a subjective feeling
of apprehension and heightened physiological reactivity. However, there is a clear
distinction between the construct of anxiety and apprehension or tension. Appre-
hension is a concept closely allied to stress; it refers to a state of the organism
created by stress. Broadly, apprehension (or tension) “is conceptualized as a state
of disequilibrium brought about by some psychological need, leading to behaviour
that tends to satisfy the need and thereby restore equilibrium” (Levitt, 1967, p. 13).
This implies consciousness of the occurring emotional state whereas anxiety is not
experienced consciously because of the temporary effects of defence mechanisms.
The subsequent feeling is popularly known as “apprehension” or “nervous tension”.
Let us consider the distinction between the emotional state of anxiety and an
anxious mood. Generally speaking, moods are usually distinguished from emotions
by one of three criteria: longer duration, lower intensity, and diffuseness or globality
(e.g. Isen, 1984; Morris and Schnurr, 1989). Of the three criteria, “diffuseness” is the
most interesting. It has been adopted, in fact, as the main criterion for mood by a
number of authors (e.g. Isen, 1984; Ruckmick, 1936)46. “Diffuseness” indeed defines
a class of affective states that is a distinct set of emotions. Emotions have an object.
They are “about” something. One is happy about something, angry at someone,
afraid of something, etc. Emotions are therefore “intentional” phenomena; they
involve a subject-object relationship47. Moods lack such an object. The diffuseness
of affective states, that allows classifying them as moods, can thus be characterized
by the absence of orientation upon an object48. Moods are, therefore, affective states
46Ruckmick states: “[Mood] has no particular cognitive element. [..] There is also generally no
cognitive impulse about it. It does not lend itself to any definite action” (1936, p.72).
47Frijda points out that emotional behaviour is directed toward or away from, or at least oriented
upon, a particular thing (Frijda, 1993).
48There exists in fact “joyful” behaviour, not focused upon one particular object, and likewise
48
without an object or without a specific object. The latter qualification is added
because some affective states have the environment as a whole as their object. In
certain anxiety states, for example, the environment is felt to be an unsafe place,
not offering any possibility for control.
The distinction between emotion and mood can of course be blurred. For exam-
ple, the object of an affective state is not the same thing as its cause. Moods, while
not having an object, may originate in a specific event involving a specific object.
A mood may also be the consequence of a particular emotion. An emotion turns
into a mood, or gives rise to a mood, when the focus upon the object is lost and the
feeling become diffuse, having no object. The individual may know what caused his
or her mood, in an unfocused state without an object.
I do not claim in this study any strict difference between the emotion of anxiety
and the anxious mood induced by means of the mood inducement technique. The
type of technique used, personal recollection, implies the recollection of particular
events, maybe involving a specific object, in which the emotion of anxiety was
experienced. This emotion may give rise to an anxious mood induced by the mood
manipulation. In this study I am interested in how anxiety affects the performance in
an individual task. I do not investigate specifically how object-specific anxiety affects
the individual performance. The self-report, submitted by participants at the end of
the mood manipulation, gives a measure of the emotional state post-manipulation49.
The STAI questionnaire, completed at the beginning of the experiment, and hence
before the mood manipulation, specifically aims to assess both the current anxious
state (State Anxiety) and the proneness to anxiety (Trait Anxiety) of participants.
an “angry mood” applied to sequences of irritated or angry responses to a variety of events.
49More precisely, the post-manipulation self-report gives a measure of the subject’s emotional
state after the mood manipulation and prior the remaining laboratory tasks. Subjects may be
anxious because of the uncertainty about the tasks they will be asked to do. They in fact receive
specific instructions about the remaining laboratory tasks after the measurement of their emotional
state.
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In the mood manipulation phase subjects were asked to think about two personal
situations over the last year that provoked a feeling of anxiety50. Thinking about
two (and not more51) events induces the emotional state that occurred, and it is
more likely that High Trait anxious subjects were more sensitive to this type of
recollection. As Spielberger pointed out (1976; 1980) individuals high and low in trait
anxiety differ in their susceptibility to psychological stress. Consequently, when High
Trait anxious subjects were asked to perform a task, the negative valence of anxiety
along with the worried thoughts initially distracted their attention from the task.
Afterwards, they adopted an approaching behaviour towards the mildly threatening
stimulus applied: as soon as subjects started working on the real effort task their
attention was shifted from the threatening stimulus. This allowed subjects to cope
with worrying thoughts, to be aware that their state of tension might compromise
their performance and finally their payment, and therefore to work harder. This
coping strategy aims to avoid negative consequences and disappointment of possible
poor result at the task due to the emotional state. As Result 2 shows, High Trait
anxious agents’ performance increased monotonically when their anxiety arousal
increases.
I would expect, according to the Yerkes-Dodson law, that very high anxiety
arousal could have negative effects on performance. However, in my experiment
the level of arousal induced is not extremely high. The type of mood inducement
technique applied, Personal Recollection, is effective but does not produce an
extreme level of emotional arousal. In some psychological experiments deception
more effectively induces high arousals of anxiety (Hertwig and Andreas, 2008;
Kelman, 1966; Dabbs and Helmreich, 1972). But in an economic laboratory “personal
recollection” seemed to be a more appropriate manipulation and my pilot experiments
confirmed its effectiveness. Though, only a moderate level of anxiety was on average
elicited from participants. For this reason the shape of the relationship between
50I specifically used the adjective “anxious”. However, anxiety and apprehension were both in
the list of emotions at the phase of measurement of emotional arousal.
51The recollection of quite a few negative events is less likely to provoke a higher arousal.
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anxiety and performance found in this experiment is not bell-shaped as stated by
the Yerkes-Dodson law. Rather I found a positive relationship that indicates that
my results highlight the positively increasing left-hand side of the bell-shaped curve
of the relationship between performance and emotional arousal.
It might be claimed that an increase in anxiety arousal (provoked by the mood
manipulation) might reflect a decrease in self-confidence. That is to say that some-
how inducing under-confidence (by using the mood manipulation technique) can
produce the same effects on performance attributed by the literature to an increase in
anxiety arousal. The relationship between anxiety and self-confidence is formalized
in the multidimensional anxiety theory which assumes a series of two-dimensional
relationships between cognitive anxiety, self-confidence and performance (Martens
and Smith, 1990). Specifically, cognitive anxiety is defined as “negative expectations
and cognitive concerns about oneself, the situation at hand, and potential conse-
quences” (Morris and Hutchings, 1981, p. 541), and self-confidence is conceptualized
as one’s belief in meeting the challenge of the task to be performed. As Martens et
al. (1990) describe, cognitive anxiety and self-confidence are at opposite ends of a
continuum. In their meta-analysis on sport performance Woodman and Hardy (2003)
confirm the (positive) relationship between self-confidence and performance and
the (negative) relationship between cognitive anxiety and performance hypothesized
by the multidimensional anxiety theory. However, they do not find any consistent
evidence on the relationship between cognitive anxiety and self-confidence. Similar
patterns are identified by Koivula et al. (2002) and Parfitt and Pates (1999) in their
studies on sport performance.
Therefore, it is not straightforward to assess that an increase in anxiety arousal
may produce a decrease in self-confidence and hence the same effects on individuals’
performance. In my study I did not collect any data on self-confidence. It would have
been interesting to introduce in the experiments the commonly used Competitive
State Anxiety Inventory-2 (Martens et al., 1990) to get a measure of cognitive
anxiety and self-confidence. This is left for future research.
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The effects of anxiety on subjects’ performance strictly depend on the proneness
to anxiety. Low and Medium Trait anxious participants have not been dramatically
affected by the mood inducement technique and therefore their level of anxiety does
not have a significant impact on the exerted effort. This explains why the coefficient
of the variable “Main”, which refers to treatment A and C together, treatments
where an anxious mood was induced, is not significant in the OLS regression shown
in Table 2.4. High, Low and Medium Trait Anxiety groups were present both in
treatment A and C (and in treatments were a non-anxious mood was induced, B
and D) but only High Trait anxious participants were affected by the threatening
stimulus of the mood manipulation. Hence, only a group of participants experienced
an increase of their anxiety level. It is in fact the variable “Anxiety” that affects
subjects’ performance, as it is shown by its coefficient in the same regression52. I
cannot exclude that some participants in treatments B and D, where a non-anxious
mood was induced, declared a high level of anxiety at the beginning of the real effort
task. Their emotional state might be due to the uncertainty about the task and their
ability to perform it well. Table 2.3 shows for example that the mean of anxiety
is high in treatment D (treatment consisting of only one session where I induced
a non-anxious mood) where the mean of effort is significantly higher compared to
treatment B (treatment consisting of two sessions where I induced a non-anxious
mood).
In this work I applied three measures of anxiety. Specifically, I obtained a State
and Trait measure using the STAI questionnaire (Spielberger, 1972) and a 5-point
Likert scale for the anxiety elicitation before and after the real-effort task53. These
52The coefficient of the variable “Apprehension” has a very similar magnitude of the anxiety
variable but with opposite sign in the aggregate regression in Table 2.4. The separate regressions
by Trait Anxiety groups show the different impact of these two variable on performance (Table
2.5).
53At the end of the real effort task I asked subjects to elicit the intensity of their emotions on a
5-point Likert scale. These groups of emotions cannot be meant to have predictive power since they
refer to an emotional state elicited at the end of the experiment. Table A.1 in Appendix A.2 shows
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measurements are of a self-report type. Trait Anxiety and State Anxiety scores are
correlated (Spearman coefficient = 0.5439, Pearson coefficient = 0.611)54. The State
Anxiety scores distribution is positively skewed (mean = 34.38, median = 32.31,
St. Dev. = 9.37, skewness = 1.11) and the 75% of subjects have a score below 40.
This means that overall participants arrived in the lab relatively relaxed and that
no confound effects due to subjects’ negative emotional state occurring before the
experimental sessions was detected (See Figure A.3 for the State Anxiety scores
distribution in Appendix A).
Although I used standard measurements of anxiety there are other techniques
used in the experimental psychological laboratory that could offer a more accurate
measure of anxiety arousal and trait. For example, a widely used measurement
is the dot-probe task that assesses the “selective attention” of an individual and
therefore her/his proneness to vigilance to threat through her/his reaction time:
a High Trait anxious subject responds more quickly to threatening stimuli. The
application of this task would definitely enforce and enrich my results55.
The motivational force of anxiety casts away the common view of anxiety as
a negative emotion and brings to the discussion of a potential involvement of this
emotion as an incentive. Specifically, a moderate56 level of anxiety can be ben-
eficial because it boosts performance. But the question can be: how to induce
anxiety in a workplace? How does the principal ensure a certain level of pressure
in the working environment? Can a psychological pressure be induced by monitoring?
some summary statistics. The mean for sadness, tiredness, anxiety, despondency, apprehension
and happiness is higher in the control treatments. Only anger seems to be significant at 10% level
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, p-value = 0.060). I checked for correlation with my dependent variable as
well and I found a positive correlation between anxiety, despondency, apprehension and frustration
(0.55, 0.49, and 0.41 respectively) but no variable is correlated with effort.
54“Persons high in Trait Anxiety tend to be higher in State Anxiety, even in relatively neutral
situations” (Spielberger et al., 1970, p. 15).
55The z-Tree software used for my experiments does not allow the time measure in fractions of
seconds. Hence, I did not implement the dot-probe task in my sessions.
56I do not provide any evidence on the effect of excessive level of anxiety.
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An assumption of standard economic theory57 is that incentives and monitoring
are substitutes: an increase in monitoring increases the probability of detecting
shrinking. Monitoring is in fact a way of preventing shirking since it is assumed to
be frequent and highly significant activity in all principal-agent relationship (Frey,
1993; Sappington, 1991; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997)58. In the standard linear
principal-agent model (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) monitoring has no direct effect
on effort; however, it reduces the agents’ risk premium, permitting stronger incentives
and therefore greater effort. In both models monitoring is associated with greater
effort and expected performance. However, monitoring can be counter-productive
because it may be a signal of distrust and thus reduces intrinsic motivation (Frey,
1993). Interesting future research can investigate this potential relation between
anxiety caused by monitoring and the level of effort achieved.
2.6 Conclusion
This essay explores the motivational role of anxiety and its effects on individual
levels of effort. Emotions have not been studied in the standard theory of incen-
tive and personality implications have not found a large space in economics literature.
I believe that an anxious state can induce agents to work harder and therefore it
can act as an incentive. To investigate my hypothesis I ran two economic experiments
enriched by a psychological technique: I manipulated the mood of the participants
and then I implemented a real effort task. When a certain level of arousal occurs,
anxious subjects achieved better results than non-anxious subjects. This result
is consistent with the Processing Efficiency Theory and with the Yerkes-Dodson
57The Efficiency Wage Theory (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986).
58Principal-agent theory assumes that individuals exert work effort to the point where net utility
is maximized. Moreover, individuals are labour-averse: whereas his earned income provides benefits,
the effort of earning procures disutility; therefore individuals will have an incentive to shirk.
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Law which state the relationship between a given level of anxiety and performance.
Moreover, I claim that “personality counts” (Lazear, 1989): High Trait Anxiety
individuals respond better to the stimuli of the mood manipulation which is the
cause of behavioural effects.
My results contribute to the literature of incentive and contract design, suggest-
ing that emotions can have a motivational function and are important elements that
drive behavioural choices on effort. Future research can explore the way in which
these types of incentives may be beneficial in a context of group work, monitoring,
and “mix and match” practices aimed at optimizing the team level of effort and
performance.
A final remark is at this point necessary. The results I have presented are given
by the analysis of data collected in the laboratory in which participants were required
to carry out some tasks. Specifically, they were asked to perform a real effort task,
the slider task. I did not run any control treatment to check the robustness of the
obtained results with respect to the effort task used. The conclusion drawn in this
chapter may depend on the effort task used.
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Chapter 3
Does It Matter Which Effort Task
You Use? A Comparison of Four
Effort Tasks When Agents
Compete for a Prize
3.1 Introduction
In laboratory economic experiments researchers ask participants to carry out tasks.
Some of these tasks are used to measure participants’ performance or to elicit their
decisions of effort or investment. These tasks are called effort tasks. Effort tasks
can be real effort tasks if subjects are required to put substantial (physical or men-
tal) effort to perform them, or induced value effort tasks when participants’ choice
of their level of effort depends on a given cost structure assigned by the experimenter.
Generally, experimentalists implicitly assume that effort tasks are equivalent and
that real effort tasks and induced value effort tasks lead to similar results.
However, there is no systematic study that either shows the methodological
equivalence between effort tasks or that claims that one (or some) of them is (are)
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more appropriate tools for measuring subjects’ performance or investment. There
is a surprising variety of effort tasks used in economic experiments that can be
operationalized in different ways. All of them have specific limitations and yet they
have been typically used as virtually interchangeable.
This chapter addresses a crucial methodological research question in experimental
economics: “does it matter which effort task you use in the laboratory economic
experiments?”. The importance of this research question arises from the necessity
of making use of tools in the laboratory that do not compromise the ability to
generalize the experimental results. The use of effort tasks which significantly affects
laboratory results has the potential to cause a dramatic loss of external validity of
the research.
Usually, only one effort task is implemented in the laboratory setting but no test
is carried out to check whether the experimenter can collect similar experimental
data by using another effort task. Researchers have not considered this important
limitation of their studies and may not realise that their results depend on the effort
task they have chosen.
This chapter tests the equivalence between effort tasks. Thus, to test the assump-
tion that the use of different effort tasks does not change the quality of my results, I
ran an economic experiment which consisted of four treatments identical except for
the effort task applied. Three real effort tasks and an induced value effort task were
implemented in the lab. The effort tasks provided a measure of subjects’ level of
performance (or investment). Participants were asked to compete in a two-player
all-pay auction in order to win a prize. Those with the highest performance could
get the prize. In this competitive setting I expect that an anxious emotional state
will have a positive effect on subjects’ level of performance (or investment). I expect
that the more risk averse contestant will exert less effort, and that there will be gen-
der difference in performance. These effects should not depend on the effort task used.
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On the contrary, results show that experimental data on performance (or in-
vestment) significantly depend on the effort task chosen. I can therefore claim that
the choice of the effort tasks to be implemented in the economic laboratory is an
important methodological issue. Real effort tasks may not be equivalent among each
other. Only some of them can minimize the individual’s abilities in order to give
a clean measure of exerted effort. Moreover, the operationalization of these tasks
in the laboratory can represent a limitation of experimental studies. Finally, this
work argues that real effort tasks and induced value effort tasks might not lead to
similar results. Hence, the interpretation of the laboratory data and the conclusions
of experimental research should acknowledge the effort task chosen.
It can be argued that the level of effort exerted, and hence the participants’ per-
formance, might depend on the relevance of the task to some groups of participants
(stereotypes). Steele and Aronson (1995) provided strong evidence of the so-called
stereotype threat: salience of some form of stereotype has a detrimental effect on
performance of some identified groups of participants1. In my experiment I can rule
out the possibility that performance was affected by any stereotype threat linked
to the type of the effort task. I did not state, in fact, in the instructions of the
experiment any scope related to gender, race, nationality, etc.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section the difference between
induced value effort tasks and real effort tasks will be briefly given before clarifying
advantages and limitation of each type of task. Some examples of their use in the
literature will be provided. Section 3.3 illustrates the behavioural hypotheses, the
experimental design, and procedure. Section 3.4 shows the experimental results.
Section 3.5 and 3.6 discuss and conclude respectively.




The laboratory experimental method in economics provides ceteris paribus obser-
vations on how a group of factors can affect individuals’ behaviour and decisions.
Many economic experiments aim, for example, to study the effects of different
environmental and institutional variables on individual effort and task performance.
For this purpose, the investigator might ask participants to perform a task, that is
any piece of work assigned to or demanded of a person. Task characteristics can
vary between tasks. Some of them could require cognitive skills or physical effort
whereas others could require only “procedural knowledge”2.
It is conventional to refer to real effort tasks as those tasks that imply a physical
or mental effort and to induced value effort tasks as those tasks where individuals
use their procedural knowledge to select a value that would represent their chosen
effort.
Though laboratory effort tasks are less comparable to the ones that would
occur in a natural work setting, their use gives the possibility to understand how
individuals’ choices depend on different variables and incentives. They are practical
tools that allow to measure the level of effort exerted by subjects under different
conditions, measure which would be difficult to get in a non-experimental setting.
Real and induced value effort tasks have been implicitly assumed to lead to
similar results. However, the choice of the effort task may considerably affect
experimental data. This is due to the substantial difference between effort tasks. In
particular, real clerical tasks may differ in task learning, required skills and intrinsic
motivation. Moreover, the implementation and operationalization of a real effort
task might not always been carried out with a control for the heterogeneity in the
distribution of the abilities.
2“Procedural knowledge” is a repertoire of skills, rules and strategies for using knowledge.
Experimenters are usually interested in procedural knowledge and, therefore, they are concerned
in writing easy and accessible instructions that would allow all subjects to have the knowledge to
understand how their decisions affect their payoffs (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
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Measurements of effort in a controlled environment where individual values are
specified by a precise utility function is offered by the use of an induced value
effort task, even though the over-simplistic setting and the lack of context might
compromise the validity of the experiment.
In this work I aim to point out that the choice of an effort task may affect
the laboratory results and that any interpretation of them should acknowledge the
nature of the task used. Therefore, I will try to answer the question “does it matter
which effort task you use in the laboratory?”, and more specifically, “do real effort
tasks and induced value effort tasks lead to similar results?”.
In the rest of this section I will organize my discussion as follows: I am going to
illustrate first what induced value effort tasks are (section 3.2.1) and second what
real effort tasks are (section 3.2.2), clarifying in each section their advantages and
limitations, and providing some examples of their implementation in the related
literature.
3.2.1 Induced Value Effort Tasks
A clear test in economic experiments of the hypotheses requires controlling for
subjects’ preferences. But this is a major difficulty because individuals’ evaluations
and utilities are not observable by the experimenter. One way to deal with this is to
provide the subject an appropriate monetary incentive which depends on a specified
utility function. This so-called induced value method assumes that given a costless
choice between two alternatives, identical except that the first gives a higher payoff
than the second, the first will be always chosen over the second by an individual
whose utility is a monotone increasing function of the monetary reward” (Smith,
1976).
The induced value method has been widely applied in testing, for example,
contest theory. In contests agents exert costly effort to compete for a prize. In
equilibrium, effort is chosen in such a way that marginal effort costs equal marginal
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gains. A direct empirical test of this theory requires that researchers know different
parameters such as, for example, the number of agents, the effort cost functions,
the exact level of the prize, and the production function including the nature of
the error term (if any). The knowledge of these parameters allows the derivation of
a precise prediction of chosen effort. Researchers can therefore decide appropriate
parameters. The test of the theory will occur by observing subjects’ chosen level of
effort.
The above type of test would not be possible with the same level of confidence in
a non-laboratory environment. “The existence of these superior control is the most
important asset behind running experiments and such control can be achieved by
using a reward structure to induced predefined monetary values on actions” (Smith,
1976).
One of the first contest experiments was conducted by Bull et al. (1987). They
asked subjects in a two-player tournament to choose an integer number, called
“decision number”, between zero and 100. Corresponding to each decision number
there was a cost listed on a table given to subjects. Schotter and Weigelt (1992)
followed the same procedure of Bull et al. in an experiment on asymmetric tourna-
ments. Sheremeta and Wu (2012) asked subjects to pick up a number from 0 to 120,
representing their level of effort in a tournament experiment where the role of the
principal was endogenous. Harbring and colleagues (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003,
2005; Harbring and Lünser, 2008) used different parameters in their experiments in
order to measure agents’ effort/bidding in tournaments. Participants could choose
in fact an integer number from 0 to 100.
Induced value effort tasks are also implemented in other type of contests. Breit-
moser et al. (2010) used an induced value effort task in their R&D races experiment
where participants’ choice of effort (or investment) was binary: low or high effort.
In examining bidding decisions in a lottery contest Millner and Pratt (1989) gave
an initial endowment to subjects of £12 to buy lottery tickets of the value of £0.10.
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In this case the level of effort (investment) could vary from 0 to 12 taking a value
up to one decimal place.
Induced value effort tasks have not been only used in contest experiments. Re-
search on fairness and social preference aims to investigate the subjects’ level of
effort under certain condition using this straightforward tool. Gächter and Thöni
(2010), for example, were interested in the impact of wage comparisons on agents’
productivity. In their experiment participants could choose a level of effort between
1 and 20 and their related costs were linear in effort. Fehr and Schmidt (2004)
investigate experimentally the role of fairness in the multi-task principal-agent model
where principals could either offer a piece-rate contract or a voluntary bonus to
the agent. Agents could select their level of effort from a set of integer from 1 to
10, whose cost was given by an increasing and convex cost function. An increasing
positive cost function was used by Fehr et al. (1997) as well. In their experiment on
the impact of reciprocity on contract enforcement effort was restricted to the interval
[0,1]. Participants could choose their level of effort from a list of 14 options. Effort
was a decimal number up to 3 decimal places. Similarly, Fehr et al. (1993) provided
participants a table showing a list of ten options for the choice of effort. In their
experiment designed to test the impact of fairness on market prices, participants
were asked to choose a level of effort from 0.1 and 1 up to one decimal place. In the
table provided, associated costs calculated according to an increasing cost function
appeared as well. Generally, a chosen effort task is used in research on fairness
and reciprocity in labour markets. Experimentalists decide the parameters of their
experiments, such as the type of cost functions and initial endowment, and ask
participants to select their desirable level of effort from a given list. Levels of effort
are always within a specified range (Charness, 2004; Brandts and Charness, 2004;
Charness et al., 2004; Gächter and Falk, 2002; Fehr and Gächter, 2000).
The above mentioned papers in contest theory and fairness in the labour market
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are just a few examples of the use of induced value effort tasks in the laboratory.
This chapter is not intended to provide a full review of the use of chosen effort tasks
in economic experiments. It just aims in this section to illustrate some possible ways
of implementing this technique. To summarize, in experiments where an induced
value effort task is implemented subjects generally receive an endowment and they
are asked to choose a number subject to their endowment. The chosen number
would represent their level of effort (or investment). Each possible level of effort is
associated with a certain level of cost according to a specified cost function imposed
by the experimenter.
While the imposition of a monetary cost function in induced value effort tasks
assures experimenters full control over the cost of effort3, whether the conditions
implemented in the laboratory are also present in reality is an open debate. Is the
induced value effort task a good replication of the agents’ decision of real effort?
One way of adding realism to the laboratory experiments is to use so called real
effort tasks.
3.2.2 Real Effort Tasks
Real effort tasks require substantial effort, they imply that subjects have to actually
work on an experimental task. For example, some researchers ask participants to
solve some mathematical questions (Vesterlund and Nierderle, 2007; Eriksson et al.,
2008; Dohmen and Falk, 2011). In Konow (2000), Falk and Ichino (2006), and
Konow et al. (2009) subjects have to fold some letters, and in Fahr and Irlenbusch
(2010) participants are asked to crack walnuts.
Following a classification adopted by Bortolotti (2004), real effort tasks can
be categorized as either cognitive tasks, where task performance mainly depends
on cognitive abilities, or physical tasks which require some physical strength to
3In particular, the experimenter can control the extent of any convexity in the cost of the
activity and can also determine how the cost varies over individuals and over any repetition of the
game.
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be performed4. Tasks involving mathematical skills are an example of cognitive
tasks. For instance, Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003), Dohmen and Falk (2011),
Brüggen and Strobel (2007), and Kuhnen and Tymula (2008) all ask subjects to solve
mathematical equations and multiplications. Vesterlund and Nierderle (2007) use
additions of two-digit numbers. A two-variable optimization task is introduced by
van Dijk et al. (2001) where subjects have to search by trial and error the maximum
of a function5.
Lévy-Garboua et al. (2009) ask instead to decode a number from a grid of
letters. Linguistic skills are needed for the task operationalized by Charness and
Villeval (2009) where students are asked to solve some anagrams. Memory and logic
are necessary to solve mazes in Gneezy (2002) and in Gneezy et al. (2003), and
to succeed in memory games (Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler, 2005) or word games
(Burrows and Loomes, 1994). In experiments run by Hoffman et al. (1994) and by
Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) participants face some “current events” quiz.
Physical tasks may be, for example, secretary tasks such as typing abstracts
(Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2005), or entering information about library books into a
database (Gneezy and List, 2006; Kube et al., 2006), or copying some information
into a database (Ottone and Ponzano, 2008) or entering strings of characters on the
screen (Dickinson, 2001). Konow (2000), Konow et al. (2009), Falk and Ichino (2006),
and Carpenter et al. (forthcoming) ask students to fold some letters and to stuff
them into envelopes. Azar (2009) asks participants to find a letter in a non-justified
grid of letters6, and Heyman and Ariely (2004) design an experiment in which a
4Real effort task can be also divided between real effort task without real outcomes, such as
solving arbitrary mathematical problems, and real effort task with real outcomes, such as folding
letters or fund-raising. It might be claimed that real effort tasks with real outcomes may incentivize
subjects to put more effort than real effort tasks without real outcomes do. In my experiment, all
the three real effort tasks I use are real effort tasks without real outcomes.
5See also Bosman and Van Winden (2002), and Bosman et al. (2005) and for a modified version
of the game see Dickinson and Villeval (2004), Montmarquette et al. (2004), and Sloof and van
Praag (2008).
6The distinction between cognitive tasks and physical tasks is not sharp. In this case, for
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computerized ball had to be dragged from one place to another. Manual tasks
such as cracking walnuts (Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2010) or a door-to-door fund-raising
(Gneezy and List, 2006) have also been used. Finally, in Pokorny (2008), Abeler
et al. (2011), Falk et al. (2006), and Gill and Prowse (2011) subjects have to count
the number of zeros in a series of tables or to drag some sliders to a certain position
on the screen7.
Overall, real effort tasks share common characteristics: first, tasks should be
easy enough to be possibly performed by everyone without an extensive training,
and second they should be uninteresting so that they minimize subjects’ intrinsic
motivation. Real effort tasks try to achieve a greater external validity of the
experiment, because the experimental design replicates the real exertion of effort
outside of the laboratory. Compared to induced value effort tasks, however, they
imply a loss of control over the monetary cost function. In real effort experiments
disutility from work (or effort) cannot be modelled as a monetary cost as it is usually
done in experiments where the induced value method is applied. When moving
from an induced value effort task to a real effort task, how to measure disutility is a
crucial issue.
One possible way to address the above problem is to use some proxies for exerted
effort (and experienced disutility). I can identify at least four proxies for effort in
the experimental literature: quantity, quality, level of difficulty of the task, and time
spent completing the task.
For example, experimenters consider as performance the number of solved equa-
tions, the number of sliders correctly positioned, the number of entered records, etc.
example, cognitive skills may be useful for the search of letters. However, the cognitive skills
involved would be very minimal and hence the task might be better considered as a physical task.
7This work is not intended to be a complete review of the effort tasks. For example, I do
not consider studies that implemented a real effort task to legitimize subjects’ initial entitlement
(Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985).
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In other experiments, where the output could have different levels of quality and
thus the output quantity is not a good proxy of effort, experimenters consider the
number of wrong answers or mistakes.
However, the number of wrong answers or mistakes are not always indicators of
lack of effort. There is usually a skill component required in each task that can be
minimized but never ruled out completely. Therefore, some subjects are more likely to
make more mistakes than more skilful subjects no matter how much effort they exert.
For this reason the level of difficulty of a task should be taken into account when
choosing the task. Sometimes, the level of difficulty is used to measure effort: in
Gneezy et al. (2003) subjects can choose the desired difficulty level of the maze
themselves.
Time can also be used as a proxy for effort under the assumption that the longer
time is spent on a specific task the higher effort is exerted (and hence the disutility
experienced). However, the time spent on a task can be also a measure of ability. A
more skillful subject might spend less time in completing the task.
Some examples in the literature can be found about the combined use of these
four proxies. For instance, Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2005) and Kube et al. (2006)
consider the number of both entries and mistakes in their library task. Carpenter
et al. (forthcoming) adjust the output for quality. Azar (2009) takes into account
time spent working on the task in addition to quantity of the output and difficulty
of the task.
Yet, all the proxies discussed are all measures of performance rather than effort
and disutility of work. I shall focus on performance which is what we usually observe
in the lab. Performance is a function of effort (and ability). Effort and ability cannot
be directly measured in the lab. Moreover, no measure discussed so far can actually
disentangle completely effort and individual differences in innate abilities and skills.
66
Thus, the presence of heterogeneity points out the difficulty of the identification of
subjective costs of decision discussed by Smith (1979).
It follows from the discussion above that the choice of an effort task represents
a crucial issue in designing an experiment. On the one hand, researchers face a
trade-off between control of the investigated variables and more realism in the
experimental environment, and on the other hand, if they opt for a real effort task
they need to take into account all the implications of the use of such a task in terms
of operationalization.
Surprisingly, in the experimental literature there is no clear account of the
limitations and the problematic use of effort tasks in the lab. Very often, laboratory
experiments in the same area of investigation apply either induced value effort tasks
or real effort tasks making implicitly the assumption that both techniques lead to
similar results.
In this work I aim to investigate whether the choice of an induced value effort
task or a real effort task actually leads to similar results and whether any difference
in my results is due to the type of effort task used. Hence, my experiment will
answer the following questions: “does it matter which effort task you use in the
lab?”.
3.3 The Experiment: Research Hypotheses, De-
sign and Procedure
3.3.1 Research Hypotheses
In order to test for any equivalence between four effort tasks chosen within the
most popular tasks in experimental settings I ran an economic experiment which
consists of four identical treatments except for the effort task used. I have chosen
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three real effort tasks and an induced value effort task for this experiment. The
real effort tasks are: the slider task (Gill and Prowse, 2011), the mathematical task
(Vesterlund and Nierderle, 2007), and (a variation of) the counting task (Abeler
et al., 2011).
In each treatment subjects are asked to expend costly effort to compete in a
contest for a prize. Subjects’ decision of the level of exerted effort may be driven
by some emotional factors. For example, it depends on the arousal of anxiety that
occurs in a competitive setting. My hypothesis is that anxiety improves subjects’
performance. This hypothesis is supported by the Processing Efficiency Theory
(Eysenck and Calvo, 1992) according to which the individual’s initial effect to anxiety
is negative because worries interfere with attention to the task-relevant information,
thus reducing the resources potentially available for the task. However, anxiety has
a motivational function that induces the subject to increase effort and therefore to
boost performance in order to:
[...] avoid the likely aversive consequences of poor performance. [A]nxious
subjects try to cope with threat and worry allocating additional resources
(i.e. effort) and/or initiating processing activities (i.e. strategies)
(Eysenck and Calvo, 1992, p. 415).
I expect therefore that an increase in anxiety can improve performance because the
individual is motivated to increase effort to such an extent that it counterbalances
and exceeds the initial negative impact of worry8.
The level of exerted effort (and the likelihood of winning of each participant)
in contests also depends on the individual’s risk attitude since the outcome of a
contest is typically uncertain. A number of authors have investigated the effects
of risk aversion in contests. Many of them compare equilibria under risk aversion
with the corresponding contest in which players are risk neutral and investigate
whether risk aversion reduces total effort on rent-seeking. Results have usually
8The first essay of this thesis discusses more in details how anxiety improves performance.
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shown that risk aversion decreases rent-seeking efforts. However, the results have
been obtained under restricted specifications. For instance, Hillman and Katz (1984)
assume that the rent is ‘small’. Skaperdas and Gan (1995) consider rent-seekers’
utility functions with constant absolute risk aversion and assume that the contest
success function is logistic with a power or exponential form. Konrad and Schlesinger
(1997) using general utility and contest success functions indicate that “it is possible
for the contest with risk averse players to dissipate more of the rents than the same
contest with risk neutral players” (p. 1677). This suggests that risk aversion has an
ambiguous effect on rent-seeking efforts.
Millner and Pratt (1991) carried out an experiment that investigates the possi-
bility that risk attitude may explain rent overdissipation. They grouped together
more risk averse participants and they compared effort in aggregate between groups.
Results show that the more risk averse group exerted lower effort in aggregate than
the less risk averse group9.
Following this experimental evidence I expect that the more risk averse individu-
als will exert less effort than less risk averse individuals.
Individual behaviour in contests depends on gender as well. A number of
experimental studies do find gender differences in behaviour and performance (Croson
and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). Specifically, women are less likely
to enter tournaments than men are (Vesterlund and Nierderle, 2007; Balafoutas and
Sutter, 2012) and they do not perform as well as men under tournament incentives
(Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004). Differences in performance
between men and women depend on the type of task as well. Gneezy and Rustichini
(2004) used a field setting wherein pairs of schoolboys and schoolgirls compete in a
footrace. In this type of task, boys achieved better performance relative to girls.
Researchers explain gender differences with individuals’ degree of confidence and
9The effects of risk aversion in contests have been largely discussed (van Long and Vousden,
1987; Treich, 2010; Cornes and Hartley, 2012, 2003; Yamazaki, 2008).
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attitude toward competition10. Since there is no possibility for participants in my
experiment to choose whether to enter the competition or not, I can observe their
decision of investment only. Following the experimental evidence, I should expect
that men will exert more effort than women in contests and hence they will perform
better.
Therefore, I formalize my hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Anxiety does not affect performance in contests.
against
Hypothesis 1a: Anxiety positively affects performance in contests.
Hypothesis 1 follows the neoclassical economic theory: emotions do not affect
agents’ performance in contests. The alternative behavioural hypothesis (hypothesis
1a) refers to the Processing Efficiency Theory, an established theory in psychology
that states the motivational function of anxiety on task performance.
Assuming that there is equivalence between effort tasks, any (positive) effect of
an anxious mood would not change across treatments.
Based on the evidence in the experimental literature on the effects of risk attitude
and gender on performance in contests, I will formalize my null and alternative
hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Risk aversion does not affect individuals’ performance in con-
tests.
10Gender differences can be explained, though not completely, by differences in attitude toward
risk: women tend to be more risk averse than men, they bid more aggressively and hence they
receive significantly lower earnings from the contests than men (Morgan et al., 2012; Ong and
Chen, 2012; Price and Sheremeta, 2012).
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Hypothesis 2a: The higher the risk aversion, the lower the individuals’ perfor-
mance in contests.
Hypothesis 3: There is no gender difference in performance when men and
women compete in contests.
Hypothesis 3a: Men perform better than women in contests.
Assuming that there is equivalence between effort tasks, any effect of risk aversion
would not change across treatments. Any gender effects would be consistent across
treatments as well. Effects of anxiety, risk aversion and gender might have different
magnitude but they should have the same direction on individuals’ performance in
each treatment.
3.3.2 Design and Procedure
The experiment was conducted in Spring 2012 at the Zicer laboratory of the Centre
for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East
Anglia. Instructions, control questionnaire and experimental tasks were computer-
ized11. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). 206 subjects (46% male and 54% female) aged between 18
and 43 took part in the 24 sessions. All of them were university students, enrolled
in different schools (only 12% were Economics students); 54% had British nationality.
Each session lasted approximately one hour. Subjects were randomly assigned to
the seats in the lab where partitions between them assured the anonymity and the
avoidance of any communication. Instructions were read aloud and the experimenter
checked individually the participants’ answers to the control questionnaire12.
Sessions consisted of three stages: 1) in the first stage participants were asked to
fill in a questionnaire; 2) in the second stage participants were asked to participate
11Participants received paper instructions as well.
12See Appendix B.1 for experimental instructions.
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in a 2-player contest; and 3) in the last stage subjects completed a risk aversion
questionnaire.
The Initial Questionnaire
At the beginning of each session, before receiving the instructions for the successive
tasks of the experiment, participants were asked to fill in the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI) questionnaire by C. Spielberger (1976). This questionnaire aims
to assess the current anxious state (State-Anxiety) and the proneness to anxiety
(Trait-Anxiety) of subjects. It consists of 20 questions on the State-Anxiety and 20
questions on the Trait-Anxiety and it is framed in order to avoid any kind of demand
effect13. The STAI questionnaire assigns two scores, one for State-Anxiety and
another for Trait-Anxiety; for each subject there are therefore two measurements
from 0 to 8014.
The Contest and the Effort Tasks
In the second stage of the session participants received the instructions for a 2-player
contest. They were asked in fact to enter a competition against another participant
in the room in order to win a prize of 10 pounds.
The competition is designed as an all-pay auction, a type of contest in which the
contestant who expends the highest effort wins the prize with probability 1. Both
players have a positive valuation of the prize, they both know their own valuation
and the valuation of their opponent. Contestants choose their effort ei ∈ [0,∞)
simultaneously, and the cost of effort is linear C(ei) = ei.
Therefore, in the case of two contestants i = 1, 2 contestant 1 wins with probability
13In Chapter 2 of the thesis I have described more in details the procedure of the STAI
questionnaire.
14Scores are adjusted according to the number of not answered questions. If there are 3 or more
questions not answered for each set of questions (Trait or State), the score for that set is considered





1 if e1 > e2
1
2 if e1 = e2
0 if e1 < e2
(3.1)
The probability with which contestant 2 wins is p2 = 1− p1.
Contestant 1’s payoff is
pi1 =

Pw − e1 if e1 > e2
5− e1 if e1 = e2
Pl − e1 if e1 < e2
(3.2)
where Pw and Pl are the prizes given to the winner and to the loser of the tournament
respectively15.
Contestants’ effort in this experiment is given by the performance in the effort task.
Four different effort tasks, the “Slider Task”, the “Maths Task”, the “Grid Task” and
the “Induced Value Effort Task” were applied separately in four different treatments,
Treatment A, B, C and D respectively. Table 3.1 shows some experimental details
for each treatment16.
Participants dealing with the Slider Task saw on their computer screen forty-eight
sliders, with a range of integer values from 0 to 100, appeared at position zero17 and
they were asked to position with the help of their mouse each slider in the central
15In this experiment Pw is equal to £10 and Pl is zero pounds.
16Treatments were run on a between-subject basis. The number of subjects per treatment is
slightly different because some students did register for the session but they did not show up. The
average payment per subject was 10 pounds and the payment was based on subjects’ performance.
Participants received a show-up fee of £3 in the sessions where a real effort task was applied
(Treatment A, B and C) in order to align the average payment between treatments. In treatment
D, in fact, average earnings from the effort task was already high because the endowment not
invested was converted in pounds and paid to subjects. In the other treatments there was no initial
endowment.
17Sliders appeared at the very left position. See Appendix B.2 for a screen shot (Figure B.1).
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Table 3.1: Experimental Treatments, Effort Tasks and Number of Subjects
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C Treatment D
Slider Task Maths Task Grid Task Induced Value Effort Task
50 participants 54 participants 52 participants 50 participants
Total: 206 participants
position (value 50). Once the slider was dropped, the value of its position was shown
to the right. If not 50, participants could adjust the position again. There was
no limit on the number of attempts per each slider. Students had two minutes to
correctly position as many sliders as they could. Subjects’ performance is given by
the number of sliders correctly positioned in two minutes18.
For the Maths Task participants were asked to sum a series of four 2-digit num-
bers that appeared on their screen. They were provided of a list of operations and
they were asked to solve as many as they could in the time constraint (2 minutes).
The number of correct answers gives the subject’s performance. Table 3.2 shows an
example of this task19.
For the Grid Task a 5 by 5 grid appeared on the screen and subjects were asked
to count the number of ones randomly assigned in the cells. They had two minutes
to solve as many grid as they could20. An additional difficulty characterized this
task: some numbers in the grid disappear after few second. However, those numbers
needed to be taken into account in the counting. In this task, participants’ effort is
18Guidance and practical advice of the use of this task have been followed.
19Participants could see on the screen only one question per time. After submitting their answer,
they could proceed to the next question.
20This task is similar to the task by Abeler et al. (2011). Their task consisted of a series of
10 by 15 grids filled in randomly by numbers zeros and ones. Subjects were asked to count the
number of zeros in each grid. No time limit was imposed.
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Table 3.2: Mathematics Tasks
Please add up the following numbers:
Question 1: 21 + 23 + 45 + 67 + 88 =
Question 2: 34 + 14 + 44 + 67 + 19 =
Question 3: 51 + 65 + 21 + 13 + 33 =
Question 4: 82 - 13 + 49 + 72 - 15 =
... ....
given by the number of grid correctly solved21.
In Treatment D I have used an Induced-Value Effort Task: participants were
endowed with ten experimental points and they had to decide how much to invest
and how much to keep for themselves22. The part of endowment not invested (if
any) was converted in pounds and paid to subjects at the end of the experiment.
Participants with the highest investment won the prize (one prize per pair).
In each treatment subjects repeated the effort task for ten rounds. They did
not receive any feedback between rounds. At the end of the session one round
was randomly selected for the payment. Contestants with the highest performance
(or investment) in each pair won the prize. If contestants had the same level of
performance (or investment) the prize was randomly assigned by the computer to
one of the two.
Risk-measurement Questionnaire
In the third stage participants completed the Holt-Laury Questionnaire23, an in-
centive compatible lottery widely used to measure subjects’ risk aversion. The risk
21See an example of a screen shot in Appendix B.2 (Figure B.2).
22Invested amounts could be up to two decimal points.
23Holt and Laury (2002).
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aversion measure can take values from 0 to 9. The higher the number the more risk
averse the participants.
At the end of the experiment, a computer screen showed to participants some
information on their payment: the outcome of the lottery, the selected round of the
effort task, the outcome of the contest and hence the final earnings. In each session
pairs were fixed and there was no feedback within rounds.
Emotions Elicitation
To get a measure of the anxiety arousal during the contest subjects were asked to
elicit their emotional state using the Visual Analogue Scale (VAS): a bar appeared
on the screen whose value 0 indicated the mood evaluation “not anxious at all” and
value 100 the mood evaluation “very much anxious”. The bar could take any integer
number between zero and 100 and participants could scroll the bar up to the desired
position. The VAS measurement has been applied three times in the session: at the
beginning of the real effort task, after 5 rounds, and at the end of the last round.
The same type of measurement was applied to collect data on emotional arousals
of other 7 emotions. The used list is by Slyker and McNally (1991): tiredness,
despondency, frustration, apprehension, tiredness, happiness, anger24.
In this analysis the self-elicitation arousal values collected before the first round
and before the 6th round of the effort task will be considered as the main explanatory
variables of the subjects’ mood while the arousal anxiety values at the end of the
tenth round of the effort task will be used as control for subjects’ current emotional
state. Table 3.3 shows the procedure of the experiment.
3.4 Results
Performance
24Slyker and McNally (1991) tested the relative effectiveness of some mood inducement procedures
for anxious and depressed moods.
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Table 3.3: Procedure of the Experiment
STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3
STAI Questionnaire
Instructions - Practice Round
Emotion Elicitation (VAS)
5 rounds Effort Task
Emotion Elicitation (VAS)




Figure 3.1 shows that performance increases over time especially in treatments
where a real effort task was used, indicating some learning effects. The red vertical
line in the figure indicates the fifth round: at the end of this round subjects’ emotions
arousal was elicited. On average, after the fifth round subjects’ performance increases
monotonically in the slider task and in the maths task. The Spearman correlation
coefficients are positive and strongly significant (slider task: 0.222; maths task: 0170).
Also in the grid task there is a positive trend after the fifth round, as confirmed by a
significant Spearman coefficient (0.103). Learning effects do not appear in the treat-
ment where an induced value effort task is applied: on average performance does not
increase monotonically. The Spearman correlation coefficient is in fact not significant.
Treatment C (the grid task) allows us to observe the highest heterogeneity
between subjects (highest variance) in both sets of rounds (Table 3.4).
In the slider task (Treatment A) the maximum number of sliders that participants
can correctly position is 48 per round; they can decide to not do the task at all (so
that the minimum is 0). However, at least 6 and at most 32 sliders were correctly
positioned in 2 minutes. The maths task and the grid task seem to be more difficult
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Figure 3.1: Performance Trend
tasks: at least one subject could not solve any mathematical question or grid. There
is no upper limit in questions/grid that could be solved for the maths task and for the
grid task: the computer could generate an infinite number of grids or mathematical
questions in 2 minutes. The best that participants could do is 12 for the maths task
and 25 for the grid task. Performance (or investment) in the induced value effort
task has a much defined range value because subjects receive an endowment of 10
experimental points and they cannot neither invest more than that nor invest a
negative amount. The modal range value for the investment decision is between 3.5
and 4. However, some participants decided to invest everything or not at all (see
Table 3.4)25.
25Figure B.3 and Figure B.4 in Appendix B.2 show the distribution of average performance in
each treatment. It is straightforward to notice how individuals’ heterogeneity is more evident in
treatments where a real effort task has been used compared to treatment D where participants
carried out the induced value effort task. It seems that the heterogeneity due to individuals’
difference in skills might affect the average performance level.
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Table 3.4: Aggregate Descriptive Statistics of Performance - by Sets of Rounds
Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Rounds 1 - 5
Slider Task 250 18.04 4.329 6 28
Maths Task 270 4.27 1.953 0 9
Grid Task 260 10.43 6.059 0 25
Ind. Value Effort Task 250 3.79 3.595 0 10
Rounds 6 - 10
Slider Task 250 19.95 4.532 9 34
Maths Task 270 4.98 2.303 0 12
Grid Task 260 11.91 6.031 0 25
Ind. Value Effort Task 250 3.73 3.719 0 10
A Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test and the t-test have been run to check for sig-
nificance between sets of rounds. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test confirms that
performance is significantly different between the two sets of rounds in treatments
in which a real effort task is used (slider task, maths task, and the grid task). The
t-test indicates that performance is higher in the second half of the rounds in those
treatments. No difference among rounds can be found in Treatment D where an
induced value effort task is applied26.
Although comparing the performance values and distributions among treatments
could bring some interesting discussion points, it is very important to clarify that
the present work does not wish to make any claim on the difference in performance
between treatments. Rather my focus will be on how some independent variables,
e.g anxiety, risk attitude, and gender can affect a dependent variable (individuals’
performance) in a significantly different way according to the effort task used.
26Table B.1 in Appendix B.2 shows the z-values for the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test and the
t-values for the t-test with the correspondent p-values.
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Table 3.5: Anxiety, Performance by Gender, and Risk Aversion - Average Values
Slider Task Maths Task Grid Task Ind. Value Effort Task
Treat. A Treat. B Treat. C Treat. D
Rounds 1 - 5
Anxiety 45.12 56.07 49.67 26.42
Performance - Male 19.508 4.6 10.928 3.246
Performance - Female 16.685 4.067 9.963 4.341
Rounds 6 - 10
Anxiety 40.20 59.41 43.21 24.88
Performance - Male 21.7 5.257 12.168 3.189
Performance - Female 18.323 4.806 11.681 4.264
Risk Aversion 5.38 5.91 5.5 6.12
Anxiety
On average the level of anxiety is higher for participants that carried out the
mathematical task (Treatment B) compared to participants that faced the other
tasks in both sets of rounds (Table 3.5). Differently from the other treatments, the
level of anxiety in Treatment B increases in the second set of five rounds. Overall the
real effort tasks used allow us to see a similar range of variance in the elicitation of
the average level of anxiety (see Table B.3 in Appendix B.2 for summary statistics).
The difference in average level of elicited anxiety between the two sets of rounds in
the treatment where the grid task is applied (Treatment C) is statistically significant
at the 10% level as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows (z-value = 1.662, p-value =
0.096)27. The differences in the average elicited anxiety in the other treatments are
not significant28.
27A t-test indicates that subjects dealing with the grid task elicited a significantly higher average
level of anxiety in the first five rounds compared with the second five rounds (t-value = 1.925,
p-value = 0.029).
28The Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows in Treatment A (slider task) that subjects have elicited
a higher average level of anxiety at the beginning of the first round compared the average level of
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Risk attitude
Table 3.5 shows that on average participants were more risk averse when the
induced value effort task was applied (Treatment D). A high degree of risk aversion
compared to Treatment A and C is captured in Treatment B as well where the
maths task was applied29. Subjects that in Treatment D faced the induced value
effort task were significantly more risk averse than subjects performing the slider
task in Treatment A and significantly more risk averse than subjects performing the
grid task in Treatment C30.
Performance by Gender
In both sets of rounds men perform significantly better than women in the slider
task and in the maths task (Treatment A and B)31. There is instead no significant
difference between the average performance in Treatment C (grid task) between
men and women. In both set of rounds all participants perform roughly at the same
level. On the contrary, women decided on average to invest significantly more than
men in the induced value effort task (Treatment C) in both sets of rounds32.
Regressions on Subjects’ Performance
Table 3.6 shows the estimates of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models
with error clustering on the aggregate level of performance33 of the first five rounds of
the effort task. The independent variables include the VAS score on anxiety, the risk
anxiety elicited at the beginning of the sixth round (10% level of significance). See Table B.2 in
Appendix B.2.
29See Table B.4 in Appendix B.2 for descriptive statistics on risk aversion.
30Two-sample t tests and Wilcoxon ranksum tests were calculated.
31See Table B.5 in Appendix B.2 for descriptive statistics on performance by gender.
32Two-sample t tests and Wilcoxon ranksum tests were calculated.
33The use of clusters provides a robust standard error per group (that is, per subject). Sashegyi
et al. (2000) argue that where observations over time are taken for different group of subjects an
econometric model must control both for intra-cluster correlation and intra-individual correlation
within the same cluster.
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aversion score given by the Holt-Laury lottery, the State-Anxiety and Trait-Anxiety
score and some demographic information on participants: gender (Male = 1 if
the subject is male), school (School of ECO = 1 if the subject is enrolled in the
School of Economics at the University of East Anglia), and nationality (British Na-
tionality = 1 if the subject is British). The age of each participant is included as well.
Table 3.6: Regressions with Error Clustering on Performance of the First 5 Rounds
Slider Task Maths Task Grid Task Ind. Value Task
Anxiety 0.027 -0.017 -0.061** 0.007
Risk Aversion 0.147 -0.135 0.840** -0.133
State-Anxiety -0.006 0.028 0.083 0.006
Trait-Anxiety -0.146** 0.013 -0.096 0.043
Male 2.54** 0.298 -0.112 -0.777
Age -0.087 0.029 -0.246 0.113
British Nationality -2.164** 0.422 4.618** -0.511
School of ECO -3.457 -0.548 3.552 0.302
Constant 24.029*** 3.510 11.855 0.308
Clusters 47 53 52 49
Observations 235 265 260 245
R-Square 0.2381 0.0891 0.2321 0.0773
F - test 3.88 0.92 2.33 1.23
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
There is strong evidence that a higher level of elicited anxiety negatively affects
subjects’ performance in the treatment in which the grid task was applied (Treatment
C): an increase in anxiety level brings to deterioration in performance. Anxiety
seems not to be a determinant of subjects’ performance when the other effort tasks
are applied. Rejecting hypothesis 1, anxiety does affect performance in contests
when the grid task is applied. However, the same direction of effects is not observed
when the other effort tasks are applied.
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In the same treatment (Treatment C - grid task) risk aversion is strongly signifi-
cant as well. It positively affects participants’ performance. In the other treatments,
however, this variable does not show a significant coefficient. Rejecting hypothesis
2, risk aversion does affect performance in contests when the grid task is applied.
However, the same direction of effects is not observed when the other effort tasks
are applied.
Male participants seem to perform better than female participants in the slider
task and in the maths task compared to the other tasks. As predicted by the hy-
pothesis 3a, male participants perform significantly better than female participants.
However, this happens only in Treatment A (the slider task).
The variable that represents the proneness to anxiety, measured by the Trait-
Anxiety score, has a negative coefficient in the treatments where either the slider
task or the grid task is used. However, only in the former one the coefficient is
significant at 5% level34.
The same group of independent variables (anxiety, risk aversion, State-Anxiety
score and Trait-Anxiety score, and four demographic information) are used to
estimate the coefficients of OLS regressions with error clustering on the level of
performance in the second five rounds. However, in these new models I consider the
level of elicited anxiety (VAS score) submitted by subjects at the beginning of sixth
round. Table 3.7 shows the coefficients of the regression models.
From the two sets of regressions described above (Table 3.6 and Table 3.7) I can
highlight the following results:
34The Spearman correlation coefficient between performance and the Trait-Anxiety score has
a negative and significant sign. See Table B.6 in Appendix B.2. Graph B.9 and Table B.7 in
Appendix B.2 show the distribution of the scores of Trait-Anxiety and some summery statistics of
the scores of Trait-Anxiety respectively.
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Table 3.7: Error Clustering on Performance of the Second Set of 5 Rounds
Slider Task Maths Task Grid Task Ind. Value Task
Anxiety -0.000 -0.026** -0.046* 0.023
Risk-Aversion -0.219 -0.092 0.459 -0.171
State-Anxiety 0.005 0.033 -0.011 -0.004
Trait-Anxiety -0.090 0.015 -0.051 0.044
Male 3.268** 0.202 -0.914 -0.691
Age 0.020 0.144 -0.137 0.134
British Nationality -2.630** 0.948 4.447** -0.633
School of ECO -0.741 -0.828 5.263* -0.719
Constant 24.031*** 1.686 13.794* 0.101
Clusters 47 53 52 49
Observations 235 265 260 245
R-Square 0.2438 0.1264 0.1704 0.1180
F - test 3.87 1.92 1.32 1.66
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
RESULT 1. Rejecting hypothesis 1, anxiety negatively affects performance in
contests.
However, the same direction of effects is not observed across treatments.
RESULT 2. Rejecting hypothesis 2, risk aversion positively affects performance
(in the first set of rounds) when the grid task is applied.
However, the same direction of effects is not observed across treatments.
RESULT 3. As predicted by hypothesis 3a, male participants achieve higher
level of performance than female participants in contests.
However, male participants achieve higher level of performance than female
participants when the slider task is applied. The same direction of effects is not
observed across treatments.
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Assuming equivalence between effort tasks, I should notice that any kind of
direction on performance caused by an anxious mood, risk aversion, gender is
replicated in every treatment, regardless the effort task used. Results show that
participants’ performance is differently affected by the same group of explanatory
variables according to the effort task used.
In addition to the variables used so far, I have considered the other seven emo-
tions elicited together with anxiety at the beginning of the round one and at the
beginning of round six35.
Also considering other emotional states and not only anxiety I find that results
vary across treatments where the only factor that changes is the effort task applied36.
The same type of results is provided by the estimates of the Random Effects
Model (RE) and Generalized Linear Model (GLM). We find that the RE regression
estimates and the GLM estimates converge to OLS regression estimates for all the
treatments (see Tables B.11, B.12, B.13, and B.14 for the GLM estimates and Tables
B.15, B.16, B.17, and B.18 for the RE estimates in Appendix B.2). For my data
an error clustering model seems the most appropriate considering the nature of my
independent variables (time-invariant variables). All the models allow us to control
for the subjects’ level non independence of observations.
35Graphs B.7 and B.8 in Appendix B.2 show the percentage of participants’ emotional arousal
at the beginning of the first round and at the beginning of the sixth round respectively. Graph B.6
in Appendix B.2 shows instead the percentage of participants’ emotional arousal at the end of the
tenth round.
36The sign and the significance of the other variables in the regressions also change among
treatments. For example, risk aversion is positive and significant in Treatment C (grid task) while
it can be negative in other treatments. The same for Trait-Anxiety whose coefficient in Treatment
A (slider task) is negative as well as in Treatment C (grid task) but positive in the other two
treatments. However, it is significant only in Treatment A. British nationality has a positive and
significant effect only on performance in Treatment C (grid task).
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3.5 Discussion
In this chapter I have tried to answer the following question: “does it matter which
effort task you use in the economic experimental laboratory?”. This research question
arises from the methodological discussion about the use of effort tasks in the lab.
Effort tasks are widely applied in economic experiments in different research areas:
gift-exchange games, contests, sequential labour markets, etc. In my experiments
subjects are asked to perform a task where they choose or exert real effort. Hence,
the task can be an induced value effort task or a real effort task.
Although real and chosen effort have been implicitly assumed to lead to similar
results, several factors might be responsible for differences between the two methods.
The introduction of a real effort task can trigger heuristics developed in everyday
experience which might not be present when subjects are asked to make a choice
between a list of numbers. As pointed out by van Dijk et al. (2001), “[work] involves
effort, fatigue, boredom, excitement and other affections not present in the abstract
experiments” (p. 189), where a (almost effortless) choice of costs on a convex or
linear function is supposed to be a reliable measure for real effort.
In addition, intrinsic utility might be derived from work. There is some evidence
that people are more willing to provide voluntary work, than contributing money,
for a given purpose (van Dijk et al., 2001). Moreover, results of a real effort task
should be seen by subjects under their control and not due to innate abilities or
other. Hypothetically real effort tasks minimize the individual differences in abilities
and show the real subjects’ decision on the level of effort to exert. Real clerical tasks
in general allow us to observe how task learning, individual skills, and motivation
interact with each other.
On the other hand, the introduction of more realism in lab experiments by
implementing real effort tasks comes at the considerable cost of losing some control
over important variables. This control is assured by the induced value method.
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With an induced value effort task the experimenter can impose the cost of disutility
associated with the task and control for subjective costs of decisions. Subjects’
outcome is in fact a function of effort, abilities and previous experience. The
observation of only outcomes in real effort experiments adds complexity to the
analysis of the data and to the possibility of disentangling between those factors in
order to actually evaluate the real level of effort exerted.
This work does not aim to promote one technique over another and to claim the
advantages of one laboratory method over another. In this work I point out that the
choice of an effort task in laboratory experiments should be considered carefully, and
most of all, experimenters should acknowledge that their results strongly depend on
the type of effort task used, no matter if participants are asked to choose a level of
costly effort or to exert real effort. As previously discussed, real effort tasks differ
between each other substantially. They can be cognitive or physical tasks (or a
combination of both) and their operationalization can be carried out in a completely
different way. First of all, it is not clear which proxy can offer a reliable measure of
effort (quantity of the output, quality of the output, level of task difficulty chosen,
time spent on the task) and second, it is a priori difficult to establish whether
subjects will derive any utility from performing the task. While some experimenters
believe that the the task should be very easy, mechanical and
mind-numbing [task] devoid of any intrinsic motivation [..] that partici-
pants view as being utterly uninteresting and without any redeeming
value (Heyman and Ariely, 2004, p. 790)
others do not exclude that some of the participants might enjoy performing it. Or
alternatively, applying a task very easy and without any potential interest could be
dangerous as well, in the sense that participants could get bored very quickly and
decide to give up the task. Therefore, a task does not have to be boring to minimize
the differences in latent ability or intrinsic interest.
In this experiment I used three real effort tasks and an induced value effort task.
87
The three real effort tasks can be considered relatively easy and mechanical, and
somehow all of them can trigger some positive utility in performing them. The
allotted time is the same for all the tasks37 and the same measure of the outcome -
the quantity - is applied.
The behavioural hypotheses in such a competitive economic setting refer to
emotional arousal, and in particular anxiety, to risk aversion, and to gender ef-
fects. These factors can affect subjects’ performance. Specifically, I expect that an
anxious mood has a positive impact on individuals’ performance consistently with
the Processing Efficiency Theory which states the motivational function of anxiety.
The initial emotional status of worries that might bring to negative consequences
on performance and payoffs acts as an incentive to exert more effort. Moreover,
performance can be affected by the individual’s degree of risk aversion. According
to the experimental literature, risk averse agents would exert lower effort. Finally,
I expect gender difference in performance: men perform better than women in a
competitive setting, according to a well-established experimental economic literature
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011; Gneezy et al., 2003;
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004).
Assuming equivalence between effort tasks, I should notice that any kind of
direction on performance caused by an anxious mood, risk aversion, gender (or by
other variables considered) is replicated in every treatment, regardless the effort
task used.
Results show that participants’ performance is differently affected by the same
group of explanatory variables according to the effort task used. There is evidence
that the mathematical task and the grid task are anxiety inducing: the more the
anxiety the worse the performance. On the contrary, the effects of anxiety on
individuals’ performance take completely different direction when either the slider
37It is the same for the induced value effort task as well.
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task or the induced value effort task is used. This suggests that the nature of the
real effort task strongly characterizes the exertion of effort, in this case inducing
anxiety. It is well known in the literature on mood inducement techniques that
mathematical tasks are anxiety inducing. Psychologists use this task in the labora-
tory in order to provoke an anxious mood (Keogh and French, 2001; Shostak and
Peterson, 1990; Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001). This work shows that the grid task might
bring participants to an anxious status as well as the maths task. The mathematical
task, very often used in economic experiments, and the grid task do not appear to
be equivalent either to the slider task or to the chosen effort task. Their features
might substantially alter subjects’ performance.
Contrary to Miller and Pratt (1991) established experimental findings, there
is evidence that a high degree of risk aversion positively affects subjects’ perfor-
mance when the grid task is applied. However, the same direction of effects on
performance is not observed when the other effort tasks are used. Experiments
in the literature have used induced value effort tasks. Therefore, my result might
be due once more to the nature of the effort task. For example, when subjects
deal with the grid task, the higher the risk aversion the higher their performance.
The same conclusion cannot be drawn if I consider the results of the other treatments.
Finally, there is evidence of gender effects in contests, where men do perform
better than women, but only in Treatment A where subjects carried out the slider
task, confirming the literature findings on the effect of the nature of the task on
performance differences between men and women.
Other explanatory variables, as for example alternative emotional status, attempt
to explain subjects’ performance in contests. The same observation holds: there is
no consistent effect of these variables on individuals’ performance among treatments.
The effect of anxiety on performance does not depend on the specific measure
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of anxiety. Other measures of (state and trait) anxiety are in the regressions38.
The proneness to anxiety (Trait-Anxiety) for example matters only for participants
carrying out the slider task. Other emotions have been considered as well. Anger,
sadness, despondency and frustration are very significant only in some treatments.
It is important to point out that my discussion on the variables of this experiment
does not refer to the magnitude of their impact on participants’ level of performance.
I am not interested in either measuring the relative effects of each variable through
treatments or proposing the advantage of one type of task over another. My claim
in this work is that the significance of the independent variables considered on
performance strongly depends on the effort task used and that experimental results
may be largely driven by the experimental method. Many experimenters present
their results and stress the importance of the impact of the factors studied on their
main variable without considering the strong role that their chosen effort task has
on their results. Their results might have a completely different interpretation if a
different effort task is happened to be used.
Surprisingly, no regular check of the robustness of the laboratory results is usually
carried out. A single task has typically been implemented in each study and little
has been said about the implications of different abilities and skills required in each
task. An exception is Brüggen and Strobel (2007): they compared the mathematical
task with an induced value effort task in a gift-exchange game. They examine the
differences between the effect of levels of wages on individuals’ effort in the setting
of a chosen effort (induced effort task) and a real effort (real effort task). They find
individuals reciprocate to higher level of wages exerting more effort and therefore
they conclude that the two laboratory methods bring similar results. However, they
carefully highlight the presence of a higher variance under real effort and that the
reciprocal behaviour of individuals is understated under chosen effort. Subjects in
fact achieve on average a level of performance four times higher when they solve the
38Graph B.5 in Appendix B.2 shows the distribution of the scores of State Anxiety. Summary
statistics of the scores of State Anxiety are shown in Table B.19 in Appendix B.2 as well.
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mathematical task39.
The claim that the level of effort exerted, and hence the participants’ performance,
might depend on the relevance of the task to some groups of participants (stereotypes)
can arise. This claim look at the extensive research that follows the pioneering study
by Steele and Aronson (1995). The authors carried out various investigations on the
performance of African Americans on standardized academic tests. They aimed to
find out whether the stereotype about Black persons’ intellectual ability was relevant
to their performance. Results show that Black participants greatly underperformed
White participants when Black participants were asked to record their race on a
demographic questionnaire filled in before the tests. Steele and Aronson provided
strong evidence of the so-called stereotype threat: salience of the racial stereotype
alone was enough to depress the performance of identified Black students.
Another series of experiments (Steele, 1997) on the stereotype about women’s
lower maths ability produced the same pattern. Women performed worse than
men when they were told that the test aimed to check any gender difference.
Steele explained that experimental conditions in which the possibility of gender
differences was left to inference (rather than stated directly) did not impair women’s
performance by triggering doubts about their maths ability. Rather, any performance
frustration and impairment came from the awareness of the possible gender-based
ability limitation alleged in the stereotype.
In my experiment I can rule out the possibility that performance was affected by
any stereotype threat linked to the type of the effort task. I did not make salient, in
fact, any group identity and I did not state in the instructions of the experiment any
scope related to gender, race, nationality, etc. Moreover, participants were randomly
matched in pairs.




Effort tasks are widely used by experimentalists in laboratory economic experiments
in order to collect measurements on participants’ level of performance or investments.
There are many effort tasks developed in the economic literature and they can be
categorized in two groups: real effort tasks and induced value effort tasks. The
former group refers to those tasks that require a substantial effort to be performed.
Induced value effort tasks instead highlight the subject’s choice of level of investment
(or effort).
There is a wide consensus between experimental economists that while real effort
tasks offer more realistic measurements of subjects’ exerted effort, induced value
effort tasks allow to have full control on the experimental environment and thus on
the explanatory variables of the economic setting.
What, on the contrary, does not receive full attention from researchers is the
possibility that effort tasks used in the laboratory can substantially affect the exper-
imental results. Generally, real effort tasks are considered to be similar as far as
they minimize as much as possible the personal skills involved in the task. Moreover,
it is implicitly assumed that real effort tasks and induced value effort tasks lead to
similar results.
From the importance that a correct use of the effort tasks has in the experimental
methodology my research questions follow: does it matter which effort task you
use in the experimental economic laboratory? Are experimental results driven by
the type of effort task chosen? Do experimental economics have to account for the
significant effect of the effort task on their results?
In order to answer my research questions I ran an economic experiment consist-
ing of four identical treatments expect for the effort task used. In my experiment
participants compete in a contest for a prize. Their investments’ measure was given
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by the performance in an effort task that they were asked to carry out for ten rounds.
In three treatments I applied three different real effort tasks: the slider task, the
maths tasks and the grid task. In the fourth treatment I used an induced value
effort tasks.
Theoretically, all the effort tasks are equivalent and they should bring similar
results. On the contrary, results differ quite significantly between treatments where
everything is identical except the effort task. My main variables, e.g. anxiety, risk
aversion, and gender, might or might not significantly affect the provision of effort.
The type of effort task used significantly affect subjects’ performance.
Since the treatments of this experiment are identical in the procedure and
material used except for the effort task applied, then I can conclude that there is no
equivalence between effort tasks. The choice of a specific task to be implemented in
the economic laboratory raises definitely a crucial methodological issue: the use of
these tools affects significantly experimental results and experimentalists should be
aware of this issue when they draw their conclusions.
A further experimental investigation can be carried out to explore the potential
impact of the use of effort tasks on the experimental results. For example, it would
be useful to get a deeper understanding of the implication of the nature of each task.
This can be important for the interpretation of the experimental data. Moreover, it




Sabotage: An Experiment on
Tournaments
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we aim to understand (whether and) how procedural fairness in
firms and sabotage issues can together cause difficulty in achieving the principal’s
objectives of productivity and cooperation among workers. Motivating effort and
increasing the productivity of the firm has traditionally been the main objective
of the principal. Economists have always considered the principal’s concern as a
matter of providing adequate individual incentives. However, agents’ effort is not
observable, disutility of work is difficult to estimate for management, and finally
agents have an interest to preserve this natural informational asymmetry.
To motivate workers’ effort many organizations use relative reward scheme, for
example tournaments. In rank-order tournaments agent’s payment depends only on
the rank of his/her performance and not on either the absolute level of performance
or the size of the differences in performance across agents. Tournaments are often
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used for job promotions and career progression.
However, recent studies in economics have highlighted the issue that in tour-
naments agents are likely to engage in counter-productive activities, caused by
rivalry and hostile behaviour (Bose et al., 2010; Lazear, 1989). The possibility to
sabotage a co-worker, even weakly by not being helpful, can negatively affect efficient
cooperation and mutual assistance in team work (Auriol et al., 2002; Kräkel, 2005;
Drago and Turnbull, 1991).
A cooperative work environment is also affected by procedural fairness, namely
the fairness of the set of procedures used to determine outcome relative to workers
in the firm. For example, the allocation of bonuses among workers. If the allocation
rule applied is perceived as unfair than there can be negative consequences on
workers’ productivity (Greenberg, 1990; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Greenberg, 1988,
1989). Fairness of the allocation rule can also be linked to contestants’ expectations
of their opponents’ level of effort and sabotage. For example, agents rewarded
according to an unfair rule might expect to be victim of sabotage. Because of their
high expectations they might bid and/or sabotage more aggressively.
In this chapter we explore the intuition that any procedure applied by the
management to define outcomes as the allocation of monetary bonuses might affect
agents’ behaviour when they compete in tournaments, even though the monetary
bonuses are completely unrelated to the prize structure of the tournaments. Agents’
behaviour in tournaments and their decisions of effort investment and sabotage
should be completely unrelated to the allocation rule used to reward workers. The
prize structure of the tournament is in fact fixed and arranged independently of the
bonus allocation. Assuming profit maximizing agents, in equilibrium they choose
the optimal level of investment and sabotage.
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To investigate whether the procedure used to allocate a monetary reward be-
tween contestants affects their behaviour in tournament we ran two experiments,
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Experiment 1 consists of four treatments: Random
Allocation 1, Meritocracy, Anti-Meritocracy, and Random Allocation 2. In these
treatments participants were ranked according to their individual performance in a
initial (real) effort task. This allowed us to divide subjects into two groups: High
Type participants, who performed better in the task, and Low Type participant,
who performed worse in the task. A High Type participant was thus randomly
matched with a Low Type participant. Pairs were then asked to enter a tournament
where they could win a prize. Before entering the competition participants received
information on their own type, their opponent’s type, and the possibility to be given
a bonus of an extra £5. Moreover, they were informed about the bonus allocation
rule to be applied: randomly between contestants, according to a meritocracy rule
(High Type participants received the bonus), or according to an anti-meritocracy
rule (Low Type participants received the bonus).
In Random Allocation 1, Meritocracy, Anti-Meritocracy treatments subjects
were asked to choose their level of investment1 and sabotage, whereas in the Random
Allocation 2 treatment subjects choose their level of investment only.
In Experiment 2 we incentivised the agents’ elicitation of beliefs of opponents’
investment and sabotage. In this experiment subjects had the possibility to sabotage.
Results show that Low Type participants were more willing to invest when they
were not rewarded and to sabotage their opponents’ investment when they were
rewarded for their comparatively poor performance. Moreover, their decision of
investment and sabotage depended on their expectations of their opponents’ level of
investment and sabotage.
1With investment we mean effort investment.
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After reviewing the literature on tournaments and procedural fairness (Section 2)
we are going to explain in details our research hypotheses, the experimental design
and procedure (Section 3). We will then discuss in two separate sections the results
of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (Sections 4-5). Section 6 discusses and concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
Rank-order tournaments are contests where agents have the opportunity to expend
costly effort in order to affect the probability of winning prizes. Specifically, agents’
effort translate into an observable output which depends on the realization of a
random variable as well. Prizes are awarded to the contestant with the highest
output. Examples of tournaments are examinations, college admission, athletic com-
petitions, and promotions in organizations. Job promotions for example, rank-order
tournaments are often applied as incentive schemes based on relative performance.
This means that workers are rewarded according to the ranking of their outputs.
The seminal paper in this area is by Lazear and Rosen (1981) who started the
formal study of rank-order tournaments in the labour market. In this paper the
theoretical properties of internal labour market tournaments were studied. It was
shown that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient allocation of resources
as an incentive reward scheme based on individual output levels if agents are risk
neutral. However, under some circumstances, risk averse workers actually prefer
to be paid on the basis of rank. Dynamic aspects of multiple stages, elimination
tournaments, number of contestants, distribution of the random variable, and issues
of incomplete information have been investigated in later research (Green and Stokey,
1982; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Rosen, 1986).
Rank-order tournaments have been extensively investigated in the lab. Bull et al.
(1987) did the first laboratory experiment. In this experiment pairs of subjects,
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whose output is the sum of effort and a uniformly distributed productivity shock,
compete for a set of prizes. The aim of this experiment is to test the theoretical
prediction of tournament theory and to compare agents’ effort in a rank-order tour-
nament with a piece-rate incentive scheme. Experimental results showed that the
mean effort levels chosen by subjects converged to their theoretical equilibrium levels.
However, a large and robust variance was observed for all rank-order tournament
experiments while the variance in the piece rate experiment was quite small. Later
experimental findings also largely supported theoretical predictions (Weigelt et al.,
1989; Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Orrison et al.,
2004; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003, 2005; Sheremeta and Wu, 2012).
There is evidence in the experimental literature of over-expenditure in contests2.
Chen (2011) for example observed over-bidding in asymmetric constests, and Krakel
and Nieken (2012) found twice as high effort levels than predicted in a tournament
with minimum productivity requirements.
A very well established finding in the literature on tournaments is that agents
increase their effort in response to an increase in the winner’s prize. Sheremeta and
Wu (2011) tested the comparative statics predictions of the canonical Lazear and
Rosen (1981) tournament theory and consistently with the theory and with other
experimental studies (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2005; Harbring and Lünser, 2008;
Falk et al., 2008) found that the incentive effects of prize spreads is significant. The
authors also found several empirical puzzles that appear to contradict the canonical
theory but that can be explained by a different assumption of the agent’s utility
function3.
2See Sheremeta and Wu (2012) for a survey.
3Specifically, the authors suggest to replace the assumption of a separable agent utility by a
non-separable utility function.
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4.2.1 Sabotage in Tournaments
Lazear (1989) was the first to recognize the negative implications of sabotaging ac-
tivities in tournaments for the efficiency properties of the tournament as an incentive
device. The option of sabotage may cause poor performance of tournaments particu-
larly if the cost of sabotage4 is low compared to the cost of the effort that enhances
an agent’s own performance. In his paper Lazear suggested a counter-measure that
can be taken, that is the “pay compression”, a reduction in the spread between
the payment for the winner and the loser, which typically reduces the incentive to
expend effort that aims to sabotage other competitors. However, this also implies a
reduction in effort that increases the agent’s own performance5.
A way of reducing sabotage among employees within a firm is to introduce
competition from outside: if unsatisfactory performance of a unit or by the firm
overall can cause the firm to go out of business than sabotage would represent an
additional cost. Therefore, in case of competition for promotion the organization
would be better off by appointing someone from outside (Chan, 1996; Chen, 2005).
Shubik (1954) studied the problem of sabotage when contestants are heteroge-
neous. He considered three shooters of different qualities that can shoot at each other
in a randomly determined sequence. Shubik showed that in the case of sequential
shooting the most able shooter will not survive with the highest probability. In fact,
whoever gets an early chance to eliminate an adversary uses her/his shot to try to
eliminate the stronger of the adversaries.
The advantage of eliminating a strong future opponent was explored further in
the literature (Chen, 2003; Münster, 2007). If a player is very good at turning effort
4Sabotage is a costly activity.
5Bose et al. (2010) supported Lazear’s ‘pay equality’ policy by claiming that the principal
often gains more from the reduced sabotage than she/he loses from the inability to tailor the
reward structure to the individual capabilities of team members. The agents also can gain from
the reduced sabotage that an egalitarian reward structure secures.
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into performance, the player will prefer to expend a lot of effort on this instead of
sabotaging her/his opponents. On the contrary less productive players will sabotage
more heavily, especially the most productive player (‘the favourite’) since she/he
is the most dangerous competitor and sabotaging her/him is more effective than
sabotaging a weaker player. In this case the opportunity to sabotage has a strongly
equalizing property (Münster, 2007). However, the number of contestants has to
be sufficiently large so that the total attack is sufficient to make the abler player
perform worse than the less able ones (Chen, 2003).
Gürtler and Münster (2010) discussed the sabotage problem among heteroge-
neous contestants in dynamic tournaments: players have the opportunity to sabotage
after each round of the contest. The authors showed that ‘favourites’ (or abler
players) are sabotaged more strongly than ‘underdogs’ in the final round compared
to static tournaments whereas in the first round6 underdogs are sabotaged more
heavily.
Similar sabotaging issues occur in elimination tournaments when players can try
to influence the outcome of contest rounds that determine their future competitors.
Suppose for example that a contest consists of two rounds, each contestant can
decide whether to help the weaker player in the other semi-final round or not. The
motivation comes from the opportunity to reduce the chance that the stronger player
advances to the final round by helping a weaker player (Amegashie and Runkel,
2006)7.
Relatively little experimental work has been carried out on sabotage in tourna-
ments8. Harbring and Irlenbusch and their co-authors (2005, 2007, 2008, 2011) have
6The authors assume two rounds.
7Deciding to not help a colleague and potential opponent, and in general being reluctant to
behave cooperatively is a weaker form of sabotage. Tournaments are competitive promotion
systems that prevent helping efforts and cooperative behaviour in the organization (Auriol et al.,
2002; Kräkel, 2005; Drago and Turnbull, 1991).
8See Chowduri and Gurlter (2013) for a survey.
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done most of the experiments in this area. Experimental results by Harbring and
Irlenbusch (2005) showed that sabotage activity increases as the spread between
winner and loser prizes widens. Therefore, in the presence of sabotage a principal
who seeks to maximize the total effort expended should optimally reduce the spread
between winner and loser prizes (as compared to the optimal spread when sabotage
is not possible). In their experiment a group of four agents compete in a rank-order
tournament and a fifth agent acts as a principal who has to decide the amount of the
winner and loser prizes. The principal in this experiment can mitigate the impact of
sabotage by chosing an appropriate incentive contract. Similar results were achieved
by Falk et al. (2008).
Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) considered additional aspects of contest designs
that could discourage agents from sabotaging each other, such as the number of
contestants, and the number of prizes to be awarded. They ran experiments with
up to eight participants and they found that increasing the number of winner prizes
does have a significant effect on effort: effort is higher when there are as many winner
prizes as there are the loser prizes. However, participants did not also increase their
sabotage activity. Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011) tested the effects of communi-
cation between both contestants and principal on effort and sabotage, which can
actually reduce destructive activities if agents agree on the prize structure. They
examined the effect of framing as well and they concluded that sabotage is signif-
icantly lower when the laboratory situation was presented as an employment context.
Harbring et al. (2007) ran an experiment on asymmetric tournaments where
heterogeneous players can mutually sabotage each other. Sabotaging behaviour
varies with the composition of the group of contestants: favourites tend to sabotage
each other’s effort more than they sabotage underdogs but underdogs engage in
sabotage with other underdogs as frequently as they do with favourites. Moreover,
the authors found that if the identity of the subject that engages in sabotage can be
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revealed, sabotaging decreases.
Concealing information to contestants as a way to reduce sabotage is considered
by Gürtler and Münster (2010) as well. They showed theoretically and experimentally
that in a two stage tournament agents that exert more effort in the first stage are
sabotaged more than agents that expend less effort in the first stage. Therefore
there is less incentive to exert a high level of effort9. The problem can be solved by
hiding information on contestants’ performance.
None of the studies we have discussed so far considers the impact of agent’s
expectations on opponents’ level of effort and sabotage. To our knowledge only
Uske (2009) has focused on this aspect. He analysed agents’ behaviour with respect
to the equilibrium effort levels in tournaments and he observed that agents tend
to systematically over-bid (to choose a high level of effort). He explained the
observed behaviour through agents’ beliefs (whose elicitation was incentivized):
agents significantly overestimate their opponents and overreacted to their own
beliefs by chosing a high level of investment. In this setting there is no possibility
to sabotage and hence there is no discussion about the belief of the opponent’s level
of sabotage and how this can affect decisions of effort and sabotage as well.
In our study we aim to analyse the impact of different types of procedures through
which a monetary bonus is allocated to agents on their decision of investment of
effort and sabotage. The bonus is allocated to contestants before entering the
competition and it is absolutely independent of the competition itself. We did not
find any work in the literature that shows if and how ‘procedural fairness’ can affect
outcomes in tournaments.
4.2.2 Procedural Fairness
The study of procedural justice (or procedural fairness) has a long tradition in psy-
chology and management. The term is used to describe the fairness of the procedures
9Choices of effort and sabotage were binary.
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used to determine outcome10 for employees. Together with ‘distributive justice’,
which describes the fairness of the outcome an employee receives, it represents the
source of ‘organizational justice’ which refers to the study of the role of fairness as
it directly relates to the workplace (Folger and Greenberg, 1985)11.
Studies in psychology and management have provided evidence on the rela-
tionship between justice perception and work behaviour and have explained how
employees’ job performance may increase or decrease depending on perceptions
of inequitable rewards (Greenberg, 1990; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Greenberg, 1988,
1989). Procedural fairness may be the explanatory variable of employees’ behaviour
in relation to a variety of work aspects such as participation (Moorman, 1991),
budgetary participation, job tension, and interpersonal trust (Lau and Tan, 2006),
etc. Lau and Tan (2006) found that procedural fairness has a full intervening effect
on the relationship between budgetary participation and job tension and that it is
a crucial variable for workers participation and behaviour. The authors claimed
that from a practical perspective it is necessary to pay attention to the fairness of
the procedures designed and applied in organizations. A work environment that
ignores ‘procedural fairness concerns run the risk of creating negative organizational
attitudes, dissatisfaction with principal’s decisions, non-compliance with rules and
procedures’ (Lind and Tyler, 1988, p. 179).
There is a growing literature in economics on procedural fairness (Hoffman and
Spitzer, 1985; Ruﬄe, 1998; Hoffman et al., 1994; Bolton et al., 2005). These studies
demonstrate that different mechanisms that are used to determine the roles in an
experiment can have strong impacts on how fair individuals perceive the situation
10For example rewards.
11One element of organizational justice is the informational justice. The latter is manifested by
providing knowledge about procedures that demonstrate regards for people’s concerns. Workers are
given adequate accounts and explanations of the procedures used to determine desired outcomes
(Muchinsky, 2002).
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to be and that this can have a strong impact on behaviour.
A recent paper by Ku and Salmon (2012) has considered that perceived pro-
cedural unfairness acts as an institutional factor that might make individuals less
tolerant of income inequality. In their setting individuals know ex ante that a
certain growth program proposed by the policy-maker will create income inequal-
ity and they are asked about their willingness to support the program. They
ran a laboratory experiment in which they varied the mechanism which assigned
people to their role (advantaged vs. disadvantaged) and they manipulated the
information displayed regarding the characteristics of each player in a pair. After
receiving this information disadvantaged players were asked to decide how much
of their endowment to pass to the advantaged co-player. The money transferred
jointly with the co-player endowment will generate an investment return which
will be then share between the two players. The mechanism rules they applied
were: random assignment, meritocracy (a mechanism based on performance), ar-
bitrary rule (an assignment rule based on participants’ answers of an arbitrary
question), and corruption (a mechanism that rewards uncooperative and unethical
behaviour). Their experimental results showed that even when the initial positions
or roles were randomly assigned, disadvantaged individuals do not choose a transfer
amount which will maximize their own income (as well as social efficiency). This
confirms the presence of inequity averse preferences, and, particularly compared
to the baseline mechanism (random assignment), disadvantaged individuals make
choices that are associated with lower efficiency (and lowered inequality) when the
other three mechanisms (‘meritocracy’, ‘arbitrary rule’, and ‘corruption’) are applied.
The work by Ku and Salmon (2012) sheds light on the significant impact of
procedural fairness on individual (cooperative and non-cooperative) behaviour.
However, it investigates a situation in which players are asked to decide how much of
their endowment to contribute. It does not consider a competitive setting in which
endowment (or final reward) depends on a competition against other individuals. In
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their experiment there was no opportunity for destructive or hostile activity which
can easily occur in real-life situations.
The latter possibility is explored by Zizzo (2004a). In his experiment participants
received money by betting and possibly by an arbitrary allocation procedure that
aimed to create different perceptions of procedural fairness. Subjects were then asked
to choose both to eliminate and to redistribute some money by taking money from
others. He found that over 80% of the subjects cared about reducing the endowment
of rich subjects at least as much as or more than reducing the endowment of the
poorer ones. The way in which subjects perceived the fairness of the procedure
significantly affected their decision of taking money from others.
4.3 The Experiments: Research Hypotheses, Ex-
perimental Design and Procedure
This research differs from the studies discussed so far since it considers mechanisms
of procedural fairness to allocate an outcome (a monetary reward) to participants
of our experiments before they enter a competition. In the competition they are
asked to choose their level of investment in order to win a prize. Moreover, they are
given the opportunity to sabotage their opponent.
The prize of the competition is independent of the allocation rule of the monetary
reward and therefore we expect that individual behaviour in competition would not
be affected by the allocation rule. However, we do believe that the fairness of the
procedure used to assign the monetary reward would significantly drive participants’
decision of the level of investment and sabotage in competition. Hence, we ran
Experiment 1 in order to explore the effects of the allocation rule of a reward on
participants’ level of investment and sabotage in tournaments.
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4.4 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was conducted in January 2013 at the Centre for Behavioural and
Experimental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia. Instructions,
control questionnaires and experimental tasks were computerized12. The experi-
ments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Overall, 96 subjects took part in 12 sessions. Participants were all undergraduate
and postgraduate students of the University of East Anglia. 45% of them were
enrolled either in the School of Economics or in the Norwich Business School; 29%
of them have British nationality and 38% of participants were male. The average
age was 22.
Experiment 1 consists of four treatments: Random Allocation 1, Random Allo-
cation 2, Meritocracy, and Anti-Meritocracy. In Random Allocation 1, Meritocracy,
and Anti-Meritocracy subjects take part in a tournament where they are asked to
choose simultaneously their level of investment and sabotage (Lazear, 1989). Players
in Random Allocation 2, instead, participate in a tournament without sabotage
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981) and therefore they choose only their level of investment.
Before entering the contest participants carry out a real effort task. Then
they are ranked according to their performance and divided in two types: 1)High
Type participants that performed better in the real effort task, and 2) Low Type
participants that performed worse in the real effort task. Subjects receive feedback
on their rank and on their opponent’s rank. A High Type participant is then
randomly matched with a Low Type participant. Information about this kind of
matching is displayed on the computer screen: each subject know about her/his
own type, and about her/his opponent type. Successively, a bonus of five pounds is
assigned according to three different rules:
1. Random Allocation: the bonus is assigned randomly either to the Low
12Participants had a paper copy of the instructions on their desks as well.
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Type contestant or to the High Type contestant;
2. Meritocracy: the bonus is assigned to the High Type contestant;
3. Anti-Meritocracy: the bonus is assigned to the Low Type contestant.
In the Random Allocation 1 treatment and the Random Allocation 2 treatment
a random allocation rule is adopted. In the Meritocracy treatment the bonus is
assigned according to a meritocracy rule whereas in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment
the bonus is given according to the anti-meritocracy rule.
Table 4.1 shows the experimental design of Experiment 1.
Table 4.1: Experimental Design - Experiment 1
Bonus randomly Bonus assigned Bonus assigned
assigned to High Type to Low Type
contestants contestants
Investment and Sabotage Random Allocation 1 Meritocracy Anti-Meritocracy
No Sabotage Random Allocation 2
The Tournament Game
In the Random Allocation 2 treatment the competition is a two-player rank-order
tournament (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). In this type of tournament players are
identical, that is they have the same utility function and same cost of investment.
In order to win the winner prize a player’s outcome must be higher of her/his
opponent’s outcome. The outcome is defined by the following production function:
qj = ej + j
where ej is the level of investment or effort, a measure of skill or average output
of player j, and j is a random component or luck drawn out of a known distribution
with zero mean and variance σ2. Player i has a similar technology to player j and
simultaneously makes a decision on her/his level of investment or effort.
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In the Random Allocation 1, Meritocracy, and Anti-Meritocracy treatments the
competition is a two-player rank-order tournament with sabotage (Lazear, 1989).
In this type of tournament players have the opportunity to expend costly effort to
reduce the opponent’s outcome. Players’ production functions are as follows:
qi = f (ei, sj) + i
qj = f (ej, si) + j
The term sj is the j’s ‘sabotage’ inflicted on the other player, ej is the level
of investment or effort of player j, and j is a random component or luck drawn
out of a known distribution with zero mean and variance σ2. Player i has a similar
technology to player j and simultaneously makes a decision on her/his level of
investment or effort and sabotage.
In each treatment there were two fixed prizes available per each pair of players:
W1 and W2 where W1 and W2 > 0 and W1 > W2. W1 is the prize that goes to the
winner, the ‘winner prize’, and W2 is the prize that goes to the loser of the contest,
the ‘loser prize’.
Investment and sabotage are costly. Each level of investment and sabotage is
associated with a cost according to two different predefined cost functions.
In the Random Allocation 1, Meritocracy, and Anti-Meritocracy treatments the
costs of the investment and sabotage are deducted from the prize a player receives
whereas in the Random Allocation 2 the prize a player gets is reduced by the cost
of investment only.
In our experiments participants receive neutrally framed instructions on this task.
In the Random Allocation 2 treatment they are asked to choose an integer number
between 0 to 100 as their Number A, which would represent their investment decision.
In the Random Allocation 1, Meritocracy, and Anti-Meritocracy treatments they
are also asked to choose a number, this time between 0 and 50, called Number B.
This latter number represents their level of sabotage. Tables of associated costs are
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provided. Subjects could practice the task before making their decisions. The task
is one-shot game. In Appendix C.1 we summarize the model of tournament without
sabotage (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) and the model of tournament with sabotage
Lazear (1989), we give the specification of each model and the parametrization used
for our experiments. In Appendix C.2 we provide the experimental instructions of
the task.
Research Hypotheses
As already mentioned, the prize of the tournament is independent of the allocation
rule of the monetary reward. Therefore, we assume that in the tournament individ-
uals would choose the level of investment and sabotage such that their pay-off is
maximized. According to the parameterization of our experiment, the optimal level
of investment and sabotage in equilibrium is 32 and 9 respectively.
However, receiving (or not) the bonus can induce individuals to change their
willingness to invest and sabotage in the competition. For example, individuals who
do not receive the bonus would be either more willing to invest in order to not miss
the opportunity to get the prize, or less willing to invest because they do not wish to
engage in costly activities. Moreover, if the bonus is assigned according to a perceived
unfair procedure individuals could have hostile feelings and could be for example
more willing to engage in sabotage. The procedural fairness of the assignment of
the monetary reward might significantly affect contestants’ behaviour in tournament.
We do not state any direction of the effects of the allocation rule of a monetary
reward on individuals’ behaviour in tournaments. Hence, we formalize our research
hypotheses as follows:




HYPOTHESIS 1a: The allocation rule of a bonus does affect individuals’
behaviour in tournaments.
Our null hypotheses implies that, assuming profit maximizer individuals, the
chosen level of investment should be 32, and the chosen level of sabotage should be
9. These optimal choices would be consistent among treatments and participant’s
type in our experimental sessions.
Experimental Procedure
Subjects undertake two separate experimental sessions: Session 1 and Session 2.
Session 1 is an online session: subjects are asked to complete an online questionnaire
before registering themselves to the laboratory sessions which would take place at
least one week later. Table 4.2 shows the experimental sessions and tasks. We are
going now to illustrate each task.
Session 1
The online questionnaire is divided into three tasks, each visualized in a computer
screen. In the first task (Task 1) participants are administered eight items of the
Dispositional Envy Scale by Smith et al. (1999). This scale gives a measure of the
subjects’ tendency to feel envy (Trait Envy). Agreement or disagreement on each
statement is indicated on a 1 to 5 Likert-type scale, in which 1 indicates “strongly
disagree“ and 5 indicates “strongly agree”. The score range is between 1 and 40. The
higher the score the more kin the subject is to feel envy.
In the second task (Task 2) participants are asked to provide some of their de-
mographic information. They answer ten questions about their gender, age, school,
nationality, etc. Some of the questions, e.g. “What is your favourite sport?” or
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Table 4.2: Experimental Sessions and Tasks - Experiment 1
Session 1 - online session
Task 1 Dispositional Envy Scale (Trait Envy)
Task 2 Demographic Information (10 items)
Task 3 Social Desirability Scale
Session 2 - laboratory session
General instructions
Task 4 Real Effort Task
Task 5 Tournament Instructions
Practice session - 5 rounds
Control Questionnaire




Task 7 “Sabotaging the experimenter” task
Task 8 Risk aversion measure
Expectations elicitation
Results and Payment
“How many friend have you got on Facebook?” serve to fill in few minutes and hence
to engage the working memory before been asked to complete another psycholog-
ical questionnaire. The second psychological questionnaire (Task 3) is the Social
Desirability Scale - 17. This provides a measure of subjects’ social desirability13.
Participants are asked to state whether each item described them with a “True” or
“False” answer. The score range is between 0 and 16: the higher the score the higher
the subject’s social desirability.
The online questionnaire takes only a few minutes and entitles subjects to
participate in Session 2, the laboratory session.




Session 2 is a laboratory session consisting of five successive tasks14. The first task
is a real effort task by Abeler et al. (2011). We slightly modified their task which
consisted of a series of 10 by 15 grids filled in randomly by numbers zero and one.
The authors asked subjects to count the number of zero in each grid. No time
limit was imposed. In our modified task a 5 by 5 grid appears on the screen and
subjects are asked to count the number of ones randomly assigned in the cells15.
They have five minutes to count correctly as many grids as they can. They are
encouraged to do so but they are no given other information about the aim of
this task16. Per each grid correctly solved participants get one point score. Par-
ticipants’ performance is therefore given by their score at the end of the time allowed.
After completing the real effort task (Task 4) subjects receive the instructions for
the second laboratory task (Task 5). This task is a 2-player tournament with two
prizes. In the Random Allocation 1, Meritocracy, and Anti-Meritocracy treatments
the tournament allows for sabotage while in the Random Allocation 2 treatment
there is no sabotage opportunity (we previously discussed these two types of tourna-
ments).
Instructions are followed by five rounds of practice. Each participant is matched
with the computer of her/his lab partition. The computer randomly selects its level
of investment (and sabotage) and this was known17. Feedback on the computer’s
14Session 2 lasts for approximately 75 minutes.
15The task is used in the experiment of the third chapter of this thesis as well.
16The task is not incentivised and subjects do not know at this stage how this task would be
linked to the successive allocation of the bonus.
17Adopting the method of practice round against the computer solves the issue of dealing with
the subjects’ beliefs on potential opponent’s choice of investment and sabotage. Subjects’ decisions
of investment and sabotage during the real round might be affected by their experience during
the practice round. The fact that subjects knew they were playing against a computer, and that
the computer would randomly select the level of investment and sabotage, plausibly reduces the
likelihood of the experience (in terms of outcome of the tournament game) affecting subjects’ later
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selections was given at the end of each round. The control questionnaire is another
opportunity to practice the task as well.
Successively, participants are ranked according to their performance in Task 4
(the real effort task). If there are two or more subjects with the same performance
score the number of attempted grids is considered: per each attempted grid subjects
receive a point score. Hence, the group of participants in the experimental session is
divided in two subgroups: 1) High Type subgroup, consisting of participants whose
performance is in the top half of the group, that is participants that performed
better the (real effort) task, and 2) Low Type subgroup, consisting of participants
whose performance is in the bottom half of the group, that is participants that
performed worse the real effort task.
Hence, one participant of the High Type subgroup is randomly matched with
another participant of the Low Type subgroup. Participants receive information on
their own type and their opponent’s type on their computer screen.
Finally, subjects read on the screen the possibility to get a reward of five pounds
(bonus) and the allocation rule according to which the bonus is assigned to one of
the two contestants: 1) randomly - Random Allocation rule; 2) to the High Type
subgroup - Meritocracy rule; or 3) to the Low Type subgroup - Anti-meritocracy
rule.
For example, in the Meritocracy treatment, participants read on their computer
screen:
The experimenter has ranked the performance of the participants in this
room in the task in which you were asked to count the number of ones
in the grids.
real round. At any rate, insofar as it did affect later behaviour, it would just be in the form of
introducing ’white noise’ in the data. The practice round should help their understanding in the
calculation of their final payoff.
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Your performance is in the top half of the group and your co-participant’s
performance is in the bottom half of the group. You performed better
than your co-participant.
The experimenter has decided TO ASSIGN A BONUS OF 5 POUNDS
to participants that performed BETTER in the task.
You have been assigned the bonus. Your co-participant has not been
assigned the bonus.
At this stage participants are asked to make their decisions of investment (and
sabotage if they are participating in Random Allocation 1, Meritocracy, and Anti-
Meritocracy treatments) in a one-shot tournament game.
Task 6, the third task of the laboratory session, is a questionnaire which aims at
identifying the current emotional state of participants, their perception of fairness
and overall their feelings in Task 5 (the tournament). In particular, items were
framed in such a way to catch the potential feeling of envy and unfairness of High
Type participants when an unfair anti-meritocracy rule is applied. The questionnaire
joins together various questionnaires (or part of them) on envy, fairness, hostile
feelings, etc. Specifically, the first nine items measure episodic envy by Cohen-
Charash (2009). We created items 10-14 to measure whether envy is caused by low
warmth towards the opponent and high competence of the opponent according to the
Warmth and Competence Model by Fiske et al. (2002). Items 15-17 measure subjects’
competitive feelings: these three items of the original questionnaire Cohen-Charash
(2009) have been adapted. From Smith et al. (1999) items have been taken and
adapted to measure subjective injustice belief (items 18-22), inferior beliefs (items
23-25), hostile and depressive feelings (items 26-32), and objective injustice (items
33-35). We created item 36 to measure the joy of competition while items 37-48 are
adapted statements used to measure the current arousal of twelve emotions (anxiety,
anger, envy, irritation, jealousy, surprise, happiness, contempt, sadness, fear, joy,
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and shame), a list adopted by economists (Bosman and Van Winden, 2002; Bolle
et al., 2010).
In total the questionnaire consisted of the 48 items just described. Partici-
pants are asked to scroll a bar whose range is between 0 (not at all) and 100
(very much) to indicate whether each item of the questionnaire describes them or
not. See Appendix C.3 for the list of the items of the questionnaire. Since the
questionnaire is administered after the tournament task, that is after decisions of
investment and sabotage are made, and since the frame of the items is the same for
both High Type and Low Type participants, results of the questionnaire might not
be strongly informative. We discuss the results of the questionnaire in Appendix C.4.
We named Task 7, the fourth task of the laboratory session, “Sabotaging the
experimenter task”. Participants had the possibility either to take from or to con-
tribute to the experimenter’s pot of extra money up to two pounds. They expressed
their choice dragging a slider towards right if they wished to contribute or towards
left if they wished to take. Amounts of money were expressed in 2 decimal places.
If the subject decided to contribute to the experimenter’s pot, the amount of money
indicated by the subject was deducted by her/his final earnings. If the subject
decided to take from the experimenter’s pot, the amount of money indicated by the
subject was added to her/his final earnings.
We introduced this task in our experiment because we understand the possibility
that participants might have hostile feelings towards the experimenter who decided
the allocation rule to be applied in each experimental session. This additional task
has an explorative nature. We discuss it and the results in detail in Appendix C.5.
In the final task, Task 8, participants completed the Holt-Laury Questionnaire18,
an incentive compatible lottery widely used to measure subjects’ risk aversion.
18Holt and Laury (2002).
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Finally, at the end of the session (after Task 8 and before the payment screen)
we asked subjects to elicit their beliefs on their opponent’s level of investment and
sabotage. This question was not incentivised. Information on the payment screen
included the outcome of the tournament, the outcome of the lottery, and hence the
final earnings. There was no participation fee. Table 4.3 indicates our sample size
per treatment.
Table 4.3: Sample Size - Experiment 1
Random Allocation 1 Meritocracy Anti-Meritocracy Random Allocation 2 Total
26 22 24 24 96
4.4.1 Experiment 1: Results
Investment and Sabotage
Overall, the average level of investment is 33, very close to the Nash equilibrium19.
However, about 23% of participants chose 0 as level of investment and 40% of
participants chose a level of investment greater than 45. 25% of subjects decided an
investment level greater than 57. The maximum investment is 90 (Figure 4.1).
The average sabotage level is 12.7 and the median is 10. About 35% of par-
ticipants chose to not sabotage (sabotage = 0). The top 25% of subjects chose
a level of sabotage greater than 24. The maximum level of sabotage is 50 (Figure 4.2).
Table 4.4 shows the average level of investment and sabotage by type. High
Type participants invest less than Low Type participants only in the Meritocracy
treatment compared to the other treatments: the average level of investment of High
19We remind that according to our parametrization of the tournament game the optimal
investment level is 32 and the optimal level of sabotage is 9.
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Type subjects is 24.818 while the average level of investment of Low Type subjects
is 49.36420. The difference is statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p =
0.073)21. Low Type participants invest on average more in the Meritocracy treat-
ment (49.364) compared to the Random Allocation 1 treatment (22.154) and this
difference is statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.042). Also, on
average, Low Type participants invest more in the Meritocracy treatment compared
to the Random Allocation 2 treatment where the bonus is randomly allocated and
sabotage is not allowed (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.102). There is no significant
difference between treatments for sabotage decisions22. See Table C.6 in Appendix
C.7 for descriptive statistics of sabotage by Type.
Regression Analysis on Investment and Sabotage
Decisions of investment and sabotage are made simultaneously (in particular,
20Table C.5 in Appendix C.7 shows descriptive statistics of investment by type.
21This test and onwards are 2-sample tests.
22However, if we consider sabotage by type, Low Type participants sabotage more in the Anti-
Meritocracy treatment than Low Type participants in the Meritocracy treatment as a t test shows
(p = 0.097).
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subjects’ enter their desired level of investment and sabotage in boxes appearing in
the same computer screen). Moreover, we have seen that investment and sabotage
are censored variables23. Therefore, we used bivariate Tobit regressions in order
to analyse the impact of various independent variables on subjects’ decisions on
investment and sabotage.
Table 4.5 shows the estimates of four Bivariate Tobit regressions on investment
and sabotage (Model 1, 2, 3 and 4). The explanatory variables include participants’
type (Low Type = 1 if the subject belongs to the Low Type subgroup), a bonus
dummy (Bonus = 1 if the subject has received the bonus), the score of risk aversion,
participants’ expectations of investment (Exp. Inv.) and sabotage (Exp. Sab),
and some interaction terms between participants’ type and bonus, and between
participants’ type and expectations of investment and sabotage. Treatments dum-
mies are included as well: Meritocracy and Anti-Meritocracy. We will discuss the
coefficients of these treatments dummies in comparison with the Random Allocation
1 treatment, which is considered our baseline treatment. We do not include data
23Many participants choose to not invest or to not sabotage at all. Therefore, there is a left
censoring.
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Table 4.4: Average Investment and Sabotage by Type - Experiment 1
Investment Sabotage
High Type Low Type High Type Low Type
Overall 32.791 33.625 10.972 14.416
Random Allocation 1 28 22.153 8.461 13.846
Meritocracy 24.818 49.363 12.909 10.636
Anti-Meritocracy 37.916 33.333 11.916 18.5
Random Allocation 2 40.166 28.916 . .
of the Random Allocation 2 treatment in which there is no opportunity to sabotage24.
There is strong evidence that participants invest significantly more in the Mer-
itocracy treatment and in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment than in the baseline
treatment, and that they are less likely to invest if they receive the bonus. Moreover,
their investment is lower the higher their risk aversion.
There is evidence that participants who have high expectation of their opponents’
investment decide to invest more. However, if we introduce in the regression the
interaction term ‘Low Type x Exp. Sab.’ expectation of investment that does not
affect significantly the investment decisions anymore (Model 3). It seems that the
participant’s type has no effect on investment decisions.
Participants’ type does not affect sabotage decisions as well, unless we consider
the interaction terms between type and expectations: Low Type are less likely to
sabotage than High Type (Model 3 and 4). However, if they receive the bonus they
are more willing to sabotage their opponent (Model 2, 3 and 4). Finally, there is
24We will discuss separately participants’ decision of investment in the Random Allocation 2
treatment.
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Table 4.5: Bivariate Tobit Estimates on Investment and Sabotage with Expectations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Investment
Low Type 6.277 -11.738 -21.237 -10.150
Meritocracy 27.498*** 38.790*** 40.643*** 38.705***
Anti-Meritocracy 29.748*** 22.256** 22.680** 22.209**
Bonus -17.623** -36.717** -38.097** -36.781**
Risk Aversion -6.457*** -5.898*** -6.013*** -5.824***
Exp. Inv. 0.368*** 0.348*** 0.292 0.363**
Exp. Sab. -0.001 0.027 -0.006 0.030
Low Type x Bonus 37.125 38.845 37.097
Low Type x Exp. Inv. 0.124 -0.030
Low Type x Exp. Sab. 0.104
Constant 34.094** 38.289*** 42.123*** 37.070**
Sabotage
Low Type 2.286 -14.518 -34.859*** -25.123**
Meritocracy 8.899 19.954** 22.632*** 20.934**
Anti-Meritocracy 13.772** 7.386 8.081 7.921
Bonus 0.108 -17.523* -19.768** -18.066*
Risk Aversion -3.481*** -3.017*** -3.330*** -3.102***
Exp. Inv. -0.101 -0.118 -0.234* -0.069
Exp. Sab. 0.304* 0.327** 0.241 0.022
Low Type x Bonus 34.376** 36.718** 33.908**
Low Type x Exp. Inv. 0.270
Low Type x Exp. Sab. 0.230 0.461*
Constant 17.093** 20.808** 30.020*** 25.292***
sigma1
Constant 29.163*** 28.847*** 28.770*** 28.961***
sigma2
Constant 17.621*** 17.272*** 16.265*** 16.634***
rho
Constant 1.363*** 1.301*** 1.272*** 1.274***
Observations 72 72 72 72
Wald test 34.69*** 35.08*** 35.74*** 34.82***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
‘Exp. Inv.’ = Expectation of Investment;
‘Exp. Sab.’ = Expectation of Sabotage.
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strong evidence that the higher the risk aversion the lower the sabotage25.
We can summarize our results discussed so far as follows:
RESULT 1: As predicted by hypothesis 1a, the allocation rule of a bonus does
affect individuals’ behaviour in tournaments: subjects that receive the bonus are less
likely to invest; investment is overall lower when a monetary bonus is randomly
allocated. The allocation of the bonus affects the sabotage decision as well: Low Type
participants sabotage more if they receive the bonus.
Subjects’ Behaviour and Nash Equilibrium
In Graph 4.3 we plot the decisions of investment and sabotage which are made
simultaneously. It seems there is a positive correlation between the two decisions
(Spearman correlation coefficient = 0.542, p < 0.001)26. We can observe as well that
many subjects decided to not sabotage at all but to invest a certain amount, and
some participants did not invest at all but they sabotage up to the maximum level27.
Overall, 22% of participants chose to not invest and simultaneously to not sabotage,
26% of them chose to not invest but to sabotage up to the maximum level (3% chose
sabotage = 50). 35% of participants chose to not sabotage but to invest up to 90.
25We introduce demographic variables in the models 13-15 (see Table C.7 in Appendix C.7).
Students enrolled in the School of Economics are less likely to invest compared to students enrolled
in other schools. The other demographic variables do not have any significant effects on investment
and sabotage decisions. Finally, we include in our regression analysis the social desirability score.
While this variable has no effect on investment’s decisions, it is strongly significant for participants’
choice of sabotage (coefficients have negative sign). See models 16-18 for sabotage in Table C.8 in
Appendix C.7.
26The correlation coefficient between these two variables is indeed positive. See Table C.9 in
Appendix C.7.
27Graphs C.8, C.9, and C.10 in Appendix C.7 plot the investment and sabotage decisions
by participants’ type, in the Meritocracy treatment, and in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment
respectively.
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In the graph the lines indicate the optimal level of investment (32) and the
optimal level of sabotage (9), according to the parameterization of the tournament
model chosen for this experiment. High Type subjects invest significantly less than
the optimal value when they receive the bonus (t test at 10% level of significance, p
= 0.083) and significantly more than the optimal value if they do not receive the
bonus (t test at 10% level of significance, p = 0.085).
The difference between the observed average sabotage and the optimal sabotage
value is significant in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment (t test, p = 0.018)28. In
particular, Low Type subjects sabotage significantly more than the optimal value in
the Anti-Meritocracy treatment (t test, p = 0.028)29. High Type subjects’ sabotage
is not significantly different from the (Nash) equilibrium level.
Regression Estimates on Investment - Random Allocation 2 treat-
ment
28Sign test, p = 0.032.
29Sign test, p = 0.073.
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In the Random Allocation 2 treatment subjects do not have the opportunity to
sabotage. They are asked to decide their level of investment only. To compare par-
ticipants’ decisions of the level of investment between treatments we run a separate
regression analysis with data on investment only. We apply a Tobit regression model
because data are left-censored. Estimates on investment are shown in Table 4.6. In
models 5-8 we compared subjects’ investment decisions of the Random Allocation
1 treatment, the Meritocracy treatment and the Anti-Meritocracy treatment with
the Random Allocation 2 treatment. We introduce a dummy for participants’ type
(Low Type = 1 if the subject belongs to the Low Type subgroup), a bonus dummy
(Bonus = 1 if the subject has received the bonus), the score of risk aversion, partici-
pants’ expectations of investment (Exp. Inv.), the social desirability score, and an
interaction term between participants’ type and bonus. In model 8 we consider also
some demographic variables: gender (Male = 1 if the participant is a man), age,
nationality (British Nationality = 1 if the participant is British), and school (School
of ECO = 1 is the participant is enrolled in the School of Economics).
While we do not have a clear direction of investment decisions in the Meritocracy
and Anti-Meritocracy treatments compared to the Random Allocation 2 treatment,
there is strong evidence that in the Random Allocation 1 treatment subjects are
significantly less likely to invest compared to the Random Allocation 2 treatment.
Since the two treatments differ between each other only for the possibility to sabo-
tage, we can conclude that investment is overall lower when there are opportunities
to sabotage and the bonus is randomly allocated.
As in previous regressions, bonus and risk aversion variables have negative and
significant coefficients: participants that receive the bonus are less likely to invest
and the more risk averse the subject is the lower the investment. Expectations of
investment positively and significantly affect the investment decision.
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Table 4.6: Tobit Estimates on Investment Data Only
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Low Type -9.252 -10.310 -5.116 -4.869
Random Allocation 1 -20.136** -20.141** -20.485** -19.992**
Meritocracy 10.468 7.284 7.324 3.221
Anti-Meritocracy -0.956 -1.147 0.819 3.468
Bonus -25.652** -24.076** -21.890* -20.115*
Risk Aversion -4.628*** -4.846*** -4.211** -4.614**
Low Type x Bonus 26.589 27.131 17.875 15.156
Social Desirability Score -0.766




School of ECO -9.702
Constant 68.790*** 76.976*** 48.837*** 51.788**
sigma
Constant 31.117*** 30.752*** 29.147*** 28.614***
Observations 96 95 96 95
Left-censored observations 22 22 22 22
Right-censored observations 0 0 0 0
Likelihood ratio test (LR) 17.56** 17.04** 27.93*** 29.62**
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
‘Exp. Inv.’ = Expectations of Investment.
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4.4.2 Experiment 1: Discussion
In this experiment we explored the effects of three allocation procedure of monetary
rewards on individual decisions of investment and sabotage in tournaments. The
monetary reward that we called ‘bonus’ has been allocated according to a meritoc-
racy rule in the Meritocracy treatment, according to a non-meritocracy rule in the
Anti-Meritocracy treatment, and finally randomly between contestants in Random
Allocation 1 and Random Allocation 2 treatments. Participants’ performance score
refers to how they carry out a task prior entering the contest. The contest is a two-
player tournament with 2 fixed prizes. The outcome of this contest is designed to be
independent of the bonus. This implies that individual behaviour in the tournament
would be not affected by the allocation of the bonus and that individuals would
choose an optimal level of effort and sabotage assuming they are profit-maximizers.
As predicted by our alternative hypothesis, the allocation of the bonus before the
tournament does actually affect contestants’ behaviour. Individual behaviour varies
across treatments and type. For example, Low Type participants invest more when
the bonus is allocated according to a meritocracy rule than a random rule. Overall,
we find that investment is lower when the random allocation rule is applied. When
on the contrary a meritocracy (or anti-meritocracy) rule is followed the average level
of investment is higher. Moreover, we find that subjects that receive the bonus are
less likely to invest effort in the tournament. For example, we have seen in Table 4.4
that High Type participants invest less in the Meritocracy treatment, that is when
they are rewarded according to a fair rule, than in other treatments. On the other
hand, Low Type participants that do not receive the bonus (when a meritocracy
rule is applied) are more willing to invest.
Regarding the participants’ choice of the level of sabotage, we observe a very
interesting effect of the bonus assignment: there is consistent and strong evidence
that Low Type participants sabotage more when they receive the bonus. In par-
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ticular, we have seen that they sabotage significantly more than the optimal level
when the anti-meritocracy rule is applied. Expectations of opponents’ behaviour
and decisions might explain Low Type participants choice of destructive effort. We
notice in fact in Table 4.5 (Model 4) that the coefficient of the interaction term ‘Low
Type x Exp. Sab.’ is significant: Low Type participants with high expectations of
sabotage they are more likely to sabotage. Interestingly, beliefs of investments do
not affect Low Type participants sabotage decisions but beliefs on sabotage induce
them to sabotage more when they expect to be sabotaged.
Although the coefficient of the interaction term ‘Low Type x Exp. Sab.’ in
Model 4 is significant, the coefficient of the same interaction term in Model 3 is not
significant. This puzzling result might be due either to noise in the data or to the
elicitation procedure of participants’ expectations. To better understand whether
the expectations of Low Type participants play a key role in their decisions to
sabotage, we decided to run another experiment, Experiment 2. In this experiment
the elicitation of the subjects’ expectations occurs before entering the competition
instead of at the very end of the experimental session. Moreover, we introduced a
monetary incentivation of the elicitation that would induce participants to make
their best guess on their opponent’s level of investment and sabotage. In this way
we test any effects of participants’ expectation on their decisions of investment
and sabotage. Specifically, we will investigate whether Low Type participants are
affected by their expectation of sabotage when they decide their level of destructive
effort.
4.5 Experiment 2
In this experiment we test any effects of participants’ expectation on their decisions of
investment and sabotage and we will investigate whether Low Type participants are
affected by their expectation of sabotage when they decide their level of destructive
effort. Specifically, our hypothesis is as follows:
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HYPOTHESIS 2: Participants’ expectations of their opponent’s level of in-
vestment and sabotage affect participants’ decisions of investment and sabotage.
Experiment 2 was run in February 2013 at the Centre for Behavioural and
Experimental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia. Instruc-
tions, control questionnaires and experimental tasks were computerized30. The
experiments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). 72 subjects took part in 9 sessions. Participants were all undergraduate and
postgraduate students of the University of East Anglia. 41% of them were enrolled
either in the School of Economics or in the Norwich Business School; 27% of them
have British nationality and 34% of participants were male. The average age was 22
as for Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 consists of two treatments: Meritocracy and Anti-Meritocracy.
In both treatments participants in are asked to take part in a tournament with
sabotage (Lazear, 1989). In the Meritocracy treatment the meritocracy rule is
applied, whereas in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment the bonus is allocated according
to the anti-meritocracy rule. Table 4.7 shows the experimental design.
Table 4.7: Experimental Design - Experiment 2
Bonus assigned Bonus assigned
to High Type to Low Type
contestants contestants
Investment and Sabotage Meritocracy Anti-Meritocracy
The experimental sessions follow a similar procedure as in Experiment 1 (see
Table 4.8). There are two separate experimental sessions over time: Session 1, the
online session, and Session 2, the laboratory session. Session 1 of this experiment is
identical to Session 1 of Experiment 1 in the tasks and procedure applied.
30Participants had a paper copy of the instructions on their desks as well.
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Session 2 consists of the same five successive tasks of Session 2 of Experiment
1. However, in this experiment the elicitation of the participants’ expectations of
investment and sabotage occurs before the tournament game. Before deciding their
level of investment and sabotage, subjects are asked to write down their best guess
on their opponent’s level of investment and sabotage. We call this stage “Guessing
stage”. Differently from Experiment 1, we incentivise the subjects’ elicitation of
beliefs. We applied the following linear incentive scheme for both investment and
sabotage:
Earnings =
 P if g = tP - a*abs(g-t) if g 6= t (4.1)
where g is the subject’s guess and t is the true value. P is the prize subjects can get
in this task. P is equal to £4. The parameter a is equal to 40 pence for guesses
on investments and equal to 80 pence for guesses on sabotage. This means that
if a participant can guess exactly the level of investment (or sabotage) of her/his
opponent she/he gets £4. Per each point that the guess is ‘out’ a deduction of
40 pence (or 80 pence if the guess is on sabotage) is made from the prize, with a
minimum of £0 earned. Only one randomly chosen guess (either on investment or
on sabotage) was paid31.
Task 6 is slightly different from Task 6 in Experiment 1: we add 14 items to the
questionnaire. We create six items (49-54) to measure participant’s expectation of
her/his opponent’s hostile feelings. Items 55 and 56 are added for an additional
measure of objective injustice beliefs, and items 57 and 58 in order to supplement
the measure of envy according to the Warmth and Competence Model. Items 59 and
60 are added to items for subjective injustice beliefs. Expectations of investment
and sabotage are measured by item 61 and 62 respectively. Finally, items 63 and 64
provide a participants’ response in terms of investment and sabotage after having
31See Appendix C.6 for experimental instructions on the guessing stage.
128
Table 4.8: Experimental Sessions and Tasks - Experiment 2
Session 1 - online session
Task 1 Dispositional Envy Scale (Trait Envy)
Task 2 Demographic Information (10 items)
Task 3 Social Desirability Scale
Session 2 - laboratory session
General instructions
Task 4 Real Effort Task
Task 5 Tournament Instructions
Practice session - 5 rounds
Control Questionnaire





Task 7 “Sabotaging the experimenter” task
Task 8 Risk aversion measure
Two final questions
Results and Payment
received information on the allocation of the bonus32. See Appendix C.3 for the items
of the questionnaire and Appendix C.4 for the discussion of the participants’ answers.
After Task 8, the Holt-Laury lottery for the risk aversion measure, and before
the payment screen, participants are asked two final questions: they are asked to
motivate their choice of the level of investment and the level of sabotage. Subjects
could read on two successive screens the following questions ‘You chose Number
[...] as Number A. Why did you choose this number?’ (first screen), and ‘You chose
Number [...] as Number B. Why did you choose this number?’ (second screen)33.
Participants provide their answers in a chat box34.
32Items 59-64 are created ad hoc as well.
33Number A indicates the level of investment and Number B indicates the level of sabotage.
34A chat box is a tool of z-Tree program that allows to insert text.
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Session 2 lasted for approximately 90 minutes; 36 participants took part to each
treatment. Therefore, a total of 72 subjects participated in Experiment 2 (Table
4.9).
Table 4.9: Sample Size - Experiment 2
Meritocracy Anti-Meritocracy Total
36 36 72
4.5.1 Experiment 2: Results
Investment and Sabotage
About 11% of participants in Study II chose 0 as level of investment. The
maximum investment level was 100 (4%). The average level of investment was 40.29,
higher than the equilibrium level. 10% chose to invest more than 78 (see Figure
4.4).














About 17% of participants chose to not sabotage at all (sabotage = 0), 25%
chose a level of sabotage greater than 24 and the maximum level of sabotage was
50 (nearly 3% of participants chose the maximum level). Mostly subjects sabotage
an amount between 20 and 24 (see Figure 4.5). The average level of sabotage was
17.04 and the median was 15.5.
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There is no significant difference between the average investments in the Meri-
tocracy treatment (39.5) and in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment (41.08)35. However,
if we consider the average investment by subjects’ type we can see (Table 4.10)
that Low Type participants invest significantly more than High Type participants
overall (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.004) and in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.014). The amount invested by either High Type or
Low Type participants is not significantly different across treatments36.
The average sabotage in the Meritocracy treatment is 18.139, very close to the
average sabotage in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment where the average sabotage is
15.94437. However, the average sabotage of Low Type participants is significantly
35See Table C.10 in for descriptive statistics on investment by treatments.
36See Table C.11 in Appendix C.7 for descriptive statistics of investment by type.
37See Table C.12 for average sabotage between treatments and Table C.13 for descriptive statistics
of sabotage by participants’ type.
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Table 4.10: Average Investment and Sabotage by Type - Experiment 2
Investment Sabotage
High Type Low Type High Type Low Type
Overall 30.666 49.916 14.111 19.972
Meritocracy 31.388 47.611 15.5 20.777
Anti-Meritocracy 29.944 52.222 12.722 19.166
higher than the average sabotage of High Type participants (Table 4.10). Low
Type participants sabotage overall significantly more than High Type participants
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.103)38.
Expectations of Investment and Sabotage
On average participants expect that their opponent would invest 48.15, 4% of
them expect that their opponent would not invest at all and nearly 21% of them
expect that their opponent would invest 50 (the median value)39. Low Type partici-
pants that receive the bonus expect that on average their opponent would invest
48.22, while Low Type participants that did not receive the bonus expect that on
average their opponent would invest 55.22. This difference is not significant. High
Type participants that receive the bonus expect that their opponent would invest 43
and High Type participants that do not receive the bonus expect that their opponent
would invest 46.17. There is no significant difference between expectations40.
The average expectation of sabotage is 21.53. Nearly 10% of participants expect
that their opponent would not sabotage at all (sabotage = 0), and about 14% of
38t test, p = 0.068.
39Only one participant out of 72 expects that their opponent would invest the maximum (100).
40Figures C.11, C.12, and C.13 in Appendix C.7 show the distribution of expectations of
investment, overall, for Low Type participants, and for High Type participants respectively.
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subjects expect that level of sabotage to be equal to 25 (the median value)41.
The expectation of sabotage of Low Type participants, whether or not they
receive the bonus, is approximately the same (if they receive the bonus expectation
= 22.44, if not expectation = 23.11). However, there is some evidence of a significant
difference between the expectation of sabotage of High Type participants that receive
the bonus (24.11) and the expectation of sabotage of High Type participants who do
not receive the bonus (16.44). The p-value of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum
test is 0.06842.
Regression Analysis on Investment and Sabotage
Table 4.11 shows the estimates of bivariate Tobit regressions on investment and
sabotage43. We compared subjects’ investment decisions of the Meritocracy treat-
ment with the Anti-Meritocracy treatment. We introduce a dummy for participants’
type (Low Type = 1 if the subject belongs to the Low Type subgroup), a bonus
dummy (Bonus = 1 if the subject has received the bonus), the score of risk aversion,
participants’ expectations of investment (Exp. Inv.) and sabotage (Exp. Sab.), and
interaction terms between participants’ type and expectations.
There is strong evidence that the higher the expectation of opponents’ level of
investment the higher the subject’s investment. The expectations of sabotage do
not matter on subjects’ investment decisions.
RESULT 2. As predicted by hypothesis 2, participants’ expectations of their
opponent’s level of investment affect participants’ decisions of investment. The higher
participants’ expectation of their opponent’s investment the higher their investment.
The interaction term “Low Type x Expectation of Sabotage” is strongly significant
41Three participants out 72 expect that their opponent would sabotage the maximum (50).
42Figures C.5, C.6, and C.7 in Appendix C.7 show the distribution of expectations of sabotage,
overall, for Low Type participants, and for High Type participants respectively.
43Decisions of investment and sabotage are made simultaneously. Many participants choose to
not invest or to not sabotage. Therefore there is a left censoring.
133
Table 4.11: Bivariate Tobit Estimates on Investment and Sabotage with Expectations
- Experiment 2
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Investment
Low Type 19.676*** 15.945*** -23.153 -15.594
Anti-Meritocracy -1.746 -0.082 -0.248 1.965
Bonus 4.454 8.274 10.141* 8.119
Risk Aversion -2.121 -0.894 -0.347 -0.744
Exp. Inv. 0.739*** 0.536** 0.369*
Exp. Sab. -0.092 -0.546 -0.006
Low Type x Exp. Inv. 0.414 0.647***
Low Type x Exp. Sab. 0.884*
Constant 38.776*** -2.461 12.230 11.077
Sabotage
Low Type 6.700* 4.127 -11.952* -11.268**
Anti-Meritocracy -3.860 -0.989 -2.758 -1.980
Bonus 1.756 -0.857 1.199 0.553
Risk Aversion -0.157 -0.737 -0.255 -0.367
Exp. Inv. -0.028 0.072 0.001
Exp. Sab. 0.688*** 0.132 0.296*
Low Type x Exp. Inv. -0.105
Low Type x Exp. Sab. 0.974*** 0.706***
Constant 14.180** 5.218 9.333 9.748*
sigma1
Constant 28.820*** 24.526*** 23.016*** 23.389***
sigma2
Constant 14.527*** 11.801*** 10.454*** 10.572***
rho
Constant 1.112*** 1.655*** 1.598*** 1.634***
Observations 72 72 72 72
Wald test 11.86** 41.18*** 53.97*** 54.84***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
‘Exp. Inv.’ = Expectation of Investment;
‘Exp. Sab.’ = Expectation of Sabotage.
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both in model 11 and 12 for sabotage decisions: the higher the expectation of sabotage
of Low Type participants the higher the sabotage level44.
RESULT 3. As predicted by hypothesis 2, participants’ expectations of their
opponent’s level of sabotage affect participants’ decisions of sabotage.
In particular, we found that Low Type participants with high expectation of
sabotage are more likely to sabotage.
Subjects’ Behaviour and Nash Equilibrium
Graph 4.6 shows the plot of investment and sabotage. Decisions seem to be
positively correlated45. Many observations show the decision to not sabotage at all.
Nearly 10% of participants do not invest (investment = 0) and do not sabotage
(sabotage = 0), 11% of them chose to not invest but sabotage up to the maximum
level (3% chose sabotage = 50). 16% of participants do not sabotage but invest up
to 5146.
Overall the average level of investment is higher than the optimal value (Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test, p = 0.025). Low Type subjects invest on average significantly
more than the optimal value (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p-value = 0.002). In
particular, they invest significantly more than 32 both when they do not receive
the bonus (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.077) and when they do receive the
44As for Experiment 1 we discuss the impact of some demographic variables in the models 19-21
(see Table C.14 in Appendix C.7). Younger students are more likely to invest while for sabotage
decisions nationality has a role: British students are less likely to sabotage their opponents. We
ran also a separate regression to check the impact of social desirability on subjects’ decisions. We
did not find any significant effects.
45Spearman correlation coefficient = 0.479, p < 0.001. See Table C.15 for correlation coefficients
in Appendix C.7.
46Graphs C.17, C.18, and C.19 in Appendix C.7 plot the investment and sabotage decisions
by participants’ type, in the Meritocracy treatment, and in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment
respectively.
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bonus (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.011)47. High Type participants’ decisions
of investment are never significantly far from the optimal level.
Sabotage is on average significantly higher than the equilibrium level (Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test, p = 0.000) and the difference between the observed average value
and the optimal value is significant in both Meritocracy treatment (Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test, p = 0.000) and Anti-meritocracy treatment (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test,
p = 0.003). Specifically, in the Meritocracy treatment both types of participants
decided to sabotage an amount higher than the optimal level (High Type, Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test, p = 0.005; Low Type, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.009). In
the Anti-Meritocracy treatment, instead, only Low Type subjects sabotage signifi-
cantly more than the optimal value (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.008)48.
47Sign tests give similar results.
48Sign tests confirm that the difference from the optimal behaviour is statistically significant.
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4.5.2 Final Questions on Investment and Sabotage Choices
Methodology
A better understanding of the reasons at the basis of participants’ choices of invest-
ment and sabotage may be obtained from the analysis of the participants’ answers to
two final open questions. They provided short answers explaining why they choose
their specific level of investment and sabotage.
To analyse this set of qualitative data we applied the Grounded Theory Method49
(GT), a methodology widely used in qualitative research. The GT method enables
the researcher to investigate a large amount of textual information and systematically
identify its properties, e.g. the frequencies of the most used keywords50.
We followed the four steps of the GT method51 for the two subsets of qualitative
we have collected: 72 participants’ answers of the first question (question about
the decision of investment), and 72 participants’ answers of the second question
(question about the decision of sabotage)52 .
The eleven categories we created are:
49Glaser and Strauss (1967).
50This aspect is similar to the content analysis method. We choose however the GT method
because the content analysis should depart from a hypothesis. We indeed prefer to keep our
qualitative analysis at an explorative level and to not state any behavioural haypothesis a priori.
51We first gave an overall reading of the answers in order to identify anchors that allow the key
points of the data to be gathered (step 1 - codes). We then highlighted the codes and we grouped
those of similar content (step 2 - concepts). We thus created eleven categories, which consist of
either only one concept or a group of concepts of similar content (step 3 - categories). We finally
aim to find out which categories are more likely to explain (or are correlated) to individuals’ choices
of investment and sabotage (final step).
52We actually have 65 out of 72 answers about investment and 66 out of 72 about sabotage. This
because there were students that did not understand the question, or that skipped the question,
etc.
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1. Cost of the Number (A or B);
2. Competitive Feelings;
3. Random Choice;
4. Expectation of Investment;
5. Expectation of Sabotage;
6. Risk aversion;
7. Cost-benefit choice based;
8. Costs + Competitive Feelings;
9. Risk aversion + Expectation of Investment;
10. Non-competitive preferences;
11. Envy.
We used the same categories for both subsets of answers on investment and
sabotage. We assigned a number from 0 to 10 to each category (categorical value),
as it is illustrated in the bullet points above. We therefore used those numbers to
indicate which category each participants’ answer belongs to. We are now going to
discuss categories’ frequencies.
Decision of Investment
26% of participants wrote that their choice of number A (level of investment) was
based on the cost of the number:
‘This number does not cost many points’; ‘I wanted it to be a low
number so that only a small amount was deducted from my final earnings’;
‘I chose 20 because the cost is not too high’.
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13% of participants made their decisions based on their expectation of their
opponent’s investment:
‘It is likely that the other participant would choose a high number’;
‘I know Player X will choose higher number than me’; ‘[..] since I have
chosen 50 as the guess of participant X’s choice of Number A’.
The same proportion (13%) of participants seems to justify their choices by their
risk attitude:
‘[...] playing it safe’; "Because the higher I choose the higher risks I
will get’; ‘Because I think 46 has a lower risk for me’.
A share of 10% of answers is assigned to category 7, represented together by
motivation of costs and competitive feelings. For example a participant wrote: ‘30
was a good value for money! Somewhere the value-for-money aspect stops: you also
want to beat Participant X.’.
In the Meritocracy treatment 35% of High Type participants considered costs as
a determinant in their investment choice and 23% of them had concerns about their
opponent’s level of investment (expectation of investment). The same proportion
of answers is assigned both to category 6 (cost-benefit choice based) and category
7 (cost + competitive feelings). 35% of Low Type participants chose their level of
investment thinking about the level of cost (as well as High Type participant in the
same treatment). However, 17% of them declared themselves risk averse to such an
investment.
In the Anti-Meritocracy treatment the majority of High Type participants (28%)
use their risk aversion as a motivation of their choice. Also the cost of the investment
had a substantial role (21%). Interestingly, 14% of subjects were concerned about
their opponent’s level of sabotage. The same number of participants chose their
Number A at random. Low Type participants (precisely 28% of them), who in
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this treatment have received the bonus, seems to think more carefully about their
opponent’s level of investment (category 3). They also consider carefully (17%) the
cost-benefit trade-off in their choice: they want to invest but they are refrained
by the high cost. 17% of them express their wish to win the ‘winner prize’ of the
competition: ‘I wanted to get the highest number so no matter what they took away
I would still win’. 11% considered the cost of investment and 17% thought about
their opponent’s level of sabotage when they made their investment’s decision.
Table 4.12 shows the percentage per category of participants’ answers about
their motivation for their level of investment.
Table 4.12: Percentage of answers per category - Investment Decisions
Meritocracy Anti-Meritocracy
High Type Low Type High Type Low Type
1. Cost of the Number A 35.29 35.29 21.43 11.76
2. Competitive Feelings . 11.76 7.14 17.65
3. Random Choice 5.88 11.76 14.29 5.88
4. Expectation of Investment 23.53 . 7.14 23.53
5. Expectation of Sabotage 5.88 . 14.29 11.76
6. Risk aversion 5.88 17.65 28.57 5.88
7. Cost-benefit choice based 11.76 11.76 . 17.65
8. Costs + Competitive Feelings 11.76 11.76 . 5.88
9. Risk aversion + Expectation of Investment . . 7.14 .
10. Non-competitive preferences . . . .
11. Envy . . . .
The value . refers to 0%;
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Decision of Sabotage
Sabotage effort was more expensive than investment and subjects realized this53.
Many of them (21%) considered this aspect in their choice of the level of sabo-
tage. However, 18% of subjects expressed their wish to win: ‘I don’t want a too
low number otherwise participant X would have bigger chance to win.’. Category
1, Competitive Feelings, occurred therefore with the second highest frequency in
participants’ answers. Category 4, Expectation of Sabotage, occurred with a high
frequency as well in subjects’ answers (12%). The same proportion of participants
wrote either about their risk attitude in choosing their level of sabotage or about
their willingness to not reduce their opponent’s outcome. We called this category
‘Non-competitive preferences’. For example they wrote: ‘I did not want my partner
to lose money"; "No point in taking money away from my opponent’.
If we consider only the answers given by High Type subjects in the Meritocracy
treatment, we notice that category 0 has the highest proportion (33%), while cate-
gory 1, Competitive Feelings, and category 4, Expectation of Sabotage, have the
same highest percentage (16%). It seems that High Type participants considered
costs in their decision of sabotage, but they thought as well about their opponent’s
level of sabotage. They felt also more willing to sabotage in order to win the highest
prize of the competition. Low Type participants in this treatment wish also to
compete aggressively (by sabotaging) in order to win the ‘winner prize’ (category 1,
Competitive Feelings, 23%) but they also have concerns about the cost of this type
of effort (category 0, Costs, 23%). However, a significant proportion of them did not
want to reduce their opponents’ outcome (category 9, Non-competitive preferences,
17%). Many of them selected a number at random (17%).
Risk aversion becomes the main concern for the majority of the High Type
participants in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment where they are not given the bonus
53They could see from the instructions but it was not explicitly said.
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(30%). 15% of them think about cost before making a choice and 15% of them
interestingly expects that their opponent will choose a ‘certain’ level of sabotage.
It is true, in fact, that 22% of Low Type participants explained that their choice
was guided by their wish to win the competition (Competitive Feelings) and 16%
of them chose a level of sabotage thinking about the balance cost-benefit (category 6).
Table 4.13 shows the percentage per category of participants’ answers about
their motivation for their level of sabotage.
Table 4.13: Percentage of answers per category - Sabotage Decisions
Meritocracy Anti-Meritocracy
High Type Low Type High Type Low Type
1. Cost of the Number B 33.33 23.53 15.38 11.11
2. Competitive Feelings 16.67 23.53 7.69 22.22
3. Random Choice . 17.65 7.69 11.11
4. Expectation of Investment 11.11 . . .
5. Expectation of Sabotage 16.67 5.88 15.38 11.11
6. Risk aversion . 5.88 30.77 11.11
7. Cost-benefit choice based 5.56 . . 16.67
8. Costs + Competitive Feelings 11.11 5.88 7.69 5.56
9. Risk aversion + Expectation of Investment . . . .
10. Non-competitive preferences 5.56 17.65 7.69 11.11
11. Envy . . 7.69 .
The value . refers to 0%;
4.5.3 Experiment 2: Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 have shown that the allocation of a bonus affects
individual’s behaviour in tournaments. In particular, we became very interested in
Low Type contestants’ decisions of investment and sabotage and we noticed that
they are more willing to sabotage when they receive the bonus. This result suggested
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us the possible role of expectations in explaining Low Type participants’ behaviour.
To focus more in detail on this role we ran a second experiment, Experiment 2,
where subjects are asked to elicit their expectations before entering the contest.
The elicitation of their expectations is incentivised according to a linear incentive
scheme.
As for Experiment 1, we find that individual behaviour does differ across treat-
ments and participants’ type. Overall, we find that Low Type participants invest
more than High Type participants, especially when they receive (unfairly) the bonus.
They invest significantly more than the optimal level. Moreover, they sabotage
significantly more than the optimal level both when they receive and when they
do not receive they bonus. We notice that participants’ decision of the level of
investment strongly depends on the expectation of investment (Result 7), but not on
the expectation of sabotage. Finally, we do find strong evidence that the Low Type
participants are more likely to sabotage when they expect a high level of sabotage
(Result 8).
In Experiment 2 we ask participants to briefly explain their motivations of their
choices of investment and sabotage. From this set of qualitative data we have
collected at the end of the laboratory sessions we are able to bring some interesting
discussion points on the individuals’ behaviour and choices of investment and sabo-
tage. The relative costs of each level of investment and sabotage play a crucial role
in subjects’ overall decisions. Many of the explanations submitted by subjects have
reference to the cost and benefit they are considering in making their choice.
Specifically, costs and competitive feelings are important factors that frequently
appeared overall in participants’ explanations of their decision of sabotage. Moreover,
we notice that when the bonus was fairly allocated (Meritocracy treatment) Low
Type participants have more competitive attitude, and High Type participants
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expected this (the correlation coefficient between sabotage and expectation of
sabotage is positive). However, it seems that Low Type subjects believed that the
bonus allocation was objectively fair in the Meritocracy treatment. On the other
hand, when the Low Type participants received the bonus in the Anti-Meritocracy
treatment they felt more encouraged to sabotage so that they could win more. High
Type participants expected this (correlation coefficient: 0.2805) and they generally
were risk averse in their decision of sabotage (the correlation coefficient between
sabotage and risk aversion is positive).
4.6 General Discussion and Conclusion
In our experiments (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) participants took part to
a 2-player contest game. They entered a competition for a fixed ‘winner prize’
by investing effort. They also had the possibility to engage in destructive effort,
by reducing the level of investment of their opponent. Players had identical cost
structure. Before entering the contest, they received some information about their
performance of a previous (real effort) task, their ranking, and about their opponent’s
performance and ranking. Additionally, they were informed about the possibility to
get a monetary reward that we called ‘bonus’ and how this was allocated among the
two players. The allocation rule of the bonus differed across treatments: in Random
Allocation 1 and Random Allocation 2 treatments the bonus was randomly allocated,
in the Meritocracy treatment the bonus was given to participants that perform
better the real effort task (High Type subgroup), whereas in the Anti-Meritocracy
treatment the bonus was given to the subgroup of participants that performed worse
the real effort task (Low Type subgroup).
The bonus was completely independent of the prize structure of the tournament.
We expected, therefore, that the allocation of the bonus did not have any effects on
participants behaviour in the tournament.
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Results show that contestants choose on average a level of investment and sabo-
tage significantly different from the optimal level and that there are differences in
behaviour across treatments and participants’ type. In Experiment 1 we notice how
the allocation rule of the bonus affects the overall level of investment: participants
are less likely to invest when the bonus is randomly allocated. They instead bid
more aggressively when a rule of meritocracy (anti-meritocracy) is used. Specifically,
we find that overall subjects are less likely to invest when they receive the bonus.
However, if we consider participants’ type, Low Type subjects invest more when
they receive (unfairly) the bonus.
Another interesting result that attracted mostly our attention for future inves-
tigation is the Low Type participants’ decision to sabotage the opponent. They
sabotage more than the optimal level when they receive they bonus, that is when
the anti-meritocracy rule is applied. We explain this behaviour with the role of
expectation of sabotage. The higher their expectations of sabotage the higher
their sabotage level. Probably, they expect to be victim of sabotage since they
have received the bonus unfairly and hence they decide to sabotage more than
the optimal level. Interestingly, the expectation of investment is not taken into
account for sabotage decisions. In Experiment 2 we bring forward the elicitation
of participants’ expectations (and we introduce an incentive scheme for this) in
order to test explicitly the role of expectations. We ask participants to guess their
opponent’s level of investment and sabotage. Results of Experiment 2 confirm the
results of Experiment 1: beliefs of investments do not affect Low Type participants’
sabotage decisions but beliefs of sabotage induce them to sabotage more when they
expect to be sabotaged.
We support this argument with the results of the analysis of the set of qualitative
data we collect at the end of the laboratory sessions of Experiment 2. It appears
that Low Type participants feel more competitive after being assigned the bonus.
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They also understand the objective fairness of the allocation rule in the Meritocracy
treatment. The bonus unfairly given to them in the Anti-Meritocracy treatment
induces them to engage more in destructive effort.
Mechanisms of (fair) allocation of outcomes, as for example monetary rewards,
are factors external to the tournament game that we applied in our setting. They
should not affect contestants’ behaviour. However, we find that they do matter
and significantly affect individuals’ decisions in tournament. Our results suggest
that a principal should consider effects of bonuses allocation and the fairness of the
allocation procedures in pursuing his/her objectives. If the principal aims to increase
overall productivity than a random allocation of bonuses is not effective. Allocating
rewards among workers according to meritocracy rules increases competitive feelings
and attitude, and finally overall agents’ investment. If the principal aims, on the con-
trary, to promote workers’ cooperative behaviour than the fairness of the allocation
rule of bonuses matters. Not rewarding the best workers creates feelings of hostility
and rewarded workers can engage in destructive behaviour which is not beneficial
for the firm. The decision of unfairly rewarded workers of engaging in destructive
effort comes from the expectation of sabotage they have. They in fact expected
to be victim of sabotage. Expectations have, hence, a key role in understanding
contestants’ behaviour in cases where the fairness of a specific allocation procedure,
applied before the contest, is controversial.
We add few final comments. We check for participants’ risk aversion and we find
that our result is consistent with the experimental literature (Millner and Pratt,
1991; Sheremeta and Wu, 2012): the higher risk aversion the lower the level of
investment (and sabotage).
Moreover, we control for aggregate level of investment in tournaments when
there are no opportunities of sabotage. In this case, subjects should put more
costly resources on productive effort. Considering data of the Random Allocation 2
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treatment as well (and comparing investment level across treatments) we find that
the average level of investment is lower when sabotage is possible.
Finally, in the light of the results obtained and described in Chapter 3 of this
thesis, we acknowledge that our results may depend on the effort task used. The
implementation of a different effort task, as for example a real effort task, might (or




This doctoral thesis aims first at investigating the effects of emotions on agents’
performance. Secondly, it contributes to the scientific discussion about a method-
ological issue on the use of effort tasks in the economic laboratory experiments.
It is structured in three substantial essays. The first essay (Chapter 2) explores
the motivating role of anxiety and its positive effects on agents’ performance in
an individual task under a piece rate incentive scheme. Contrary to the negative
valence given to this emotion, anxiety can induce agents’ to exert more effort in
order to counter-balance the negative consequences of a poor outcome. I find that
participants in my laboratory experiment, whose anxious mood was induced, achieve
on average a higher level of performance than participants whose mood was positively
manipulated.
In the second essay, Chapter 3, I point out the implications of the use of effort
tasks in economic laboratory experiments. Participants are asked to carry out some
tasks that allow the experimenter to measure for example participants’ performance
or decisions of investment. Effort tasks can be either real effort tasks, which require
mental or physical effort to be performed, or induced value effort tasks, which asked
participants to choose a costly level of desired effort or investment.
148
Experimenters use effort tasks in an equivalent way: they do not acknowledge
the limitation of this tool in presenting their experimental results. Effort tasks might
not lead in fact to similar results since they vary a lot in their nature.
My laboratory experiment compares the effect of a group of explanatory variables
on agents’ performance. Four different effort tasks have been used, three real effort
tasks and an induced value effort task. Results show that there is no equivalence
between tasks and that the experimental data might be significantly affected by the
choice of the task.
In the last essay, Chapter 4, I considered the effects of different allocation rules
of an extra monetary reward (bonus) on agents’ behaviour in contests. We collected
experimental data. Assuming profit maximizer agents, we expect that they would
choose the optimal level of investment and sabotage in a tournament with fixed
prizes. The tournament prize structure is in fact independent of the monetary
reward. However, we find that contestants’ behaviour is affected by the allocation of
the bonus and that perceived fairness, expectations and competitive feelings drive
contestants’ choices of investment and sabotage.
An important qualification of our findings has referred to earlier but now is
worth reiterating. I use a real effort task in my first essay and an induced value
effort task in my third essay. I draw conclusions from the experimental data thus
collected. However, I do acknowledge that my experimental results might depend
on the effort tasks that I have used. The methodological lesson that comes from my
second essay does suggest the limitation and the potential loss of external validity
of the research when effort tasks are used in the economic laboratory. The reason
why I have applied an induced value effort task in the last essay (Chapter 4) is
that it assures full control over the cost of (productive and destructive) effort and
guarantees very strong internal validity of the experiments run.
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This doctoral thesis suggests interesting ideas for future research. Here just few
examples. Monitoring mechanisms may be explored in order to check their joint
effects with individual anxiety on performance. Moreover, other types of incentives
can be studied rather than tournaments when it comes necessary in a firm to use
particular allocation procedure. Finally, it would be very useful to strengthen the
investigation on the limitations of the effort tasks implemented in the laboratory in
order to provide complete evidence of the risks and potential of each (or the most




A.1 The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)
Questionnaire
[Instructions and statements for State Anxiety]
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are
given below. Read each statement and than blacken in the appropriate circle to
the right of the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this mo-
ment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any
one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
[Participants could select their answer by clicking one of the 5 buttons to the
right of each statement where 1 indicates ‘Not at all’ and 4 indicates ‘Very much so’.
To the four-point Likert scale answers scheme another possible answer was added:
“I did not understand the question”, the fifth button to the right. Subjects that were
not sure about the meaning of the question could select it. This type of answer was
considered as not answering the question in the score counting. Scores were adjusted
according to the number of not answered questions. If there were 3 or more questions
not answered for each set of questions (Trait or State) the score for that set was
considered missing.]
151
1. I feel calm
2. I feel secure
3. I am tense
4. I feel strained
5. I feel at ease
6. I feel upset
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes
8. I feel satisfied
9. I feel frightened
10. I feel comfortable
11. I feel self-confident
12. I feel nervous
13. I am jiitery
14. I feel indecisive
15. I am relaxed
16. I feel content
17. I am worried
18. I feel confused
19. I feel steady
20. I feel pleasant
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[Instructions and statements for Trait Anxiety]
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the right
of the statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong
answer. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer
which seems to describe how you generally feel.
21. I feel pleasant
22. I feel nervous and restless
23. I feel satisfied with myself
24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be
25. I feel like a failure
26. I feel rested
27. I am "calm, cool, and collected"
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them
29. I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter
30. I am happy
31. I have disturbing thoughts
32. I lack self-confidence
33. I feel secure
34. I make decision easily
35. I feel inadequate
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36. I am content
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me
38. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind
39. I am a steady person




[The experimenter reads these instructions at the beginning of the experiment].
You are participating in an experiment on decision making. The experiment is
expected to last 1 hour and 15 minutes. Your earnings in this experiment will depend
on your decisions and ability. A participation fee of £3 is guaranteed. During the
experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you
have any questions at any moment please raise your hand and the experimenter will
come to your desk.
The experiment consists of THREE SECTIONS:
FIRST SECTION
In the first section you are asked to fill in a questionnaire. The questionnaire consists
of 2 parts: PART A and PART B. For each part you will receive specific instructions.
Please read the instructions carefully.
After that all of you complete the questionnaire, you will receive the instructions for
the second and third section of the experiment.
[The experimenter reads these instructions after that participants have completed
the (STAI) questionnaire].
SECOND SECTION




In the third section you are asked to carry out a task for 10 rounds. In each round
you will see 48 sliders on the screen. Each slider has integer values from 0 to 100.
Each slider will appear on position 0. The sliders can be adjusted and readjusted
an unlimited number of times and the current position is displayed to the right of
each slider.
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Your task is to position each slider at exactly 50 with the help of your mouse. You
will have 2 minutes to carry out your task that is each round will last for 2 minutes.
The remaining time is displayed in seconds in the top right corner of the screen.
Your score
You get one point per each slider you have positioned at 50.
Example:
Suppose you position five sliders at exactly 50 then your points score is 5.
At the beginning of each round your score is reset. This means that scores of
previous rounds will not be added to scores of successive rounds.
The payment
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select one round and you
will be paid based on your score of that round. Your earnings will be: your score x
£0.30.
Example:
Suppose your score in round 1 is 5. If the computer selects round 1 then your
earnings are: 5 x £0.30 = £1.50.
Example:
Suppose your score in round 2 is 10. If the computer selects round 2 then your
earnings are: 10 x £0.30 = £3.
Example:
Suppose your score in round 9 is 20. If the computer selects round 9 then your
earnings are: 20 x £0.30 = £6.
Your total earnings in this experiment will be £3 plus £0.30 x your score of the
selected round.
STAI Questionnaire Instructions.
Instructions for the State Anxiety
You will be shown 20 statements. Read each statement and click on the appropriate
answer to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no
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right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give
the answer which seems to describe best your present feelings.
Instructions for the Trait Anxiety
You will be shown 20 statements. Read each statement and click on the appropriate
answer to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do
not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to
describe best how you generally feel.
Mood Manipulation Instructions.
Please think about two of your personal situations over the last year in which
you felt very anxious. Please think about those events in details, remembering how
you felt and what happened.
Please write down about the first personal situation you have previously thought
about. Feel free to write whatever you want about that.
Please write down about the second personal situation you have previously thought
about. Feel free to write whatever you want about that.
Please write down some adjectives that describe exactly your feelings in personal
situations you have previously thought about. Feel free to write whatever you want
about that.
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A.3 Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: Slider Task
Table A.1: Aggregate average values of emotions elicited after the task
Main Treatmens Control Treatments
Anxiety 0.77 (1.22) 1.17 (1.56)
Happiness 1.58 (1.28) 1.82 (1.51)
Tiredness 1.87 (1.58) 2.12 (1.63)
Despondency 0.62 (1.02) 0.70 (1.17)
Sadness 0.48 (0.89) 0.67 (1.13)
Apprehension 0.83 (1.17) 1.04 (1.25)
Anger 0.75 (1.16) 0.43 (0.90)
Frustration 1.27 (1.38) 1.24 (1.49)
Note: Standard Deviation in parentheses
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Table A.2: OLS Estimates with Error Clustering On Performance with Interaction
Terms
Model 3 Model 4
Period 0.336*** (5.03) 0.341*** (5.03)
Main 0.616 (0.92) 0.860 (1.39)
Number of Sessions -0.185 (-0.14) -0.822 (-0.67)
Anxiety -0.541 (-0.41) 0.835 (0.69)
Despondency 2.768*** (3.31) 2.247*** (2.95)
Sadness -0.291 (-0.72) 0.103 (0.26)
Apprehension -0.786 (-1.34) -1.060* (-1.91)
Tiredness -0.681* (-1.93) -0.526 (-1.56)
Happiness -0.516 (-1.62) -0.147 (-0.49)
Anger -0.162 (-0.24) -0.173 (-0.25)
Frustration -0.988 (-1.50) -1.460** (-2.22)
State Score -0.157* (-1.73) -0.083 (-0.99)
Trait Score 0.028 (0.34) 0.028 (0.41)
Anxiety x Period -0.011 (-0.40) -0.013 (-0.46)
Anx x NS -0.038 (-0.06) 0.052 (0.09)
Anx Square -0.305 (-1.19) -0.199 (-0.80)
Anx x Trait Anx -0.014 (-0.38) -0.019 (-0.64)
Anx x State Anx 0.063 (1.64) 0.039 (1.12)
Anx x Despondency -1.194*** (-2.90) -0.759* (-1.97)
Anx x Apprehension 0.211 (0.82) 0.162 (0.70)
Anx x Tiredness 0.379** (2.01) 0.196 (1.09)
Anx x Frustration 0.241 (0.73) 0.336 (1.09)
Anx x Anger 0.309 (0.98) 0.164 (0.49)
Age -2.044*** (-4.06)
Gender 3.142*** (2.96)
British Nationality 1.650*** (2.65)
School of Economics 0.576 (0.50)
Anx x Gender -0.542 (-1.03)




t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 3: Error clustering without demographic variables;
Model 4: Error clustering with demographic variables;
Anx x NS: Anxiety x Number of Sessions;
abs(Anx) and abs(Anx)Square have been omitted.
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Table A.3: OLS Estimates with Error Clustering On Performance without Frustration
or Despondency
No Frustration No Despondency
Model 5 Model 5a Model 6 Model 6a
Period 0.322*** 0.320*** 0.322*** 0.320***
Main 0.776 0.739 0.578 0.578
Number of Sessions -0.877 -0.713 -1.004 -0.834
abs(Anx) -0.137 -0.109 0.130 0.040
abs(Anx)Square 0.004 -0.055 -0.186 -0.183
Anxiety 0.749** 0.434 0.969*** 0.588*
Apprehension -0.916*** -0.599* -0.795** -0.509
Despondency 0.611 0.529
Sadness -0.079 -0.503 0.181 -0.316
Tiredness -0.284 -0.180 -0.225 -0.138
Happiness -0.008 -0.266 -0.067 -0.316
Anger 0.156 0.554 0.300 0.671*
Gender 2.355*** 2.492***
British Nationality 1.597** 1.645**
School of Economics 0.172 0.284
Age -2.362*** -2.293***
State Score -0.004 -0.043 0.022 -0.020
Trait Score -0.018 0.012 -0.025 0.004
Frustration -0.424 -0.231
Constant 17.057*** 18.951*** 16.656*** 18.860***
Observations 1470 1480 1470 1480
R-Square 0.251 0.090 0.249 0.086
F-test 6.166 6.239 6.079 6.185
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;
Models 5a and 6a do not include demographic variables.
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Table A.4: OLS Estimates with Error Clustering on Performance by Trait Anxiety
Groups without Demographic Variables
High Trait Medium Trait Low Trait
Period 0.341*** (3.40) 0.279*** (6.18) 0.395*** (4.03)
Main 0.605 (0.36) 1.186 (1.49) 0.371 (0.11)
Number of Sessions -0.624 (-0.47) -2.864*** (-3.23) 2.518 (1.45)
abs(Anx) -7.468 (-1.30) -0.298 (-0.13) 5.017 (0.80)
abs(Anx)Square 1.669 (0.85) 0.212 (0.23) -1.044 (-0.37)
Anxiety 2.413** (2.57) -0.362 (-0.81) 0.396 (0.45)
Despondency -1.024 (-0.84) 0.676 (1.10) 2.303 (1.06)
Sadness -0.555 (-0.58) 0.652 (1.23) -1.969 (-1.16)
Apprehension -1.142 (-1.47) -0.810* (-1.99) -0.430 (-0.34)
Tiredness -0.687 (-1.22) -0.430 (-1.48) -0.100 (-0.14)
Happiness 1.080 (1.40) -0.771** (-2.41) -0.967 (-0.78)
Anger 0.231 (0.27) 0.649 (1.33) -0.024 (-0.02)
Frustration -0.376 (-0.60) -0.973** (-2.17) 2.935 (1.57)
State Score 0.047 (0.48) -0.043 (-0.60) -0.001 (-0.00)
Trait Score 0.331*** (3.03) -0.080 (-0.69) -0.046 (-0.13)
Constant 1.268 (0.22) 26.547*** (5.40) 14.404 (1.65)
Observations 380 780 320
R-Square 0.266 0.249 0.245
F-test 3.731 5.437 6.266
t statistics in parentheses;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure A.2: Trait Anxiety Score Distribution
Table A.5: Aggregate average values of anxiety by Trait Anxiety Groups
Low Trait Anxiety Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max
Anxiety 320 1.094 1.210 0 4
Medium Trait Anxiety Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max
Anxiety 790 1.367 1.315 0 4
High Trait Anxiety Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max
Anxiety 400 1.85 1.315 0 4
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Experimental Instructions - Treatment A - The Slider Task
[The experimenter reads this instructions at the beginning of the experiment].
You are participating in an experiment on decision making. The experiment is
expected to last 1 hour.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other partic-
ipants. If you have any questions at any moment please raise your hand and the
experimenter will come to your desk.
The experiment consists of THREE SECTIONS:
FIRST SECTION
In the first section you are asked to fill in a questionnaire. The questionnaire
consists of 2 parts: PART A and PART B. For each part you will receive specific
instructions. Please read the instructions carefully.
After that all of you have completed the questionnaire, you will receive the instruc-
tions for the second and third section of the experiment.




In the second section you are randomly matched with another participant in this
room. You will not be told whom you are matched with. We will call him or her
your “co-participant”.
In this section you and your co-participant are asked to perform a task that will
be described shortly. In this task you get a score based on your performance.
The task
You will see 48 sliders on the screen. Each slider has integer values from 0 to
100.
Each slider will appear on position 0.
Your task is to position each slider at exactly 50 with the help of your mouse.
The sliders can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and the
current position is displayed to the right of each slider.
Your score
You get a score of one point per each slider you have positioned at 50.
Example:
If you position five sliders at exactly 50, you get a score of 5 points.
You will have two minutes to correctly position as many sliders as you can. We
will call these two minutes “round”.
In this experiment you are asked to carry out this task for 10 rounds. You will
be matched with the same co-participant among the 10 rounds. All the sliders will
appear at position 0 at the beginning of each round. Therefore, your score will be
reset. This means that scores of previous rounds will not be added to scores of
successive rounds.
165
Your earnings in the second section
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select one round out
of 10. The selected round will be the same for you and your co-participant.
The computer will compare your score to the score of your co-participant obtained
in the selected round. Three situations can occur:
• If your score in the selected round is higher than your co-participant’s score,
you earn a prize of £10;
• If your score in the selected round is lower than your co-participant’s score,
you earn £0;
• If your score in the selected round is equal to your co-participant’s score, the
computer will randomly select one of you; you have therefore a 50% chance of
being selected and of winning the prize.
Example 1
Suppose the computer selects round 1. If your score in round 1 is higher than your
co-participant’s score, your earnings are £10.00.
Example 2
Suppose the computer selects round 5. If your score in round 5 is lower than your
co-participant’s score, your earnings are £0.00.
Example 3
Suppose the computer selects round 10. If your score in round 10 is equal to your
co-participant’s score, your earnings are £10 or £0 with a 50% chance.
THIRD SECTION
In the next screen you will be asked to make some decisions. Your decisions will
affect your final earnings: what you will earn from this task will be added to your
earnings of the previous task.
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You now need to make 9 decisions for each of two successive computer screens.
Each decision is a paired choice between two options (for example, “Option A” and
“Option B”). You will make 9 decisions and record these in the final column, but
only one of them from each computer screen will be used in the end to determine
your earnings. You will only know which one at the end of this session.
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Experimental Instructions - Treatment B - The Maths Task
[The experimenter reads this instructions at the beginning of the experiment].
You are participating in an experiment on decision making. The experiment is
expected to last 1 hour.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other partic-
ipants. If you have any questions at any moment please raise your hand and the
experimenter will come to your desk.
The experiment consists of THREE SECTIONS:
FIRST SECTION
In the first section you are asked to fill in a questionnaire. The questionnaire
consists of 2 parts: PART A and PART B. For each part you will receive specific
instructions. Please read the instructions carefully.
After that all of you have completed the questionnaire, you will receive the
instructions for the second and third section of the experiment.
[The experimenter reads this instructions after that participants have completed
the (STAI) questionnaire].
SECOND SECTION
In the second section you are randomly matched with another participant in this
room. You will not be told whom you are matched with. We will call him or her
your “co-participant”.
In this section you and your co-participant are asked to perform a task that will
be described shortly. In this task you get a score based on your performance.
The task
The task consists of adding-up four numbers that are randomly generated and
that are displayed on your screen.
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For example, you will see on your screen:
50 + 20 + 10 + 33
Your task is to sum these numbers that is 50 + 20 + 10 + 33. The correct
answer in this example is 113.
The use of paper, pencil or calculator is forbidden. You must make these
calculations in your head.
Once your calculation has been done, you enter your answer in the specified area
and you submit your answer by clicking the “submit” button. Having submitted your
answer a new series of numbers appears automatically on your screen. Therefore,
you are asked to sum these new numbers and to submit your answer.
You will have two minutes to submit as many correct answers as you can. We
will call these two minutes “round”. In this experiment you are going to perform the
arithmetic task for 10 rounds. You will be matched with the same co-participant
among the 10 rounds but the series of numbers will be different in each round.
Your score
You get a score of one point per each correct answer you submit. You will not
be told whether your answers are correct or wrong when you submit them.
Example:
In the example: 50 + 20 + 10 + 33 the correct answer is 113.
If your answer is 113 you get a score of 1 point.
At the beginning of each round your score is reset. This means that scores of
previous rounds will not be added to scores of successive rounds. Your score is
independent in each round.
Your earnings in the second section
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select one round out
of 10. The selected round will be the same for you and your co-participant.
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The computer will compare your score to the score of your co-participant obtained
in the selected round. Three situations can occur:
• If your score in the selected round is higher than your co-participant’s score,
you earn a prize of £10;
• If your score in the selected round is lower than your co-participant’s score,
you earn £0;
• If your score in the selected round is equal to your co-participant’s score, the
computer will randomly select one of you; you have therefore a 50% chance of
being selected and of winning the prize.
Example 1
Suppose the computer selects round 1. If your score in round 1 is higher than your
co-participant’s score, your earnings are £10.00.
Example 2
Suppose the computer selects round 5. If your score in round 5 is lower than your
co-participant’s score, your earnings are £0.00.
Example 3
Suppose the computer selects round 10. If your score in round 10 is equal to your
co-participant’s score, your earnings are £10 or £0 with a 50% chance.
THIRD SECTION
In the next screen you will be asked to make some decisions. Your decisions will
affect your final earnings: what you will earn from this task will be added to your
earnings of the previous task.
You now need to make 9 decisions for each of two successive computer screens.
Each decision is a paired choice between two options (for example, “Option A” and
“Option B”). You will make 9 decisions and record these in the final column, but
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only one of them from each computer screen will be used in the end to determine
your earnings. You will only know which one at the end of this session.
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Experimental Instructions - Treatment C - The Grid Task
[The experimenter reads this instructions at the beginning of the experiment]. You
are participating in an experiment on decision making. The experiment is expected
to last 1 hour.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other partic-
ipants. If you have any questions at any moment please raise your hand and the
experimenter will come to your desk.
The experiment consists of THREE SECTIONS:
FIRST SECTION
In the first section you are asked to fill in a questionnaire. The questionnaire
consists of 2 parts: PART A and PART B. For each part you will receive specific
instructions. Please read the instructions carefully.
After that all of you have completed the questionnaire, you will receive the
instructions for the second and third section of the experiment.
[The experimenter reads this instructions after that participants have completed
the (STAI) questionnaire].
SECOND SECTION
In the second section you are randomly matched with another participant in this
room. You will not be told whom you are matched with. We will call him or her
your “co-participant”.
In this section you and your co-participant are asked to perform a task that will
be described shortly. In this task you get a score based on your performance.
The task
For the task 1 you will see one table on the screen. You will be asked to count
the number of ones in each table. Then please write down your answer in the box
at the bottom of the screen and submit it by clicking the “Submit” button. After
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you have submitted your answer a new table will be generated and displayed on the
screen. Please notice that once you have submitted you cannot change your answer.
This task will last for 2 minutes. Try to solve as many tables as you can within
the 2 minutes.
The remaining time is displayed in seconds in the top right corner of the screen.
Your score
You get a score of one point per each table you have correctly solved.
Example: If you correctly solve five tables, you get a score of 5 points.
You will have two minutes to correctly solve as many tables as you can. We will
call these two minutes “round”.
In this experiment you are asked to carry out this task for 10 rounds. You will
be matched with the same co-participant among the 10 rounds. At the beginning of
each round your score will be reset. This means that scores of previous rounds will
not be added to scores of successive rounds.
Your earnings in the second section
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select one round out
of 10. The selected round will be the same for you and your co-participant.
The computer will compare your score to the score of your co-participant obtained
in the selected round. Three situations can occur:
• If your score in the selected round is higher than your co-participant’s score,
you earn a prize of £10;
• If your score in the selected round is lower than your co-participant’s score,
you earn £0;
• If your score in the selected round is equal to your co-participant’s score, the
computer will randomly select one of you; you have therefore a 50% chance of
being selected and of winning the prize.
Example 1
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Suppose the computer selects round 1. If your score in round 1 is higher than your
co-participant’s score, your earnings are £10.00.
Example 2
Suppose the computer selects round 5. If your score in round 5 is lower than your
co-participant’s score, your earnings are £0.00.
Example 3
Suppose the computer selects round 10. If your score in round 10 is equal to your
co-participant’s score, your earnings are £10 or £0 with a 50% chance.
THIRD SECTION
In the next screen you will be asked to make some decisions. Your decisions will
affect your final earnings: what you will earn from this task will be added to your
earnings of the previous task. You now need to make 9 decisions for each of two
successive computer screens. Each decision is a paired choice between two options
(for example, “Option A” and “Option B”). You will make 9 decisions and record
these in the final column, but only one of them from each computer screen will be
used in the end to determine your earnings. You will only know which one at the
end of this session.
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Experimental Instructions - Treatment D - The IV Effort
Task
[The experimenter reads this instructions at the beginning of the experiment].
You are participating in an experiment on decision making. The experiment is
expected to last 1 hour. During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate
with other participants. If you have any questions at any moment please raise your
hand and the experimenter will come to your desk.
The experiment consists of THREE SECTIONS:
FIRST SECTION
In the first section you are asked to fill in a questionnaire. The questionnaire
consists of 2 parts: PART A and PART B. For each part you will receive specific
instructions. Please read the instructions carefully.
After that all of you have completed the questionnaire, you will receive the
instructions for the second and third section of the experiment.
[The experimenter reads this instructions after that participants have completed
the (STAI) questionnaire].
SECOND SECTION
In the second section you are randomly matched with another participant in this
room. You will not be told whom you are matched with. We will call him or her
your “co-participant”.
In this section you and your co-participant are asked to perform a task that will
be described shortly. In this task you get a score based on your performance.
The task
You are given an endowment of 10 Experimental Points.
You are asked to decide how much you want to invest and how much you want
to keep for yourself.
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For example, if you decide to invest 5.55 experimental points your remaining
endowment will be 10.00 - 5.55 = 4.45 experimental points.
Once you have decided, you enter your answer in the specified area and you
submit your decision by clicking the “submit” button.
You will be asked to make this decision 10 times. We will call these times
“rounds”. Therefore this experiment will have 10 rounds in which you are matched
with the same co-participant. You receive an endowment of ten experimental points
at the beginning of each round. You will not be told about your co-participant’s
decisions.
Your earnings in the second section
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select one round out
of 10. The selected round will be the same for you and your co-participant.
The computer will compare your decision to the decision of your co-participant
made in the selected round. Three situations can occur:
• If your investment in the selected round is higher than your co-participant’s
investment, you earn a prize of £10;
• If your investment in the selected round is lower than your co-participant’s
investment, you earn £0;
• If your investment in the selected round is equal to your co-participant’s
investment, the computer will randomly select one of you; you have therefore
a 50% chance of being selected and of winning the prize.
Your remaining endowment in the selected round will be converted in pounds
with the following conversion rate:
0.01 Experimental Points = £0.01
For example, 1 Experimental Point will be converted in £1.
Therefore, your earnings in the second section will be:
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• £10 + your remaining endowment in the selected round if your investment in
the selected round is higher than your co-participant’s investment;
• £0 + your remaining endowment in the selected round if your investment in
the selected round is lower than your co-participant’s investment;
• £10 + your remaining endowment in the selected round if your investment
in the selected round is equal to your co-participant’s investment and the
computer selects you as the winner;
• £0 + your remaining endowment in the selected round if your investment
in the selected round is equal to your co-participant’s investment and the
computer selects your co-participant as the winner.
Example 1
Suppose the computer selects round 1.
Suppose that your investment in round 1 is 4.49 experimental points.
Your remaining endowment is 10.00 - 4.49 = 5.51 experimental points.
Your remaining endowment converted in pounds is £5.51.
If in round 1 your investment is higher than your co-participant’s investment, your
earnings are £10.00 + £5.51 = £15.51.
Example 2
Suppose the computer selects round 4.
Suppose that your investment in round 4 is 3.40 experimental points.
Your remaining endowment is 10.00 - 3.40 = 6.60 experimental points.
Your remaining endowment converted in pounds is £6.60.
If in round 4 your investment is lower than your co-participant’s investment, your
earnings are £0.00 + £6.60 = £6.60.
Example 3
Suppose the computer selects round 10.
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Suppose that your investment in round 10 is 5.00 experimental points.
Your remaining endowment is 10.00 - 5.00 = 5.00 experimental points.
Your remaining endowment converted in pounds is £5.00.
If in round 10 your investment is equal to your co-participant’s investment, your
earnings are £10.00 + £5.00 = £15.00 if the computer selects you as the winner OR
£0.00 + £5.00 = £5.00 if the computer selects your co-participant as the winner.
THIRD SECTION
In the next screen you will be asked to make some decisions. Your decisions will
affect your final earnings: what you will earn from this task will be added to your
earnings of the previous task. You now need to make 9 decisions for each of two
successive computer screens. Each decision is a paired choice between two options
(for example, “Option A” and “Option B”). You will make 9 decisions and record
these in the final column, but only one of them from each computer screen will be
used in the end to determine your earnings. You will only know which one at the
end of this session.
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B.2 Tables and Figures
Tables
Table B.1: Ranksum and t-test on Performance - Comparison by Set of Rounds
Obs z-value p-value t-value p-value
Pr(T < t) Pr(|T|>|t|) Pr( T > t )
Slider Task 10 -2.611 0.0090 -4.1019 0.0017 0.0034 0.9983
Maths Task 10 -2.611 0.0090 -4.9631 0.0006 0.0011 0.9994
Grid Task 10 -2.619 0.0088 -5.9538 0.0002 0.0003 0.9998
Ind. Value Effort Task 10 -0.731 0.4647 0.3628 0.6369 0.7261 0.3631
Note: z-value for a two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test; t-value for the t-test.
Table B.2: Sign-Rank and t-test on Anxiety - Comparison by set of Rounds
Obs z-value p-value t-value p-value
Pr(T < t) Pr(|T|>|t|) Pr( T > t )
Slider Task 50 1.854 0.0637 1.1912 0.8803 0.2393 0.1197
Maths Task 54 -1.104 0.2697 -0.8485 0.2000 0.4000 0.8000
Grid Task 52 1.662 0.0964 1.9256 0.9701 0.0597 0.0299
Ind. Value Effort Task 50 -0.029 0.9767 0.4411 0.6695 0.6610 0.3305
Note: z-value for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test; t-value for the t-test.
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Table B.3: Aggregate Descriptive Statistics of Anxiety - by Sets of Rounds
Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Rounds 1 - 5
Slider Task 50 45.12 31.885 0 100
Maths Task 54 56.07 27.53 0 100
Grid Task 52 49.67 30.013 0 100
Ind. Value Effort Task 50 26.42 26.520 0 100
Rounds 6 - 10
Slider Task 50 40.20 31.784 0 100
Maths Task 54 59.41 31.745 0 100
Grid Task 52 43.21 31.917 0 100
Ind. Value Effort Task 50 24.88 30.569 0 100
Table B.4: Summary Statistics on Risk Aversion
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Slider Task 50 5.38 1.794436 1 9
Maths Task 54 5.91 2.226 0 9
Grid Task 52 5.5 2.227 0 9
Ind. Value Effort Task 50 6.12 2.067 1 9
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Table B.5: Summary Statistics on Performance by Gender
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Rounds 1 - 5
Male 120 19.508 3.902 10 28
Slider Task
Female 130 16.685 4.274 6 28
Male 105 4.6 2.003 0 9
Maths Task
Female 165 4.067 1.897 0 9
Male 125 10.928 5.966 0 23
Grid Task
Female 135 9.963 6.128 0 25
Male 125 3.246 3.771 0 10
Ind. Value Effort Task
Female 125 4.341 3.336 0 10
Rounds 6 - 10
Male 120 21.7 4.351 11 34
Slider Task
Female 130 18.323 4.083 9 27
Male 105 5.257 2.171 1 10
Maths Task
Female 165 4.806 2.373 0 12
Male 125 12.168 6.149 0 24
Grid Task
Female 135 11.681 5.933 0 25
Male 125 3.189 3.706 0 10
Ind. Value Effort Task
Female 125 4.264 3.669 0 10
Table B.6: Spearman Correlation Coefficients
Performance Performance Performance Performance
Slider Task Maths Task Grid Task Ind. Value Effort Task
Anxiety before round 1 0.0114 -0.1837 -0.0951 -0.0140
Anxiety before round 6 -0.0033 -0.2499* -0.1145 0.1760
Risk Aversion -0.0739 -0.1667 0.0812 -0.1281
State-Anxiety -0.1437 0.0479 -0.1654 0.0554
Trait-Anxiety -0.3418** 0.0025 -0.0427 0.1520
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
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Table B.7: Summary Statistics on Trait-Anxiety - Measured at the Beginning of the
Experiment
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Slider Task 48 39.54 11.622 23 68
Maths Task 53 42.68 9.058 27 62
Grid Task 52 41.16 8.964 21 61.052
Ind. Value Effort Task 50 42.15 10.782 20 65.263
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Table B.8: Error Clustering on Performance Using the Square of Anxiety Levels
Slider Task Maths Task Grid Task Ind. Value Task
Anxiety Round 1 0.109* -0.034 -0.161 -0.015
Anxiety Square Round 1 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Risk Aversion 0.133 -0.151 -0.137 -0.096 0.914** 0.451 -0.139 -0.163
Trait-Anxiety -0.089 -0.105 0.015 0.017 -0.100 -0.054 0.041 0.033
State-Anxiety -0.045 0.020 0.027 0.039 0.080 -0.010 0.008 0.006
Male 2.355** 3.118*** 0.297 0.156 -0.025 -0.939 -0.831 -0.705
British Nationality -2.059** -2.475** 0.350 1.007 4.248** 4.422** -0.543 -0.651
School of Eco -3.443 -0.631 -0.537 -0.826 4.309 5.225* 0.267 -0.899
Age -0.148 0.033 0.027 0.163 -0.339 -0.131 0.098 0.102
Anxiety Round 6 0.043 -0.044 -0.034 -0.024
Anxiety Square Round 6 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001
Constant 23.884*** 22.919*** 3.895 1.392 0.2460 0.1707 0.981 1.259
Observations 235 235 265 265 260 260 245 245
R-Square 0.2659 0.2502 0.0932 0.1289 0.1345 0.2817 0.2003 0.2811
F - test 4.38 3.57 0.79 1.72 2.64 1.18 0.0801 0.1296
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The first columns of each task refer to
observations of the first set of 5 rounds.
The second columns of each task refer to
observations of the second set of 5 rounds.
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Table B.9: Error Clustering on Performance with Interaction Terms with Anxiety
Before the Task
Slider Task Maths Task Grid Task Ind. Value Task
Anxiety Before Round 1 -0.016 -0.007 -0.037 0.110
Risk Aversion -0.188 -0.197 1.226** -0.293
Trait-Anxiety -0.143 0.056 0.279 0.132
State-Anxiety -0.002 -0.002 -0.629*** 0.003
Male 2.874 0.589 2.134 -0.096
British Nationality -2.261** 0.409 2.887 0.265
School of Eco -3.911 -0.581 3.604 0.234
Age -0.092 0.021 -0.356* 0.198
Anxiety*Risk Aversion 0.008 0.001 -0.009 0.005
Anxiety*Trait Anxiety -0.000 -0.001 -0.008* -0.002
Anxiety*State Anxiety 0.000 0.000 0.012*** -0.000
Anxiety*Male -0.007 -0.006 -0.027 -0.028
Constant 25.719*** 3.264 18.551 -4.913
Observations 235 265 260 245
R-Square 0.2452 0.0948 0.3331 0.1216
F - test 2.88 0.80 5.44 2.14
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.10: Error Clustering on Performance with Interaction Terms with Anxiety
Before Round Six
Slider Task Maths Task Grid Task Ind. Value Task
Anxiety Before Round 6 -0.060 -0.011 0.120 0.069
Risk Aversion -0.094 0.114 1.394*** -0.234
Trait-Anxiety -0.173 -0.008 0.387*** 0.055
State-Anxiety 0.024 0.027 -0.521*** 0.016
Male 4.339** 1.885 0.458 -0.409
British Nationality -2.434** 0.952 4.952* -0.418
School of Eco -1.226 -0.778 3.604 -0.646
Age 0.011 0.142 -0.270 0.155
Anxiety*Risk Aversion 0.001 -0.003 -0.017* 0.004
Anxiety*Trait Anxiety 0.001 0.001 -0.010*** -0.001
Anxiety*State Anxiety 0.001 -0.000 0.010*** -0.001
Anxiety*Male -0.024 -0.027 -0.040 -0.024
Constant 25.272*** 0.729 11.627 -1.406
Observations 235 265 260 245
R-Square 0.2813 0.1511 0.3517 0.1316
F - test 3.39 0.80 3.33 1.49
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.11: OLS and GLM Estimates with Errors Clustering on Performance in the
Slider Task
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Anxiety Before Round 1 0.027 0.027
(1.51) (1.54)
Risk Aversion 0.147 0.147 -0.219 -0.219
(0.63) (0.64) (-0.64) (-0.65)
State-Anxiety -0.006 -0.006 0.005 0.005
(-0.06) (-0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
Trait-Anxiety -0.146** -0.146** -0.090 -0.090
(-2.26) (-2.30) (-1.18) (-1.20)
Male 2.540** 2.540*** 3.268*** 3.268***
(2.59) (2.63) (3.11) (3.16)
Age -0.087 -0.087 0.020 0.020
(-0.74) (-0.75) (0.16) (0.17)
British Nationality -2.164** -2.164** -2.630** -2.630**
(-2.41) (-2.45) (-2.50) (-2.54)
School of ECO -3.457 -3.457 -0.742 -0.742
(-1.56) (-1.58) (-0.31) (-0.32)
Anxiety Before Round 6 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.01) (-0.01)
Constant 24.029*** 24.029*** 24.031*** 24.031***
(5.65) (5.75) (5.48) (5.58)
Observations 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.2381 0.2438
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 1: OLS on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 2: GLM on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 3: OLS on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
Model 4: GLM on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
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Table B.12: OLS and GLM Estimates with Errors Clustering on Performance in the
Maths Task
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Anxiety Before Round 1 -0.017 -0.017*
(-1.63) (-1.66)
Risk Aversion -0.136 -0.136 -0.092 -0.092
(-1.18) (-1.20) (-0.85) (-0.87)
State-Anxiety 0.028 0.028 0.033 0.033
(0.92) (0.93) (0.98) (1.00)
Trait-Anxiety 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.015
(0.47) (0.48) (0.46) (0.47)
Male 0.298 0.298 0.202 0.202
(0.70) (0.71) (0.44) (0.44)
Age 0.029 0.029 0.144 0.144
(0.38) (0.38) (1.57) (1.59)
British Nationality 0.423 0.423 0.948 0.948
(0.89) (0.91) (1.61) (1.64)
School of ECO -0.548 -0.548 -0.828 -0.828
(-0.87) (-0.88) (-1.41) (-1.44)
Anxiety Before Round 6 -0.026*** -0.026***
(-3.02) (-3.06)
Constant 3.511 3.511 1.686 1.686
(1.52) (1.54) (0.64) (0.65)
Observations 265 265 265 265
R-squared 0.0891 0.1264
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 1: OLS on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 2: GLM on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 3: OLS on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
Model 4: GLM on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
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Table B.13: OLS and GLM Estimates with Errors Clustering on Performance in the
Grid Task
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Anxiety Before Round 1 -0.061** -0.061**
(-2.12) (-2.15)
Risk Aversion 0.840** 0.840** 0.459 0.459
(2.07) (2.10) (1.17) (1.19)
State-Anxiety 0.083 0.083 -0.011 -0.011
(0.85) (0.86) (-0.11) (-0.11)
Trait-Anxiety -0.096 -0.096 -0.051 -0.051
(-1.00) (-1.01) (-0.51) (-0.52)
Male -0.112 -0.112 -0.914 -0.914
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.55) (-0.56)
Age -0.246 -0.246 -0.137 -0.137
(-1.12) (-1.14) (-0.57) (-0.58)
British Nationality 4.618** 4.618** 4.447** 4.447**
(2.40) (2.44) (2.21) (2.25)
School of ECO 3.552 3.552 5.263* 5.263*
(1.27) (1.29) (1.87) (1.90)
Anxiety Before Round 6 -0.046* -0.046*
(-1.72) (-1.74)
Constant 11.855 11.855 13.794* 13.794*
(1.58) (1.60) (1.70) (1.73)
Observations 260 260 260 260
R-squared 0.2321 0.1704
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 1: OLS on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 2: GLM on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 3: OLS on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
Model 4: GLM on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
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Table B.14: OLS and GLM Estimates with Errors Clustering on Performance in the
Induced Value Effort Task
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Anxiety Before Round 1 0.007 0.007
(0.35) (0.35)
Risk Aversion -0.133 -0.133 -0.171 -0.171
(-0.69) (-0.71) (-0.75) (-0.76)
State-Anxiety 0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(0.13) (0.13) (-0.06) (-0.07)
Trait-Anxiety 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
(0.73) (0.74) (0.73) (0.74)
Male -0.777 -0.777 -0.691 -0.691
(-0.86) (-0.87) (-0.78) (-0.79)
Age 0.113 0.113 0.134 0.134
(1.04) (1.06) (1.25) (1.27)
British Nationality -0.511 -0.511 -0.634 -0.634
(-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.52) (-0.53)
School of ECO 0.302 0.302 -0.719 -0.719
(0.22) (0.23) (-0.68) (-0.69)
Anxiety Before Round 6 0.023 0.023
(1.47) (1.50)
Constant 0.308 0.308 0.101 0.101
(0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 245 245 245 245
R-squared 0.0773 0.1180
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 1: OLS on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 2: GLM on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 3: OLS on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
Model 4: GLM on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
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Table B.15: OLS with Errors Clustering and Random Effects Estimates on Perfor-
mance in the Slider Task
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Anxiety Before Round 1 0.027 0.027
(1.51) (1.51)
Risk Aversion 0.147 0.147 -0.219 -0.219
(0.63) (0.63) (-0.64) (-0.64)
State-Anxiety -0.006 -0.006 0.005 0.005
(-0.06) (-0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Trait-Anxiety -0.146** -0.146** -0.090 -0.090
(-2.26) (-2.26) (-1.18) (-1.18)
Male 2.540** 2.540*** 3.268*** 3.268***
(2.59) (2.59) (3.11) (3.11)
Age -0.087 -0.087 0.020 0.020
(-0.74) (-0.74) (0.16) (0.16)
British Nationality -2.164** -2.164** -2.630** -2.630**
(-2.41) (-2.41) (-2.50) (-2.50)
School of ECO -3.457 -3.457 -0.742 -0.742
(-1.56) (-1.56) (-0.31) (-0.31)
Anxiety Before Round 6 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.01) (-0.01)
Constant 24.029*** 24.029*** 24.031*** 24.031***
(5.65) (5.65) (5.48) (5.48)
Observations 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.2381 0.2438
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 1: OLS on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 2: Random Effects on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 3: OLS on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
Model 4: Random Effects on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
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Table B.16: OLS with Errors Clustering and Random Effects Estimates on Perfor-
mance in the Maths Task
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Anxiety Before Round 6 -0.017 -0.017
(-1.63) (-1.63)
Risk Aversion -0.136 -0.136 -0.092 -0.092
(-1.18) (-1.18) (-0.85) (-0.85)
State-Anxiety 0.028 0.028 0.033 0.033
(0.92) (0.92) (0.98) (0.98)
Trait-Anxiety 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.015
(0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46)
Male 0.298 0.298 0.202 0.202
(0.70) (0.70) (0.44) (0.44)
Age 0.029 0.029 0.144 0.144
(0.38) (0.38) (1.57) (1.57)
British Nationality 0.423 0.423 0.948 0.948
(0.89) (0.89) (1.61) (1.61)
School of ECO -0.548 -0.548 -0.828 -0.828
(-0.87) (-0.87) (-1.41) (-1.41)
Anxiety Before Round 6 -0.026*** -0.026***
(-3.02) (-3.02)
Constant 3.511 3.511 1.686 1.686
(1.52) (1.52) (0.64) (0.64)
Observations 265 265 265 265
R-squared 0.0891 0.1264
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 1: OLS on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 2: Random Effects on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 3: OLS on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
Model 4: Random Effects on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
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Table B.17: OLS with Errors Clustering and Random Effects Estimates on Perfor-
mance in the Grid Task
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Anxious Period 1 -0.061** -0.061**
(-2.12) (-2.12)
Risk Aversion 0.840** 0.840** 0.459 0.459
(2.07) (2.07) (1.17) (1.17)
State-Anxiety 0.083 0.083 -0.011 -0.011
(0.85) (0.85) (-0.11) (-0.11)
Trait-Anxiety -0.096 -0.096 -0.051 -0.051
(-1.00) (-1.00) (-0.51) (-0.51)
Male -0.112 -0.112 -0.914 -0.914
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.55) (-0.55)
Age -0.246 -0.246 -0.137 -0.137
(-1.12) (-1.12) (-0.57) (-0.57)
British Nationality 4.618** 4.618** 4.447** 4.447**
(2.40) (2.40) (2.21) (2.21)
School of ECO 3.552 3.552 5.263* 5.263*
(1.27) (1.27) (1.87) (1.87)
Anxiety Before Round 6 -0.046* -0.046*
(-1.72) (-1.72)
Constant 11.855 11.855 13.794* 13.794*
(1.58) (1.58) (1.70) (1.70)
Observations 260 260 260 260
R-squared 0.2321 0.1704
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 1: OLS on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 2: Random Effects on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 3: OLS on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
Model 4: Random Effects on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
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Table B.18: OLS with Errors Clustering and Random Effects Estimates on Perfor-
mance in the Induced Value Effort Task
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Anxiety Before Round 1 0.007 0.007
(0.35) (0.35)
Risk Aversion -0.133 -0.133 -0.171 -0.171
(-0.69) (-0.69) (-0.75) (-0.75)
State-Anxiety 0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(0.13) (0.13) (-0.06) (-0.06)
Trait-Anxiety 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
(0.73) (0.73) (0.73) (0.73)
Male -0.777 -0.777 -0.691 -0.691
(-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.78) (-0.78)
Age 0.113 0.113 0.134 0.134
(1.04) (1.04) (1.25) (1.25)
British Nationality -0.511 -0.511 -0.634 -0.634
(-0.48) (-0.48) (-0.52) (-0.52)
School of ECO 0.302 0.302 -0.719 -0.719
(0.22) (0.22) (-0.68) (-0.68)
Anxiety Before Round 6 0.023 0.023
(1.47) (1.47)
Constant 0.308 0.308 0.101 0.101
(0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 245 245 245 245
R-squared 0.0773 0.1180
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 1: OLS on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 2: Random Effects on effort of the first 5 set of rounds.
Model 3: OLS on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
Model 4: Random Effects on effort of the second 5 set of rounds.
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Table B.19: Summary Statistics on State-Anxiety - Measured at the Beginning of
the Experiment
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Slider Task 47 34.26 8.889 20 65
Maths Task 54 37.31 9.355 22 62
Grid Task 52 33.69 9.336 21 61.052
Ind. Value Effort Task 49 35.76 10.071 20 70
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Effort in Rank-Order Tournaments
In rank-order tournaments an agent’s payment depends only on the rank of his or
her performance and not on either the absolute level of performance or the size of
the differences in performance across agents1.
Lazear and Rosen (1981) will consider a two-player symmetric tournament. The
tournament is symmetric when players are identical (homogeneous), that is when
they have the same utility function and same cost of effort. Moreover, they assume
agents to be risk-neutral.
Therefore agents i and j have the following utility function U separable in
the payment received and the effort exerted:
Ui(p, e) = Uj(p, e) = u(p)− c(e)
where p is the non-negative payment to the agent and e is the agent’s non-
negative effort. u(.) and c(.) are both positive and increasing functions, concave
and convex respectively.
Agent j provides a level of effort that is not observable by the principal and that
is converted in output according to the following production function:
1Rank-order tournaments have the structure of a contest as contestants expend effort (we will
call the agents’ observable effort performance or output) in trying to win a prize, and the prize is
awarded as a function of these efforts.
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qj = ej + j
where ej is the level of investment or effort, a measure of skill or average output
of agent j, and j is a random component or luck drawn out of a known distribution
with zero mean and variance σ2. Agent i has a similar technology to agent j and
simultaneously makes a decision on her/his level of investment2.
Let us assume that there are two fixed prizes W1 and W2 where W1 and W2 > 0
and W1 > W2. The winner of the contest is determined by the largest production q.
W1 is the prize that goes to the winner and W2 is the prize that goes to the loser of
the contest.
A contestant k’s expected utility is:
EUk = P [W1 − C (ek)]+(1− P ) [W2 − C (ek)] = PW1+(1− P )W2−C (ek) (C.1)
with k = i, j and where P is the probability of winning.
The probability that j wins the winning prize is
P = prob (qj > qi) = prob (ej + j > ei + i) = prob (ej − ei > i − j) =
prob (ej − ei > ) = G (ej − ei)
(C.2)
where  ≡ i − j where i and j are i.i.d. The random variable  follows a pdf
g,  ∼ g (), with mean zero (E()=0) and variance 2σ2 (E(2 = 2σ2). G (·) is the
cdf of .
2The agent’s (lifetime) output is a random variable whose distribution is controlled by the agent
himself. In particular, the agent is allowed to control the mean of the distribution by investing
in costly skills prior to entering the competition. However, a given productivity realization also
depends on a random factor which is beyond anyone’s control. Contestants pre-commit their
investments knowing the tournament prizes and the rules of the game, but they do not communicate
each other or collude. Moreover, productivity risk is non-diversifiable by the agent himself. This
is one reason for choosing a long period (agent’s lifetime is considered a single period in the
tournament game): ability effect cannot be diversified when it is not possible to discover it quickly
(managerial talent, for example). If the period were short and the random factor was independently
distributed across periods, the agent could diversify per period to balance off good and bad years.
However, it is assumed that  is i.i.d. across individuals, so that owners of firms can diversify risk
by pooling workers together or by holding a portfolio.
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Each contestant chooses ek to maximize C.1. Assuming interior solutions, this




= 0⇒ (W1 −W2) ∂P
∂ek




< 0⇒ (W1 −W2) ∂
2P
∂e2k
− C ′′ (ek) < 0 (C.4)
with k = i, j.
Player j takes ei as given in determining his effort and conversely for i (Nash-
Cournot assumptions). Moreover, we know that:
∂P
∂ej
= ∂G (ej − ei) /∂ej = g (ej − ei) (C.5)
Therefore, the FOC can be written as follow:
(W1 −W2) g (ej − ei)− C ′ (ej) = 0 (C.6)
Equation C.5 is the j’s reaction function. Player i’s reaction function is symmet-
rical to C.5.
Symmetry implies that when the Nash equilibrium exists:
e∗ = ej = ei
and P = G(0) = 12 . The outcome is purely random in equilibrium; players whose
investment is identical, have the same winning probability. The winner will be
randomly determined in equilibrium. However, each player affects his probability of
winning by investing.
At the Nash equilibrium equation C.6 reduces to
C ′ (ei) = (W1 −W2) g (0) (C.7)
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because ej = ei. Players’ investment depend on the spread between winning and
loosing prizes: the higher the spread, the more they will invest. Levels of the prizes
only influence the decision to enter the game, which requires non-negative expected
wealth.
However, it is important to remember that it is not necessarily true that there is
a solution because with arbitrary density functions the objective function may not
be concave in the relevant range. A pure strategy solution exists if σ2 is sufficiently
large. Contests are feasible only when chance is a significant factor.
Specification of the Model
With suitable restrictions on the distribution of the random term and the utility
functions, a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium will exist for the game. Testing
the theory in the lab requires the specification of the utility function, the production
function, the distribution of , and the prizes W1 and W2.
One simple simplification is the following:





qk = ek + k
where k = i, j, c > 0, and k is distributed uniformly over the interval [−a, a]
where a > 0, and independently across the agents. We, moreover, restrict agents’
effort to lie in the interval [b, d].
The agent k’ expected utility, as previously shown, is
EUk = P [W1 − C (ek)] + (1− P ) [W2 − C (ek)]
that can be written as
W2 + P (W1 −W2)− C (ek)
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with k = i, j. If a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists, it will be symmetric
ei = ej = e∗. If the equilibrium is interior of [b, d], each agent’s first and second
order conditions must be fulfilled:
∂EU
∂ek
= 0⇒ (W1 −W2) ∂P
∂ek
− C ′ (ek) = 0 (C.8)
with k = i, j. Substituting the first order derivative of the cost of effort function
and C.5 into C.8 we have:
∂EU
∂ek














where a is the size of the interval of the random term. We can thus write
explicitly the expression for the equilibrium value
e∗ = (W1 −W2) c4a (C.11)
The concavity of the agent’s utility function ensures that C.8 is sufficient for a
maximum. Moreover, the second order condition is fulfilled:
∂2EU
∂e2k
< 0⇒ (W1 −W2) ∂
2P
∂e2k
− C ′′ (ek) < 0⇒ 0− 2
c
< 0 (C.12)
This holds because c is a strictly positive scalar.
Therefore, the efforts chosen by agents in the rank-order tournaments will propor-
tionally increase with any increase in the spread between the prizes and in the
cost of effort c, while they will move inversely with both the size of the uniform
distribution of the random term3.
3The more important luck is in determining the outcome of the contest, the lower is effort.
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Effort and Sabotage in Rank-Order Tournaments
Let us assume now that the agents’ production functions are as follows:
qi = f (ei, sj) + i
qj = f (ej, si) + j
The term sj is the j’s ‘sabotage’ inflicted on the other player4. The term
sabotage is used to indicate any costly action that one agent takes and that negatively
affects the output of another agent. The aggressive behaviour has therefore the
direct effect of output reduction. It is not clear, however, that the final effect
is output reduction. The outcome of this relative performance contest is indeed
affected by choices of effort and sabotage; thus it is possible that agents’ effort is
sufficiently larger to make up for the lost output through sabotage5. This is the
so-called identification issue: the observation of agents’ final outcome does not allow
to clearly identify between the agent’s effort and the sabotage choice6.
In his model Lazear (1989) considers a game which consists of 2 symmetric
agents i and j; agent i wishes to maximize his expected utility:
maxei,siEU = P (ei, si; ej, sj)W1 + [1− P (.)]W2 − C (ei, si) (C.13)
where P (ei, si; ej, sj) is the probability that agent i wins conditional on his choice
of effort and sabotage. Hence, i wins the winning prize if qi > qj and the winning
probability is given by
P (ei, si; ej, sj) = prob (qi > qj) = prob [f (ei, sj)− f (ej, si) > j − i] = G [f (ei, sj)− f (ej, si)]
(C.14)
4The other terms of the production function have the same characteristics described in the
previous paragraph.
5It is clear however that output always decreases when the cost of sabotage falls.
6For this reason an experiment which consists of treatments that do not allow for sabotage
would help in the analysis of agents’ behaviour.
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where G (.) is the distribution function of the random variable j − i.
The first order conditions (F.O.C.) to agent i’s maximization problem (C.13)
are:




= C2 (ei, si) (C.15)
or
(W1 −W2) g [f (ei, sj)− f (ej, si)] f1 (ei, sj) = C1 (ei, si) (C.16)
(W1 −W2) g [f (ei, sj)− f (ej, si)] f2 (ej, si) = −C2 (ei, si) (C.17)
Agent j solves the corresponding problem. Since players are identical, in equilib-
rium, ei = ej and si = sj. Therefore, the solution is given by the following four7
first order conditions:
(W1 −W2) g (0) f1 (ei, sj) = C1 (ei, si)
(W1 −W2) g (0) (−) f2 (ej, si) = C2 (ei, si)
(W1 −W2) g (0) f1 (ej, si) = C1 (ej, sj)
(W1 −W2) g (0) (−) f2 (ei, sj) = C2 (ej, sj)
The existence of a unique interior solution is not guaranteed unless the second
order conditions8 are fulfilled as well:
(W1 −W2) g (0) f11 − C11 < 0
and
7Two per each player.
8Both per each agent.
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(W1 −W2) g (0) f22 − C22 < 0
Moreover, to ensure a unique interior solution there must be enough dispersion
of the random term.
Finally, the agent has also a participation constraint. Under the symmetrical
Nash equilibrium, each agent has a probability of winning that match equal to
G(0) = 12 . This implies that in equilibrium an agent’s expected utility is
EU = W1+W22 − C(e∗, s∗)
The agent will participate in the contest (assuming that the outside option is 0)




This guarantees that an interior solution exists and that agents have no incentive
to deviate to zero.
Specification of the Model with Sabotage
Let us assume that the random variable is uniformly distributed over the interval















9See the proof in the appendix in Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008).
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Thus our FOC (C.1 and C.15) for agent i will reduce to
(W1 −W2) 12b = 2eice
and
(W1 −W2) 12b = 2sics
from which we obtain the effort and sabotage level in equilibrium
e∗ = (W1 −W2) ce4b
and
s∗ = (W1 −W2) cs4b
Note that an increase in the prize spread leads to higher effort as well as sabotage
activities and that the marginal cost of effort and sabotage are equal in equilibrium
(Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008, page 7).
Parametrization
Experimental parameters’ choice is restricted by the above simplifications:
e ∈ [0, 100]
s ∈ [0, 50]
The range for sabotage value follows the experimental literature in sabotage in
contests (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2005, 2003, 2008).
We will use the same range of the random term in treatments with and without
sabotage.  ∈ [−60, 60]
The constant ce and cs are respectively 3 and 2. Therefore we have the following
total cost:
C (e, s) = e2/76.8 + s2/21.6
Sabotaging is more expensive. An aggressive behaviour could be punished and
the agent actually exposes herself to this risk. Therefore, imposing higher costs of
sabotaging is an indicator of potential risk and related negative consequences.
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We impose for convenience the following prizes values:
W1 = 350
W2 = 250
The spread of 100 points is convenient for calculations. Beside, the relative
proportion of prizes follows the literature (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Bull et al.,
1987).
The effort level in equilibrium, assuming maximizing agents, is 32 and the
sabotage level in equilibrium is 9.
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C.2 Experimental Instructions
TASK 2 - INSTRUCTIONS
In this task you are matched with another participant in this room. We will call
him or her participant X.
You and participant X will be asked to make some decisions. Your decisions are made
anonymously and you will have no information identifying who you are matched with.
Task 2 consists of a PRIZE COMPETITION: one of you will get the Winner
Prize and the other will get the Loser Prize.
The Winner Prize is 350 Experimental Points.
The Loser Prize is 250 Experimental Points.
In this task you and participant X will gain experimental points. At the end of the
experiment your experimental points will be converted by the computer into pounds
at the rate of 2 pence for each point.
For example, if you have 100 Experimental Points it means that you have earned 2
pounds.
HOW CAN I WIN THE WINNER PRIZE?
To win the Winner Prize your Total Experimental Points must be higher
than participant X’s Total Experimental Points.
Otherwise, you will get the Loser Prize.
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Therefore:
If your Total Experimental Points are HIGHER than participant X’ Total Experi-
mental Points then you will get the Winner Prize.
If your Total Experimental Points are LOWER than participant X’ Total Experi-
mental Points then you will get the Loser Prize.
If your Total Experimental Points are EQUAL TO participant X’ Total Experi-
mental Points then you will get either the Winner Prize or the Loser Prize with
a 50% chance.
HOW DO I GET MY TOTAL EXPERIMENTAL POINTS?
Your Total Experimental Points and participant X’s Total Experimental Points are
determined as follows:
Your Total Experimental Points = Your choice of Number A - Number
B chosen by participant X + your Random Number
Participant X’s Total Experimental Points = his/her choice of Number
A - your choice of Number B + her/his Random Number
We are going now to explain each component of your Total Experimental Points
and participant X’s Total Experimental Points.
Number A
The first component of your Total Experimental Points is a number that we will
call Number A.
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The Number A can be any whole number between 0 and 100. You will be
asked to choose one number between 0 and 100 for Number A.
Each Number A is associated with a cost. The higher the number the higher the
cost is. You can find the list of costs associated with each Number A in table 1
"Number A and Costs".
The cost associated with the Number A you will choose will be deducted
from your prize.
Participant X will be simultaneously asked to choose her/his Number A. She/he
will be provided with the same list of numbers and related costs.
[Here Table 1. "Number A and Costs" was inserted]
Number B
The second component of your Total Experimental Points is a number that we will
call Number B.
The Number B can be any whole number between 0 and 50.
Participant X can reduce your Total Experimental Points by a Number
B. Participant X will be asked to choose one number between 0 and 50
for Number B
.
Each Number B is associated with a cost. The higher the number the higher the
cost is.
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You can reduce participant X’s Total Experimental Points as well by a
Number B. You will be provided with the same list of numbers and related costs.
You can find the list of costs associated with each Number B in table 2 "Number B
and Costs".
The cost of your choice of Number B will be deducted from your prize.
[Here Table 2. "Number B and Costs" was inserted]
The Random Number
The third component of your Total Experimental Points is a Random Number.
After you have chosen your A and B numbers the computer will select a personal
random number.
This number can be any whole number between - 60 and + 60.
- 60, - 59, - 58, - 57, - 56, ..., -2, -1, 0, + 1, + 2, ..., + 56, + 57, + 58, +
59, + 60.
Each number is equally likely to be drawn.
There is one separate and independent random draw for you and one for participant
X. This means that either you can be assigned the same random number as partici-
pant X or a different one.
Please note that you will be asked to choose your A and B numbers
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simultaneously with participant X. Once you both have made your deci-
sions, the computer will draw the random numbers.. You will know your
Total Experimental Points and participant X’s Total Experimental Points only at
the end of the experiment.
———————————————————–
Here is a reminder of how your Total Experimental Points and participant X’s Total
Experimental Points are determined:
Your Total Experimental Points = Your choice of Number A - Number
B chosen by participant X + your Random Number
Participant X’s Total Experimental Points = his/her choice of Number
A - your choice of Number B + her/his Random Number
And a reminder of how you can win the prize:
If your Total Experimental Points are HIGHER than participant X’ Total Experi-
mental Points then you will get the Winner Prize.
If your Total Experimental Points are LOWER than participant X’ Total Experi-
mental Points then you will get the Loser Prize.
If your Total Experimental Points are EQUAL TO participant X’ Total Experi-
mental Points then you will get either the Winner Prize or the Loser Prize with
a 50% chance.
MY EARNINGS FROM TASK 2
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Your earnings in experimental points from Task 2 are determined as follows:
Your earnings = the Prize you won - cost of your Number A - costs of
your Number B
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C.3 Task 6 - Questionnaire
The following 48 items have been used in Experiment 1:
Nine items from the original scale have been used (Cohen-Charash, 2009). Items
have been adapted.
1. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt some hatred.
2. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt some resentment against
participant X.
3. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt some rancour against partici-
pant X.
4. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt bitter.
5. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt irritated and annoyed.
6. I desired the bonus that participant X has.
7. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt I lacked some of the things
that participant X has.
8. Task 2 (the task in which I chose my A and B numbers) seems to be going better
for participant X.
9. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt envious.
Items have been created ad hoc to measure the Model by (Fiske et al., 2002).
10. I think participant X is competent.
11. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt warm towards participant X.
12. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt positive towards participant
X.
13. I think participant X’s success to Task 1 (the task in which I counted the number
of ones) is due to luck.
14. I think participant X’s success to Task 1 (the task in which I counted the number
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of ones) is due to skill.
Three items for competitive feelings toward the other have been adapted (Cohen-
Charash, 2009).
15. Task 2 (the task in which I chose my A and B numbers) between participant X
and I was competitive.
16. I was concerned to outperform participant X in Task 2 (the task in which I
chose my A and B numbers).
17. I was concerned to maximize my own earnings relative to X’s earnings in Task 2
(the task in which I chose my A and B numbers).
Five items out of six on subjective injustice beliefs have been used. Items have been
adapted (Smith et al., 1994).
18. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt unfairly treated.
19. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt resentment over the unfairness
of my treatment.
20. It seemed unfair that participant X started Task 2 (the task in which I chose
my A and B numbers) with certain advantages over me.
21. It seemed unfair that the good fortune of participant X came naturally to
him/her.
22. It seemed unfair that participant X had an advantage over me because of luck.
Three items out of four on inferior beliefs have been used. Items have been adapted
(Smith et al., 1994).
23. Participant X made me feel inferior.
24. In Task 1 (the task in which I counted the number of ones) I was aware of my
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inferior qualities.
25. The discrepancy in performance in Task 1 (the task in which I counted the
number of ones) between participant X and I was due to my own inferior qualities.
Seven items on hostile and depressive feelings. All the items of the original scale
have been used. Items have been adapted (Smith et al., 1994).
26. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt anger against participant X.
27. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt hostile feelings against
participant X.
28. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I hated participant X.
29. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I disliked participant X.
30. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt in low spirits.
31. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I felt that I lacked energy.
32. Participant X made me feel depressed in Task 2 (the task in which I chose my
A and B numbers).
All three items of the original scale on objective injustice have been used. Items
have been adapted (Smith et al., 1994).
33. An objective judge would agree that participant X did not deserve the bonus.
34. Anyone would agree that participant X’s advantage was unfairly obtained.
35. Participant X achieved his/her advantage through undeniably unjust procedures.
Item created ad hoc for the measure of competitive feelings.
36. I did enjoy competing with participant X in Task 2 (the task in which I chose
my A and B numbers).
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Twelve items created ad hoc to measure emotion arousal. The list (anxiety, anger,
envy, irritation, jealousy, surprise, happiness, contempt, sadness, fear, joy, shame) is
used by economists (Bosman and Van Winden, 2002; Bolle et al., 2010).
37. I was happy because of the assignment of the bonus.
38. I was angry because of the assignment of the bonus.
39. I enjoyed the assignment of the bonus.
40. I was sad because of the assignment of the bonus.
41. I was anxious because of the assignment of the bonus.
42. I was envious because of the assignment of the bonus.
43. I was irritated because of the assignment of the bonus.
44. I was jealous because of the assignment of the bonus.
45. I was surprised because of the assignment of the bonus.
46. I felt contempt because of the assignment of the bonus.
47. I felt fear because of the assignment of the bonus.
48. I felt shame because of the assignment of the bonus.
The following 14 items have been added to the questionnaire for Experiment 2.
Six items created ad hoc to measure participant’s expectation of hostile feelings.
49. I think that after participant X found out the allocation of the bonus she/he
felt anger against me.
50. I think that after participant X found out the allocation of the bonus she/he
felt hostile feelings against me.
51. I think that after participant X found out the allocation of the bonus she/he
hated me.
52. I think that after participant X found out the allocation of the bonus she/he
disliked me.
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53. I think that after participant X found out the allocation of the bonus she/he
felt in low spirits.
54. I think that after participant X found out the allocation of the bonus she/he
felt that she/he lacked energy.
Two items created ad hoc to be added to the objective injustice beliefs items.
55. An objective judge would agree that I did not deserve the bonus.
56. Anyone would agree that my advantage was unfairly obtained.
Two items created ad hoc to be added to the ‘Warmth and Competence Model’ items.
57. I think my success to Task 1 (the task in which I counted the number of ones)
is due to luck.
58. I think my success to Task 1 (the task in which I counted the number of ones)
is due to skill.
Two items created ad hoc to be added to the subjective injustice beliefs items.
59. The allocation rule of the bonus was fair.
60. I believe that participant X thinks that the allocation rule of the bonus was fair.
One item created ad hoc to measure participant’s expectation of investment.
61. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I thought that participant X would
have chosen a high Number A.
One item created ad hoc to measure participant’s expectation of sabotage.
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62. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I thought that participant X would
have chosen a high Number B.
Two items created ad hoc to measure participant’s response to the bonus allocation.
63. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I have chosen a high Number A.
64. After I found out the allocation of the bonus I have chosen a high Number B.
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C.4 Task 6 - Results of the Questionnaire
For Experiment 1 the questionnaire consists of 48 items10.
For the data analysis we have divided our observations into four groups (per each
experiment):
1. High Type participants that received the bonus;
2. High Type participants that have not received the bonus;
3. Low Type participants that have received the bonus;
4. Low Type participants that have not received the bonus.
Per each group (and per each experiment) we carry out a principal component
analysis, a technique for identifying groups or clusters of variables able to give
as much information as possible on an underlying variable. In our case we aim
at understanding the (group of) reasons and motivations that guided participants
towards their decisions of investment and sabotage in the tournament game.
We grouped the items of the questionnaire. In Experiment 1 we have 19 variables, 7
of them are groups of items11 while 12 of them are represented by only one item.
Here our variables for Experiment 1:
1 Episodic Envy: (items 1-9);
2 Warmth towards the other and competence: items 10-14;
3 Competitive feelings toward the other: items 15-17 and item 36;
4 Subjective injustice beliefs: items 18-22;
5 Inferior beliefs: items 23-25;
6 Hostile and depressive feelings: items 26-32;
10We have added 14 items to the questionnaire for Experiment 2.
11We calculate the average of the participant’s answers to the items that belongs to a group.
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7 Objective injustice: items 33-35;
8 Happiness: item 37;
9 Anger: item 38;
10 Joy: item 39;
11 Sadness: item 40;
12 Anxiety: item 41;
13 Envy: item 42;
14 Irritation: item 43;
15 Jealousy: item 44;
16 Surprise: item 45;
17 Contempt: item 46;
18 Fear: item 47;
19 Shame: item 48;
For High Type participants that have received the bonus we retain only factors
whose eigenvalue is equal or greater than one according to the Kaiser criterion.
Hence we retain five factors. By the way the first three factors explain more the
half of the total variance (the first factor explains the 39% of the variance, the
second one the 13% and the third one the 10%). For the first factor anger and
sadness have nearly the same weight followed by envy, jealousy and fear. Factor
2 is defined by beliefs of subjective and objective injustice (variable 4 and 7), and
anxiety. Happiness and joy define Factor 3.
For High Type participants that have not received the bonus we retain 6 factors
but only 3 of them combined explain nearly the half of the total variance (49%)
with the same proportion. Sadness and surprise have the highest weight together
226
with episodic envy and anger in Factor 1. The variables that define Factor 2 are
contempt, irritation and subjective injustice beliefs, while we have inferior beliefs,
joy and happiness for Factor 3.
The factor that we retain in the principal component analysis carried out for Low
Type participants that have received the bonus are five but already the first two
can explain the 50% of the total variance. Factor 1 is defined mostly by irritation,
episodic envy and hostile feelings while the variables with the highest weights for
Factor 2 are fear and objective injustice beliefs. For Low Type participants that
have not received the bonus the variables with the highest weights overall are joy,
jealousy and subjective injustice beliefs which define Factor 1, Factor 2, and Factor
3 respectively. These three factors explain the 53% of the total variance.
We discuss now the results of the principal component analysis performed for the
four groups of participants (indicated above) of Experiment 2. For this study we
have 23 variables, 9 of them are groups of items while 14 of them are represented
by only one item. Variables are identical to those used in Experiment 1 except for
the following: 1) we added two items to variable 2 (items 57 and 58); 2) we added
two items to variable 4 (items 59 and 60); and 3) we added two items to variable 7
(items 55 and 56). Finally, we have four more variables compared to Study I:
20 Expectation of other’s hostile feelings: items 49-54;
21 Expectation of investment: item 61;
22 Expectation of sabotage: item 62;
23 Response to the bonus allocation: items 63-64;
We consider three factors in the principal component analysis for High Type partic-
ipants that have received the bonus. They explain the 53% of the total variance.
We observe a high weight of jealousy, irritation and hostile feelings for Factor
1. Competitive feelings towards the other and shame are significant variables for
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Factor 2 and finally we notice that expectations of investment and sabotage de-
fine Factor 3. For High Type participants that have not received the bonus we
retain two factors only that evenly explain the 52% of the total variance. The first
group of variables (Factor 1) refers to emotions of sadness and irritation, and sub-
jective and objective injustice beliefs, while inferior beliefs and shame define Factor 2.
Seven factor have eigenvalues equal or higher than one in the principal component
analysis for Low Type participants that have received the bonus and the first three
of them explain the 55% of the total variance. Three variables have even weight
in defining Factor 1: episodic envy, envy, and irritation. Variables in Factor 2
clearly refers to expectations of sabotage and investment while the group of items
of objective injustice beliefs have the highest weight for Factor 3.
Two factors finally seems to explain most of the total variance (48%) in the analysis
for Low Type participants that have not received the bonus. The first consists of
episodic envy, jealousy, hostile feelings and subjective injustice beliefs, while for the
second factor significant variables anxiety, fear and high expectation of investment.
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C.5 Task 7: “Sabotaging the Experimenter” Task
In this task subjects read on their screens that the experimenter is responsible for
the decision about the allocation rule of the bonus. Moreover, they are told that
the experimenter had an extra pot of money for future research, and that they are
given the opportunity either to take up to two pounds from the experimenter’s
pot or to contribute up to two pounds to the experimenter’s pot12. Amounts of
money are expressed in 2 decimal places. If the subject decides to contribute to the
experimenter’s pot, the amount of money indicated by the subject is deducted by
the her/his final earnings. If the subject decides to take from the experimenter’s pot,
the amount of money indicated by the subject is added to her/his final earnings.
Figure C.1 shows a screen shot of the task.
Figure C.1: Task 7. Sabotaging the experimenter
We introduce this task in our experiment because we understand the possibility that
participants might have hostile feelings towards the experimenter who decided the
12Subjects can also choose to neither take from or to contribute to the experimenter’s pot.
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allocation rule to be applied in each experimental session. Because of the explorative
nature of this task we do not make any predictions on the direction of the effects of
this information on individuals’ behaviour in this task.
We will refer to the variable “Contribution”, which can take any value up to two
decimal places from 0 to + 2, when the subject contributes to the experimenter’s pot.
Negative values up to - 2 indicate that participants take from the experimenter’s pot;
we call this decision “Sabotage”. We pooled data of Experiment 1 and Experiment
2.
Overall, 18% of participants decided to contribute to the experimenter’s pot of
money. 76% took from the experimenter’s pot. On average, participants contributed
1.26 to and took 1.78 from the experimenter’ pot. Table C.1 shows the average
contribution and sabotage by treatment and by type. In Experiment 1, High Type
participants sabotage the experimenter more than Low Type participants when a
bonus is allocated according to a meritocracy or anti-meritocracy rule. In Experiment
2, on average participants that did not receive the bonus (Low Type in the Meritoc-
racy and High Type in the Anti-Meritocracy) took more from the experimenter’s pot.
Table C.1: Contributing to and Sabotaging the Experimenter - Average values
Contribution Sabotage
High Type Low Type High Type Low Type
Experiment 1
Random Allocation 1 0 1.33 -1.92 -2
Meritocracy 0 0.91 -1.8 -1.42
Anti-Meritocracy 2 0.5 -1.91 -1.57
Random Allocation 2 1.67 1.49 -1.56 -1.71
Experiment 2
Meritocracy 2 0.89 -1.82 -1.96
Anti-Meritocracy 1.41 1.01 -1.86 -1.54
35% of participants that decided to contribute to the experimenter’s pot contributed
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£2 and 74% of participants that decided to take from the experimenter’s pot took
£2. Since data are censored we apply a Tobit regression model in our regression
analysis to investigate the effects of a group of explanatory variables on individual
decisions to contribute to or to take from the experimenter’s research pot. Table C.2
shows the estimates of Model 13-14 for contribution and Model 15-16 for sabotage
decisions. We include in the models participants’ type (Low Type = 1 if the subject
belongs to the Low Type subgroup), a bonus dummy (Bonus = 1 if the subject
has received the bonus), the score of risk aversion, the social desirability score,
treatment dummies, an interaction term between participants’ type and bonus, and
some demographic information.
Table C.2: Tobit Estimates on Subjects’ Contribution and Sabotage
Contribution Contribution Sabotage Sabotage
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Low Type -0.347 -0.150 -0.356 -0.406
Meritocracy 0.086 0.204 0.944** 0.947**
Anti-Meritocracy 0.110 0.411 0.299 0.372
Random Allocation 2 0.2796 0.611* 0.726* 0.712*
Bonus 1.042 1.077** -0.261 -0.262
Risk Aversion -0.107 -0.041 -0.030 -0.028
Social Desirability Score 0.111* 0.058 0.062 0.048
Low Type x Bonus -1.222 -0.822 0.856 0.867
Male 0.483* -0.152
Age 0.198*** 0.004
British Nationality 0.682* -0.282
School of ECO 0.356 -0.224
Constant 0.907 -4.192*** -3.346*** -3.072**
sigma
Constant 0.696*** 0.457*** 1.165*** 1.150***
Observations 30 30 126 126
Left-censored observations 0 0 93 93
Right-censored observations 11 11 0 0
Likelihood ratio test (LR) 15.44* 34.66*** 10.19 11.53
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
There is evidence that in the Meritocracy treatment and in the Random Allocation
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2 treatments participants were more likely to take from the experimenter’s pot than
in the Random Allocation 1 treatment. Individuals’ social desirability level and
demographic variables are significant only for contribution decisions (Model 13-16).
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C.6 The Guessing Stage
YOUR GUESSES
Before choosing your Numbers A and B you will be asked to make TWO guesses,
one on participant X’s choice of Number A and the other on participant X’s choice
of Number B.
At the end of the experiment the computer will select ONE of your guesses at
random. The Experimental Points you have earned for that guess will be converted
into pounds at the rate of 2 pence for each point.
Your guess on participant X’s Number A
You will see the following sentence on the screen: ”Please guess participant X’s
choice of Number A”.
You will be asked to make a guess of the Number A, from 0 to 100, that participant
X has chosen.
You can make the higher earnings by choosing your best guess. If your guess turns to
be exactly right, you will earn 200 Experimental Points. If not, for every percentage
point your guess is ’out’, a deduction of 20 points is made from the 200 Experimental
Points. But you cannot lose more than 200 Experimental Points.
Example 1
Suppose your guess of participant X’s choice of Number A is 50. Suppose partici-
pant X’s choice of Number A is 50. In this case you will earn 200 Experimental Points.
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Table C.3: Your guess and your earnings in Experimental Points
If your guess is You will earn
exactly right 200
1% out 200 - 20 = 180
2% out 200 - (20x2) = 160
3% out 200 - (20x3) = 140
4% out 200 - (20x4) = 120
5% out 200 - (20x5) = 100
6% out 200 - (20x6) = 80
7% out 200 - (20x7) = 60
8% out 200 - (20x8) = 40
9% out 200 - (20x9) = 20
10% out 200 - (20x10) = 0
More than 10% out 0
Example 2
Suppose your guess of participant X’s choice of Number A is 50. Suppose participant
X’s choice of Number A is 53. In this case you will earn (200 - 20 x (53-50)) = (200
- (20 x 3)) = 140 Experimental Points.
Example 3
Suppose your guess of participant X’s choice of Number A is 50. Suppose participant
X’s choice of Number A is 15. In this case you will earn 0 Experimental Points.
Your guess on participant X’s Number B
You will see the following sentence on the screen: “Please guess participant X’s
choice of Number B”.
You will be asked to make a guess of the number B, from 0 to 50, that participant
X has chosen.
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You can make the higher earnings by choosing your best guess. If your guess turns
to be exactly right, you will earn 200 Experimental Points. If not, for every point
your guess is ’out’, a deduction of 40 Experimental Points is made from the 200
Experimental Points. But you cannot lose more than 200 Experimental Points.
Table C.4: Your guess and your earnings in Experimental Points
If your guess is You will earn
exactly right 200
1 point out 200 - 40 = 160
2 point out 200 - (40x2) = 120
3 point out 200 - (40x3) = 80
4 point out 200 - (40x4) = 40
5 point out 200 - (40x5) = 0
More than 5 point out 0
Example 1
Suppose your guess of participant X’s choice of Number B is 25. Suppose partici-
pant Xs’ choice of Number B is 25. In this case you will earn 200 Experimental Points.
Example 2
Suppose your guess of participant X’s choice of Number B is 25. Suppose participant
X’s choice of Number B is 23. In this case you will earn (200 - 40 x (25-23)) = (200
- (40 x 2)) = 120 Experimental Points.
Example 3
Suppose your guess of participant X’s choice of Number B is 25. Suppose participant
X’s choice of Number B is 40. In this case you will earn 0 Experimental Points.
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C.7 Tables and Figures
Table C.5: Descriptive Statistics of Investment by Type - Experiment 1
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
High Type 48 32.791 27.517 0 88
Overall
Low Type 48 33.625 28.196 0 90
High Type 13 28 33.687 0 88
Baseline
Low Type 13 22.153 23.744 0 65
High Type 11 24.818 25.922 0 70
Treatment A
Low Type 11 49.363 30.220 0 90
High Type 12 37.916 26.314 0 76
Treatment B
Low Type 12 33.333 28.750 0 80
High Type 12 40.166 22.702 0 77
Treatment C
Low Type 12 28.916 26.262 0 62
Table C.6: Descriptive Statistics of Sabotage by Type - Experiment 1
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
High Type 36 10.972 13.028 0 50
Overall
Low Type 36 14.416 14.422 0 50
High Type 13 8.461 12.971 0 36
Baseline
Low Type 13 13.846 15.186 0 40
High Type 11 12.909 15.584 0 50
Treatment A
Low Type 11 10.636 12.339 0 36
High Type 12 11.916 11.114 0 30
Treatment B
Low Type 12 18.5 15.459 0 50
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Table C.7: Bivariate Tobit Estimates on Investment and Sabotage with Demographic
Variables
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Investment
Low Type -12.482 -11.276 -17.605
Meritocracy 36.133*** 33.527*** 34.496***
Anti-Meritocracy 24.746* 24.343** 25.297**
Bonus -38.902** -33.921** -34.821**
Risk Aversion -6.574*** -5.977*** -6.364***
Low Type x Bonus 37.255 31.703 32.686
Male 3.562 4.841 4.398
Age 0.270 0.470 0.486
British Nationality -10.765 -8.262 -6.625
School of ECO -18.697** -16.073* -17.240**
Exp. Inv. 0.357*** 0.208
Exp. Sab. -0.034 0.194
Low Type x Exp. Sab. -0.253
Low Type x Exp. Inv. 0.238
Constant 65.014** 37.774 41.672
Sabotage
Low Type -10.423 -10.920 -30.277**
Meritocracy 15.349* 16.804* 19.142**
Anti-Meritocracy 10.195 10.792 11.804*
Bonus -11.871 -13.813 -15.768
Risk Aversion -3.689*** -3.647*** -4.093***
Low Type x Bonus 28.724 28.224 30.050*
Male 5.601 4.068 3.496
Age -0.090 -0.448 -0.478
British Nationality -0.543 -0.977 0.138
School of ECO -6.638 -8.102 -8.074
Exp. Inv. -0.130 -0.284**
Exp. Sab. 0.354** 0.368
Low Type x Exp. Sab. 0.101
Low Type x Exp. Inv. 0.319*
Constant 26.466* 34.368** 44.284***
sigma1
Constant 30.118*** 27.392*** 27.331***
sigma2
Constant 17.569*** 16.892*** 15.860***
rho
Constant 0.936*** 1.225*** 1.192***
Observations 71 71 71
Wald test 27.51** 40.73*** 41.66***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.8: Bivariate Tobit Estimates on Investment and Sabotage with Social
Desirability Measure
Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
Investment
Low Type 6.472 -14.276 -14.121
Meritocracy 24.609** 37.684*** 39.405*
Anti-Meritocracy 29.154*** 20.628* 16.889
Bonus -17.056** -39.006** -41.897*
Risk Aversion -7.061*** -6.354*** -6.295***
Social Desirability Score -0.288 -0.099 -0.068
Low Type x Bonus 42.714 41.001
Low Type x Anti-Meritocracy 7.233
Low Type x Meritocracy -5.424
Constant 57.955*** 60.294*** 61.996***
Sabotage
Low Type 3.296 -12.184 2.114
Meritocracy 5.554 15.945* 92.272
Anti-Meritocracy 15.713*** 10.172 13.335
Bonus 4.265 -11.854 -82.076
Risk Aversion -4.628*** -4.256*** -4.411***
Social Desirability Score -1.893** -1.821** -2.123**
Low Type x Bonus 31.542* 91.334
Low Type x Anti-Meritocracy -5.803
Low Type x Meritocracy -93.624
Constant 40.260*** 42.865*** 44.594***
sigma1
Constant 31.612*** 31.232*** 31.013***
sigma2
Constant 17.993*** 17.701*** 16.996***
rho
Constant 1.106*** 1.044*** 1.057***
Observations 71 71 71
Wald test 19.96** 21.50** 21.53**
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.10: Descriptive Statistics of Investment by Treatments - Experiment 2
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Treatment A2 36 39.5 25.905 0 100
Treatment B2 36 41.083 30.152 0 100
Table C.11: Descriptive Statistics of Investment by Type - Experiment 2
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
High Type 36 30.666 23.099 0 90
Overall
Low Type 36 49.916 29.281 0 100
High Type 18 31.388 19.189 0 65
Treatment A2
Low Type 18 47.611 29.565 10 100
High Type 18 29.944 27.004 0 90
Treatment B2
Low Type 18 52.222 29.661 0 100
Table C.12: Descriptive Statistics of Sabotage by Treatments - Experiment 2
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Treatment A2 36 18.139 12.613 0 50
Treatment B2 36 15.944 12.954 0 40
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Table C.13: Descriptive Statistics of Sabotage by Types - Experiment 2
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
High Type 36 14.111 10.208 0 35
Overall
Low Type 36 19.972 14.405 0 50
High Type 18 15.5 7.920 0 30
Treatment A2
Low Type 18 20.777 15.813 0 50
High Type 18 12.722 12.154 0 35
Treatment B2
Low Type 18 19.166 13.258 0 40
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Table C.14: Bivariate Tobit Estimates on Investment and Sabotage with Demo-
graphic Variables - Experiment 2
Model 19 Model 20 Model 21
Investment
Low Type 20.811*** 16.722*** -23.036
Anti-Meritocracy -3.449 -0.760 -1.403
Bonus 5.737 8.195 10.166*
Risk Aversion -2.742 -1.287 -0.474
Male 8.011 5.402 1.266
Age -2.583 -2.993** -2.628*
British Nationality -8.299 -10.123 -5.183
School of ECO 1.563 4.548 6.949
Exp. Inv. 0.742*** 0.572**
Exp. Sab. 0.013 -0.532
Low Type x Exp. Sab. 0.971*
Low Type x Exp. Inv. 0.371
Constant 97.868** 62.254* 67.718**
Sabotage
Low Type 5.697 3.398 -12.060
Anti-Meritocracy -4.208 -1.043 -3.138
Bonus 1.982 -0.880 1.352
Risk Aversion -0.212 -0.826 -0.367
Male -1.262 1.907 1.372
Age -0.413 -0.969 -1.063*
British Nationality -6.073 -8.644** -7.702**
School of ECO 1.479 3.648 3.905
Exp. Inv. -0.022 0.088
Exp. Sab. 0.741*** 0.163
Low Type x Exp. Sab. 0.994***
Low Type x Exp. Inv. -0.129
Constant 25.670 26.185 32.552**
sigma1
Constant 28.407*** 23.971*** 22.482***
sigma2
Constant 14.421*** 11.439*** 9.988***
rho
Constant 1.180*** 1.701*** 1.623***
Observations 71 71 71
Wald test 15.91** 60.17*** 62.96***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
‘Exp. Inv.’ = Expectation of Investment;
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